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This study is a conceptual project which explores ways in which U. S. black 
epistemologies can provide new understandings of oppression and new strategies for 
transcending hierarchical relationships of power and domination. Specific epistemologies 
developed by enslaved Africans in the U. S. and their descendents have enabled U. S. 
black Americans to navigate the paradoxes and contradictions of living under conditions 
of oppression in a society founded on freedom and equality. It is hypothesized that these    
U. S. black epistemologies, which make sense of and provide strategies for managing 
existential feelings of alienation, displacement, and despair that accompany experiences 
of oppression, can be useful for the majority of people in our society who, due to the 
postmodern condition, are now experiencing similar existential feelings. 
The U. S. black epistemology chosen for this exploration is black theology. It is 
believed that this discipline’s struggles to deal with issues of oppression, within-group 
heterogeneity, the complex role of Christianity in black liberation, and issues of 
appropriation and authenticity provide a microcosm of issues facing black Americans in 
the U. S. The context and history of the development of black theology is provided 
followed by a deconstructive analysis of contemporary black theological discourse. 
Finally, a re-articulated black theology is constructed out of libratory black theological 
discourse, the Korean concept of Han (i.e. the psychological woundedness of victims of 
oppression), feminist theology, and selective, critical appropriations of prevailing theories 
 
 
of power and knowledge. This project ends with a discussion of the pedagogical nature of 
the present study. Ways in which this re-articulated black theological vision connects 
with critical pedagogy and social justice are explicated. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
Increasing attention is now being paid to postmodern understandings of truth. 
Along with these understandings comes recognition that rigid conceptualizations of 
oppression inadequately capture the often complicated ways individuals can participate in 
and also be penalized by systems of domination. Recognition that individuals are, to 
varying degrees, complicit in the systems of power that influence their lives also 
increases the difficulty of identifying genuinely oppressed groups and subsequently 
makes it much more difficult to outline plans of action for transcending systematic 
oppression. In spite of these acknowledged difficulties, the purpose of this project is to 
articulate a thought experiment1 about possibilities for transcending systems of 
oppression through the use of various forms of subjugated and oppositional knowledge.2  
My understanding of oppression and strategies for transcending it are derived 
from my lived experiences of navigating multiple and competing identities of privilege 
and marginalization. In order to make transparent the positionality from which I initiate 
this project, I feel it necessary to situate myself within my work. As a highly educated   
U. S. black woman who believes in God, there is a constant navigation of paradoxes that 
informs my subjectivity and frames my understanding of the world. As a black American 
living in the U. S., I embody the glaring contradictions of a society founded ideologically 
                                               
1 I am borrowing the phrase utilized by Sallie McFague (1982) in her book Metaphorical Theology. 
 
2 Here, I am using Patricia Hill Collins’ (2000) concept of subjugated knowledge which differs from the 
concept suggested by Foucault in that it is comprised of fully developed, rather than naïve knowledge 
forms. I also utilize Collins’ (2000) concept of oppositional knowledge, understood as a specific type of 
subjugated knowledge that is aimed at resisting oppression. 
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on notions of freedom and equality yet made economically prosperous through the forced 
labor of enslaved Africans. As one who identifies (albeit tenuously) with the Christian 
faith, my awareness of the historical uses of Christianity as a tool of oppression for black 
people leaves me doubtful of its liberating potential. Yet, own experiences of degrees of 
liberation within black Christian churches and my respect for the majority of black 
Americans who claim the Christian faith as liberating (Cone, 1975; Wimbush, 1991, 
1993), make me reluctant to completely denounce Christianity. Finally, I embody the 
contradictions of one who identifies with the masses of oppressed U. S. black Americans, 
yet whose education in predominantly white institutions of higher learning serves as a 
potential site for the indoctrination of Eurocentric values and practices (Shujaa, 1994) 
that have historically been used to keep the masses of black Americans (as well as other 
marginalized groups) oppressed. I live the daily tensions, manifested through each of 
these instances, of being an outsider within (Collins, 2000) these various sites of power. 
While tensions necessarily exist between these identities, they make me who I am. 
My struggles against oppression are waged within the intersections of these competing 
identities. Theologian Renee’ Hill (1999) highlights the tensions and contradictions of 
embodying multiple and competing identities involved in resisting oppression when she 
writes: “I live at the intersection of many rebellions, resistances, and struggles for 
liberation . . . My life is lived fully only in the intersections, in-between places, and 
borderlands of identities” (p. 138). It is these ‘borderlands of identity,’ these places of 
being an outsider-within, that inform my understandings of oppression.  
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I realize, however, that being an outsider within various locations of power 
renders me susceptible to internalizing the same oppressive themes and practices that I 
seek to dismantle. I am therefore, always mindful of Audre Lorde’s (1984) statement:     
“. . . the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us 
temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about 
genuine change” (p. 112). 
My goal is to explore the conceptual possibilities for re-envisioning 
understandings of oppression that will dismantle hierarchical relationships of domination 
and bring about social justice. Yet the conceptual tools that I have at my disposal are, 
arguably, tools of oppression. I cannot ignore the historical contribution of Eurocentric 
and academic ways of knowing (i.e. the master’s tools) to the diminishment, perceived 
inferiority (Ramsey, 1996; West, 1982), and oppression (Shujaa, 1994) of others, 
especially members of marginalized groups. Yet, my education in predominantly white 
institutions has provided me with ways of knowing that help me to think about and 
articulate my oppression in ways that I was previously unable to. One goal of this thought 
project is then, to explore possibilities of refuting Lorde’s (1984) statement. At question 
is whether Eurocentric, patriarchal, and oppressive conceptual tools can be selectively 
appropriated in ways that are empowering and libratory or whether the very utilization of 
such tools carries inescapable traces of domination.  
Admittedly, it seems the height of arrogance to attempt a thought project of social 
justice given the limitations I have articulated. Such authorial positionality is inescapable, 
and yet my concern for issues of social justice necessitates that I articulate my truths 
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despite my subjectivity. The following passage by James Cone frames this dilemma 
brilliantly. He writes: 
 
There is no place we can stand that will remove us from the limitations of history 
and thus enable us to tell the whole truth without risk of ideological distortion. As 
long as we live and have our being in time and space, absolute truth is impossible. 
But this concession is not an affirmation of unrestricted relativity. We can and 
must say something about the world that is not reducible to our own subjectivity. 
(Cone, 1975, p. 102) 
 
 
While this project represents a personal effort to come to terms with those in-
between places of identity—those simultaneous places of oppression and liberation—it is 
at the same time a social justice project that seeks to determine whether those in-between 
places of identity can foster social transformation. My task is then, to say something 
about our global world that honors and at the same time transcends my subjectivity—to 
speak the truths I believe about oppression in ways that are suggestive of liberation for all 
marginalized groups and for those participating in the oppression of others.  
I was inspired to initiate this thought experiment after reading Patricia Hill 
Collins’ (2000) Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment. In that book, Collins argues that U. S. black women’s simultaneous 
experiences of racial and gender oppression provide a unique vantage point from which 
to understand and resist oppression. Collins further argues that U. S. black women’s 
epistemologies can engage in dialogue with other subjugated ways of knowing to realize 
social justice for everyone. I discovered in Collins’ work possibilities for utilizing my 
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own outsider-within identities to understand and transcend systems of oppression through 
dialogue with other outsider-within groups. 
While Collins’ analysis focused on the subjugated and oppositional knowledge of 
U. S. black women, my focus is on the subjugated and oppositional knowledge of U. S. 
black people, in general, whose historical experiences of displacement, radical otherness, 
and despair can provide the masses now suffering the effects of the postmodern 
condition3 (hooks, 1993a; West, 1993b) with strategies for resistance. 
A study of the entirety of black thought would be prohibitive. Instead, this project 
focuses on a particular form of black religious thought (i.e. black theology) for several 
reasons. First, because the majority of U. S. black Americans are Christian (Pinn, 2002), 
black religious thought, perhaps better than any other form of black thought, can capture 
the impulses and aspirations of most U. S. black people. Second, black theology—a 
specific type of black religious thought—is a public theology (Hopkins, 1999; Thomas, 
2004) which speaks to the relationship between God and black humanity in ways that are 
sensitive to the lived experiences of black Americans and those they share the world 
with. Finally, because black theology developed as an academic discipline, it embodies 
the tensions associated with several significant outsider-within locations: black 
theologians in Eurocentric institutions of higher education, black Christians within a 
                                               
3 West (1993b) argues that blacks in the U. S. have historically embodied postmodern themes of degraded 
otherness and marginality. hooks (1993) argues that the collective experience of black people, prior to the 
advent of postmodernism included displacement, profound alienation, and despair; she also argues that one 
result of postmodernism has been that many other groups now share with black people the loss of a sense of 
grounding, alienation, and despair that historically defined the black experience for many black people.  
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historically racist and patriarchal faith, and U. S. black Americans within a racist and 
patriarchal society. 
By navigating lived experiences of oppression within their religion, academic 
institutions, and society, I hypothesize that U. S. black American theologians are 
provided a unique vantage point from which to understand and resist oppression. Yet 
such a vantage point is partial (Collins, 2000) and susceptible to internalized oppression 
(Lorde, 1984). Therefore, the black theological discourse to be utilized for this project 
will be analyzed critically for libratory as well as oppressive content. The problem of 
oppression is bigger than anyone one discourse. This project, then, seeks to incorporate 
into those libratory themes of black theology, a broad range of subjugated knowledge 
derived from racial, theological, philosophical, feminist, and educational discourses in an 
attempt to articulate a more accurate understanding of oppression and of the pedagogical 
processes necessary to overcome it.  
 The purpose of Chapter I, then, is to outline the theoretical underpinnings I have 
used to articulate my specific understandings of the world, of power, oppression, and 
resistance. Chapter II is an attempt to begin at the beginning, with an abbreviated history 
of the socio-historical context within which black theology developed. Chapter III 
analyzes contemporary black theological articulations for their libratory content. Chapter 
IV is an exercise in fragments—an attempt to liberate from their oppressive meta-
narratives, those themes of black theological discourse that are found to be relevant and 
useful for this project. Chapter IV concludes with suggestions for a re-articulated vision 
of black theology based on various black theological, philosophical, and feminist 
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fragments. The final chapter of this book situates the libratory black theological discourse 
of this project within an explicitly educational framework; correspondence between the 
theological discourse utilized in this project and the discourse of critical, libratory 
education will be emphasized.
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CHAPTER I 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Michel Foucault on Power/Knowledge 
 
Any project attempting to elucidate issues of power, knowledge, and resistance 
would be remiss if it failed to consider the contributions of French philosopher Michel 
Foucault to these understandings. Positioning his writings in response to the presumed 
universal and totalizing influence of the Enlightenment on modernity, Foucault’s work 
has routinely been credited with articulating the particularity, situatedness, and 
fragmented characteristics of the postmodern condition (Hartsock, 1990; Natoli & 
Hutcheon, 1993; West, 1993b). 
 Foucault explored changes in practices, ways of knowing, and institutions that 
were the impetus for the construction of modern European society (Armstrong, 2006). He 
problematized relationships between knowledge, structures of power, and resistance to 
power in his historical analyses of prisons, mental institutions and sexuality, which 
critiqued political and epistemological foundations and notions of the sovereign subject 
(Gutting, 2005; Hopkins, 1997; Rouse, 2005). Foucault’s writings are routinely organized 
as early, middle, and later periods, ranging from the 1965 publication of Madness and 
Civilization to the 1988 The History of Sexuality, Volume 3 (Hopkins, 1997; Sawicki, 
2005).  
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Foucault’s subject matter was diverse; he examined the historical reconstructions 
of knowledge in scientific fields such as medicine and psychiatry, ways in which 
reconfigurations of knowledge make new forms of power and domination possible, as 
well as possibilities for subjectivity and freedom within systems of power (Hopkins, 
1997; Rouse, 2005). For the purposes of this chapter, Foucault’s explication of concepts 
of power, knowledge, and resistance will primarily be derived from his 1980 book 
Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977. Before proceeding 
to the discussion of Power/Knowledge, however, it is necessary to situate this text within 
the larger framework of Foucault’s work.4 
 In his writings about the history of knowledge in specific fields of science, 
Foucault focused on ‘historically situated fields of knowledge’ (Rouse, 2005) or 
discursive formations that regulated what information could be counted as truth. In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzed reconfigurations of discursive formations in 
modern society which through practices of various techniques of power (i.e. discipline, 
surveillance, and constraint), afforded the dominant group new possibilities of knowledge 
about human beings (e.g. changes in work environments that allowed individuals to be 
more easily managed, medical examinations and documentation to reveal and control 
human behavior) and new ways to expand control of humans into the social realm 
(Hopkins, 1997; Rouse, 2005).  
                                               
4 This chapter makes no attempt to create an overarching schema within which to understand Foucault’s 
work; it is recognized that Foucault, in rejection of the totalizing systems of modernity he sought to 
debunk, intended his works to be fragmentary and particular (Rouse, 2005). For ease of discussion, 
however, recurring themes between Foucault’s historical, archaeological works and his genealogical work 
on social relations of power will be addressed. 
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In pre-modern civilization, Foucault argued that centralized power was wielded 
by a sovereign authority through the use of violence and other forms of repression 
(Armstrong, 2006; Rouse, 2005). Emergent fields during modernity associated with 
population growth and care created new productive techniques of power (i.e. disciplinary 
and regulatory), new discursive formations that interacted with disciplinary and 
regulatory power to construct normative ways of knowing, and newly subjected 
individuals (Armstrong, 2006; Rouse, 2005; Sawicki, 2005). In this way, power became 
not just a top-down reality, but a reality which circulated throughout the social world and 
was simultaneously experienced within the body of the individual. Foucault writes: 
 
But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary 
form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, 
their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. (Foucault, 1980, p. 39) 
 
 
As opposed to coercive or destructive uses of power which merely represses the 
individual, disciplinary power is productive in its ability to construct new habits, new 
ways of knowing, and as mentioned earlier, new individuals (Foucault, 1980; Rouse, 
2005). Foucault speaks of the effects of these new technologies of power in the 
production of docile bodies below: 
 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it 
down and rearranges it…It defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, 
not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one 
wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. 
Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, “docile” bodies. 
(Foucault, as cited in Rouse, 2005, p. 98) 
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Along with these new technologies of power came ever-increasing abilities to 
gain knowledge about the individuals being disciplined, trained, placed under 
surveillance, or otherwise documented; increases in the mechanisms of power brought 
about concomitant increases in knowledge about the individuals through whom power 
circulated. These productive mechanisms of power—the ability of disciplinary power to 
subjugate individuals and construct their identities is significant. Of this complex 
manifestation of power, Foucault writes: 
 
. . . power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked 
only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the 
manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way. If, on the 
contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realize, it 
produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far 
from preventing knowledge, power produces it. (1980, p. 59) 
 
 
Hence, Foucault’s (1980) concept of power/knowledge, which suggests the positive co-
dependent relationship between knowledge and power, is expressed in the following 
passage: 
 
Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in 
dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just a 
way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be 
exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender 
power. (p. 52) 
 
 
 Although knowledge and power work together to extend control over individuals, 
power/knowledge can also be resisted. The exercise of disciplinary power is fluid and bi-
directional. Thus, the ‘docile’ bodies subjected to systems of power are also capable of 
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exercising power themselves. Discussing the productive aspects of disciplinary power 
which render individuals virtual power conduits, Foucault (1980) writes: 
 
In reality, power in its exercise goes much further, passes through much finer 
channels, and is much more ambiguous, since each individual has at his disposal a 
certain power, and for that very reason can also act as the vehicle for transmitting 
a wider power. (p. 72) 
 
 
The ability of individuals who experience power as domination to also 
wield power necessitates for Foucault, an advancement over traditional analyses 
of power that present power as a merely repressive force possessed by the 
dominant class (Armstrong, 2006). Foucault argues that binary understandings of 
dominant and subjugated groups distort the fluidity and shared nature of 
disciplinary power. For Foucault, the oppressor/oppressed binary is not a binary at 
all; below he describes relations of power that are shared by everyone in society. 
He writes: 
 
Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, 
never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a community or piece of wealth. 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only 
do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert 
or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other 
words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its point of application. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 98) 
 
 
Stated differently, Foucault understands power as a force that works through individuals, 
not as a weapon targeted at individuals. Thus, relations of power are dynamic and 
complex; individuals who experience themselves as subjugated through power relations 
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also are able to resist their subjugation through their own exercise of power. These 
relations of power legitimate specific forms of knowledge that simultaneously reproduce 
power while also creating spaces for its resistance (Sawicki, 2005). Foucault’s emphasis 
on the individual’s ability to resist disciplinary power is significant. He emphasizes the 
possibilities for resistance occurring at the level where power is experienced in the 
following passage:  
 
. . . there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more 
real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of 
power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to 
be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It 
exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, 
resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies. (Foucault, 1980, 
p. 142) 
 
 
That Foucault seems to suggest localized resistances to subjugation can be 
incorporated into global strategies appears promising for the current project. 
Additionally, Foucault’s theory of power is useful in conceptualizing the nuances of 
power relationships between dominant and subjugated groups whereby those who are 
subjugated are understood as having the agency to resist domination. Rather than simply 
explicating the means through which dominate groups gained power historically, 
Foucault’s analyses suggests the means through which subjugated groups can resist 
domination and exploitation. Yet the implications of Foucault’s analyses also are 
problematic for this project. In particular, Foucault’s refusal to epistemologically ground 
his analyses and his denial of a sovereign subject run counter to the libratory aims of this 
project and therefore ultimately limit the applicability of Foucault’s analyses for this 
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project. The limitations of Foucault’s work, relevant to this project, will now be 
discussed.  
For Foucault, the exercise of power allowed certain discursive formations to be 
legitimated as truth while other knowledge forms were marginalized or silenced. Thus 
Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge could also be reinterpreted as 
power/knowledge/truth, wherein understandings of what constitutes truth were merely 
manifestations of disciplinary or regulatory power. Relevant to the construction of truth 
through relations of power, Foucault (1980) writes: 
 
There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of 
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. 
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise 
power except through the production of truth. This is the case for every society     
. . . I would say that we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society 
demands, of which it has need, in order to function; we must speak the truth; we 
are constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the truth. Power never 
ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth; it institutionalizes, 
professionalizes and rewards its pursuit. (p. 93) 
 
 
Truth, therefore, is not external to relations of power. There is no standpoint 
outside of relations of power from which one can legitimate any given truth-claim over 
another. In fact, to attempt to invoke such a privileged epistemological stance (i.e. 
epistemological sovereignty) indicates an aspiration of power5—a desire to suppress 
                                               
5 According to Rouse (2005), Foucault’s analyses critiqued the notion of social contract expressed in 
Hobbes’ Leviathan and its legitimization of sovereign monarchal power; for the same reasons that Foucault 
rejected the notion of sovereign power, his intermingling of power and knowledge also necessitates a 
rejection of epistemological sovereignty. Stated differently, Foucault argued that both power and truth are 
historically situated within specific contexts of struggle and cannot transcend those particularized spaces of 
contestation; appeals to transcendent rights of power or knowledge are, according to Foucault, are simply 
disguised manifestations of power.  
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other truth-claims and their ‘knowing subjects’—that Foucault viewed as “one of the 
chief dangers confronting us” as a civilization (Rouse, 2005, p. 107). 
 In the following passage, Foucault (1980) makes clear his disbelief in the 
epistemological sovereignty of Truth. He states: 
 
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in 
power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, 
truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the 
privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of 
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131) 
 
 
Foucault’s coupling of power/knowledge precludes the possibility of liberating 
knowledge (i.e. knowledge capable of transcending systems of domination). Because 
knowledge and power reinforce one another, there is no possibility that increased, more 
critical, or ‘better’ knowledge can emancipate individuals from systems of power and 
contestation (Hartsock, 1990). Each individual, whether dominant or subjugated, is 
intractably implicated within systems of power. Discussing the inescapability of 
involvement in relations of power Foucault (1980) writes:  
 
It seems to me that power is ‘always already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it, 
that there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system to gambol in. But 
this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination 
or an absolute privilege on the side of the law. To say that one can never be 
‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no 
matter what. (p. 142) 
 
 
Here Foucault clearly allows for resistance to power, but such resistance can only 
expose and ameliorate systems of power—it cannot transcend systems of power 
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(Armstrong, 2006; Hartsock, 1990; Sawicki, 2005). Yet such a formulation begs the 
question of the utility of analyses which can expose relationships of domination, but fails 
to provide the means of escaping them. Foucault presents an analysis of individuals who 
are trapped in a perpetual cycle of contestation and resistance with no hope of escape. 
Foucault’s is a pessimistic view of humanity to say the least. Others have discussed the 
decidedly pessimistic nature of Foucault’s work in terms of the limited agency attributed 
to individuals within systems of domination 6and the lack of impetus for struggle against 
domination.7 
Although these critiques have been thoroughly explicated elsewhere (see 
footnotes six and seven), they will be presented again here in a slightly modified format 
to address issues of applicability between Foucault’s work on power/knowledge and the 
emancipatory goals of this project. The format of these critiques follows three questions: 
who is it that resists techniques of power, how do subjugated bodies resist disciplinary 
and regulatory powers, and why should subjugated bodies resist these mechanisms of 
power? 
Who Resists? 
For Foucault, the individual lacks an identity that exists prior to relations of 
power; social practices are understood and identities are constructed only within the 
context of discursive practices (Foucault, 1980). Foucault makes this point clear in the 
following passage:  
                                               
6 See for example Linda Alcoff’s (1990) “Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration.” 
 
7 See for example Charles Taylor’s (1986) Foucault on Freedom and Truth (pp. 69-102), in David C. 
Hoy’s (Ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader. 
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. . . it’s my hypothesis that the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized 
on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, 
is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, 
movements, desires, forces. (1980, p. 74) 
 
 
Referring to Foucault’s suggestion that there is no subjectivity outside of power relations, 
Hartsock (1990) questions possibilities of resisting disciplinary power when these 
mechanisms reach into the capillaries of individual bodies and create the individual’s 
sense of self. Given such a scenario she rightfully asks who it is that does the resisting 
(Hartsock, 1990). 
Foucault presents disciplinary power as ubiquitous (Armstrong, 2006). It 
circulates through the body and the mind producing an altered psychological state which 
creates specific types of internalized regulation and self-awareness (Rouse, 2005). 
Through disciplinary power, individuals are ‘normalized’ into categories (i.e. sane or 
insane, criminal or citizen, heterosexual or homosexual, etc.) that limit their range of 
subjective possibilities and influence their behaviors in ways that facilitate self-regulation 
(Armstrong, 2006; Sawicki, 2005). Thus, in Foucault’s analysis, individuals are 
reconstructed as docile objects of power—individuals whose identities don’t exist outside 
the relations of power through which they are constructed (Armstrong, 2006; Hartsock, 
1990; Sawicki, 2005). Foucault (1980) writes: 
 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive 
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against 
which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, 
it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain 
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted 
as individuals. The individual, that is, not a vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one 
of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or 
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precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. 
The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle. (1980, 
p. 98) (emphasis mine) 
 
 
Clearly, subjectivity is created within relations of power. Thus, Hartsock’s 
question of who it is that actually resists techniques of power is significant. Foucault had 
very specific reasons for developing his analysis without the presupposition of a 
transcendent subject (Rouse, 2005). His critique of modernity did not require a 
foundational subject to be legitimate (Rouse, 2005; Sawicki, 2005), but suspicion 
surrounding his lack of an a priori subject seems warranted for oppressed groups in 
particular. As self-identified members of marginalized groups have noted, it is indeed 
suspicious that while many subjugated groups are now finding their voices and asserting 
their subjectivity, the postmodern enterprise of problematizing subjectivity continually 
gains ground (hooks, 1993a; Hartsock, 1990; West, 1993b). Nancy Hartsock clarifies this 
issue in the following passage: 
 
Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at the precise moment when so 
many groups have been engaged in “nationalisms” which involve redefinitions of 
the marginalized Others that suspicions emerge about the nature of the “subject,” 
about the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about 
historical “progress.” Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who 
have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects 
rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 
problematic? Just when we are forming our own theories about the world, 
uncertainty emerges about whether the world can be theorized. Just when we are 
talking about the changes we want, ideas of progress and the possibility of 
systematically and rationally organizing human society become dubious and 
suspect. (1990, p. 164) 
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Regardless of Foucault’s reasons or legitimacy in critiquing notions of a 
foundational subject who exists outside relations of power, this project—which seeks to 
articulate an essential humanness that is diminished but not destroyed through relations of 
domination—requires conceptualization of individual subjectivity capable of 
transcending systems of domination. For that to occur, a foundational subject is 
necessary. 
How Does Resistance to Relations of Power Occur? 
 
Although Foucault contends that resistance to power is implicit in his analysis, 
critics have questioned the practicality of such resistance, given the inescapable influence 
of disciplinary power on individual thought and actions. In his later works, Foucault 
addresses issues of autonomy and freedom within the constraints of systems of power 
(Armstrong, 2006). In doing so, he provides a fuller account of the processes through 
which individuals can resist subjugation. He called such exercises of freedom ‘ethics’; 
these acts consist of pursuing freedom through self-reconstruction—by utilizing skills 
and techniques gained through disciplinary powers in pursuit of self-transformation 
(Armstrong, 2006; Sawicki, 2005). Discussing the possibilities Foucault identified for 
autonomous identity construction (i.e. resistance) within systems of power Jana Sawicki 
writes: 
 
In so far as the disciplines have subjugated us by attaching us to specific 
identities, to specific notions of individuality, our autonomy is bound up with 
questionable mechanisms of social control. At the same time, if power is 
something that is exercised, and if we are capable of critical reflection upon the 
historical conditions that constitute us, we are also capable of distancing ourselves 
from ourselves, taking up and using the discourses, techniques, and practices that 
have constituted us in new ways. (2005, p. 388) 
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Arguably, forms of resistance and autonomy as described above represent a very 
limited range of freedom (Armstrong, 2006). Resistance as described in the above 
passage emerges within historically specific, contested spaces of identity and they serve 
to loosen constraining identities, not to transcend power relations (Armstrong, 2006; 
Hartsock, 1990; Sawicki, 2005). While such resistance could certainly make the lives of 
individuals engaging in these attempts at self-reconstruction more tolerable, it is unclear 
how such specific and fragmented forms of resistance can bring about systemic changes 
in relations of power; as such resistance strategies of this kind are ultimately insufficient 
for a liberation framework (Hartsock, 1990) such as the one espoused in this project. 
Why Resist? 
Returning to Foucault’s discussion of the effects of disciplinary power, the 
question of why individuals should resist relations of power becomes significant.  
Hartsock (1990) suggests that Foucault’s anti-foundationalist analysis presents power as 
neutral and consequently provides no convincing rationale for resisting power. Although 
his analysis clearly provided more nuanced understandings of the oppressor/oppressed 
relationship than is afforded through binary understandings of oppression and 
domination, Foucault goes so far in his analysis as to make power differentials virtually 
disappear (Hartsock, 1990). Because power is always circulating in Foucault’s analysis, it 
is difficult to locate domination; additionally, the imagery of a net that Foucault uses to 
describe power implies equality rather than domination in relations of power (Hartsock, 
1990). Power is everywhere in Foucault’s analysis and hence, for all practical purposes, 
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nowhere (Hartsock, 1990). If everyone participates in the network of power, why should 
power be resisted? 
Nancy Hartsock (1990) argues that another troubling aspect of Foucault’s 
power/knowledge formulation is that it could lead to blaming the victim for her or his 
own subjugation. Foucault emphasizes ways in which the micro-technologies of power 
operate from the bottom up; this ascending analytical format details ways in which the 
internalization of disciplinary and regulatory powers permit individuals to keep 
themselves within the norms of constricted identities that render them vehicles for their 
own social control. Referring to the effect of these techniques of power on the individual, 
Foucault writes: 
 
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others 
have to recognize in him. (Foucault, 1983, as cited in Sawicki, 2005, p. 5) 
 
 
Rather than control experienced from top-down, individuals internalizes these 
mechanisms and regulate themselves. Thus, actual experiences of oppression become 
blurred; because the individual shares in the network of power and consents to her or his 
subjugation, Foucault’s subjects seemingly become complicit in their own subjugation 
(Hartsock, 1990; Sawicki, 2005). Foucault (1980) clearly states that power influences 
individuals at the level of their desire; because subjected individuals desire their 
normalization, there is no compelling evidence why they should resist it. Would such 
resistance be tantamount to—as Jana Sawicki (2005) suggests—an internal contestation 
with oneself over more flexible yet still limited identities? In the absence of a 
15 
 
foundational subject in his analyses and without explicating the influence of power 
differentials in systems of domination, Foucault presents an understanding of power that 
blurs distinctions of who resists subjugation, how resistance can lead to emancipation 
from systems of domination, and consequently why these relations of power should be 
resisted.  
Because Foucault’s highly particularized analysis of relations of power is 
presented from the point of view of the dominant group8 (Hartsock, 1990; Hopkins, 
1997), his understanding of relationships of power is likely to differ significantly from a 
theory of power derived from one who self-identifies as a member of a subjugated group 
(Hartsock, 1990). For the purposes of this project, a more nuanced conceptualization of 
the relationship between power and knowledge that articulates possibilities of 
transcending systems of domination is required. 
Patricia Hill Collins and the Matrix of Domination 
In Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment (2000), Patricia Hill Collins posits a complex set of relationships between 
power, knowledge as self-definition, and resistance. Collins argues that structures of 
power are organized around a matrix of domination—the socio-historically specific 
organization of intersecting systems of oppression. Within the matrix of domination, 
specific social locations are formed by the intersection of different systems of oppression 
(e.g. race, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc.). Intersectionality, then, is 
                                               
8 Dwight Hopkins (1997) argues than although Foucault was marginalized due to his homosexuality, his 
familial wealth and elite education still positioned him as an individual with power as domination. 
Additionally, Hartsock (1990) argues that Foucault’s perspective may be understood as the ‘colonizer who 
refuses’ (p. 164) —one who exercises dominating power ambiguously. 
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Collins’ conceptualization of ways in which “. . . systems of race, social class, gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, nation, and age form mutually constructing features of social 
organization . . .” (p. 299). Different intersections of oppression produce different ways 
of knowing and consequently different understandings of reality. 
Also important for Collins’ analysis is the concept of suppressed knowledge, 
which she adapts from Foucault’s concept of subjugated knowledge. She argues that 
dominant groups systematically suppress the ideas of oppressed groups in order to 
maintain social inequalities. Yet such suppression is unstable; those conditions which 
foster oppression also provide impetus for resistance. Collins argues that U. S. black 
women, as a historically oppressed group, have derived ways of knowing that can foster 
liberation. For Collins, U. S. black women, through their ongoing experiences of racial 
and gender oppression, have a unique vantage point from which to derive libratory 
insights about oppression. She writes: 
 
Placing U.S. Black women’s experiences in the center of analysis without 
privileging those experiences shows how intersectional paradigms can be 
especially important for rethinking the particular matrix of domination that 
characterizes U.S. society. Claims that systems of race, social class, gender, and 
sexuality form mutually constructing features of social organization foster a basic 
rethinking of U.S. social institutions. (Collins, 2000, p. 228) 
 
 
Thus Collins’ analysis of power centers the experiences and ways of knowing of 
black women, which she argues, differ in important ways from Eurocentric, positivistic 
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modes of attaining knowledge.9 She articulates an understanding of resisting and 
transcending relations of power that is based on black feminist epistemology10—those 
suppressed ways of knowing that black women have developed in the historical context 
of surviving racial and gender oppression in the U. S. which critique prevailing systems 
of knowledge and encourage liberation (Collins, 2000). Through her analysis, Collins 
expands Foucault’s presentation of power/knowledge in ways that more adequately 
answer who resists, how resistance occurs, and why individuals should resist relations of 
power. A discussion of Collins book relevant to these three questions will conclude this 
chapter. 
Who Resists? 
 Collins, like Foucault, recognizes the differing levels of influence various 
domains of hierarchical power relations have on individual oppression. Collins argues 
that the matrix of domination is organized through structural (e.g. law, religion, 
economy), disciplinary (i.e. bureaucratic organization), hegemonic (i.e. cultural sphere), 
and interpersonal (i.e. personal relationships) domains of power. Unlike Foucault, 
however, whose description of the disciplinary techniques of power prevents the 
possibility of subjectivity outside relations of power, Collins’ concept of safe spaces 
allows possibilities for self-definition and subjectivity that are external to systems of 
domination. 
                                               
9 Collins (2000) argues that the rules of Eurocentric (scientific) thought include a separation between 
observer and subject, suppression of personal emotions, suspending personal ethics and values, and an 
methodology of knowledge validation achieved through adversarial debate. 
 
10 Collins (2000) argues that black feminist epistemology is based on four main criteria: lived experience as 
a criterion of knowledge, use of dialogue to assess truth, meaning-making developed through an ethic if 
care, and an ethic of personal accountability for knowledge claims. 
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 Safe spaces are those places where black women are free to articulate safe 
discourse that resists the oppressive images and ideology of the dominant group. Within 
these safe spaces (e.g. extended families, churches, community organizations, etc.) black 
women have historically been able to ‘construct independent self-definitions’ (Collins, 
2000, p. 101), nurture a collective black women’s consciousness, and become 
empowered.  
 Collins emphasis on black women’s safe spaces is significant. By articulating 
spaces where black women had relative control over the images of themselves prevalent 
in the wider society, Collins is at the same time contesting Foucault’s understanding of 
subjectivity as only existing within relations of power. Safe spaces elude disciplinary 
power; the subjectivity constructed within these safe spaces is therefore not constituted 
within the relations of power Foucault envisioned. Describing the threat safe spaces pose 
to dominant groups, Collins (2000) writes: 
 
One reason safe spaces are so threatening to those who feel excluded, and so 
routinely castigated by them, is that safe spaces are free of surveillance by more 
powerful groups. Such spaces simultaneously remove Black women from 
surveillance and foster the conditions for Black women’s independent self-
definitions. When institutionalized, these self-definitions become foundational to 
politicized Black feminist standpoints. (p. 113) 
 
 
By positing subjects that exist outside techniques of power, Collins provides a credible 
answer to who actually resists hierarchical systems of power.  
How Does Resistance Occur? 
 Of the four domains organizing the matrix of domination (i.e. structural, 
disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal), Collins recognizes that achieving resistance 
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and change within the first two domains is very difficult. The structural domain consists 
of large scale, inter-dependent social institutions that often utilize multiple forms of 
oppression to maintain the subordination of oppressed groups. While much of black 
women’s struggles to gain empowerment within the structural domain have concerned 
the attainment of full citizenship rights (i.e. right to health care, housing, education, and 
employment) change within this domain necessitates changes to the social institutions 
that marginalize black women. When such changes have occurred they have resulted 
from events that threaten social order—revolutions, wars, large-scale social movements, 
etc. As such, the structural domain is largely resistance to change. 
 Additionally, the disciplinary domain, which manages power relations, is also 
resistant to change because bureaucratic organizations simultaneously reproduce 
intersecting oppressions and conceal their effects. Collins utilizes Foucault’s 
understanding of disciplinary power as dedicated to disciplining and subjecting 
individuals to surveillance in order to control them. Collins argues that strategies for 
resistance within disciplinary domains must come from inside these systems, but that 
such strategies do not hold great promise for success. Discussing the limited success for 
black women’s resistance to disciplinary powers within academic settings Collins writes: 
 
Given the power of surveillance in the disciplinary domain, it is unrealistic to 
expect that any essentially radical Black feminist thought will emanate from 
within the academy, especially in times when marketplace ideologies have 
become so prominent . . . Market place ideologies increasingly affect all aspects 
of life, including actual people and ideas about people in outsider-within locations 
. . . If an organization perceives that it needs outsiders within, it buys them. (2000, 
p. 283) 
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Unlike structural and disciplinary domains of power, Collins argues that 
hegemonic and interpersonal domains are highly susceptible to human action. 
Furthermore, the inter-related nature of these domains suggests that changes to the 
hegemonic and interpersonal domains will ultimately result in changes to disciplinary and 
structural domains as well.  
The hegemonic domain concerns matters of ideology, culture, and consciousness; 
it justifies actions in the structural and disciplinary domains by maintaining common 
sense ideas that support dominant groups by receiving support for these ideas from 
subordinate groups. Thus for Collins, resistance in the hegemonic domain consists of 
developing consciousness as a sphere of freedom from which to theorize processes of 
social change. Collins (2000) writes: 
 
The significance of the hegemonic domain of power lies in its ability to shape 
consciousness via the manipulation of ideas, images, symbols, and ideologies. As 
Black women’s struggle for self-definition suggest, in contexts such as these 
where ideas matter, reclaiming the “power of a free mind” constitutes an 
important area of resistance. Reversing this process whereby intersecting 
oppressions harness various dimensions of individual subjectivity for their own 
ends becomes a central purpose of resistance. (p. 285) 
 
  
While important, reclaiming conscious spheres of mental freedom where critiques of 
hegemonic ideologies can be articulated represents for Collins, reactionary forms of 
resistance. She argues that the construction of new knowledge provides other important 
pro-active avenues for black women’s empowerment. 
 Collins views the interpersonal domain of power—manifested through the daily 
practices of human relationships—as a fruitful site for creating and disseminating new 
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knowledge about human relationships that empower black women as well as other 
marginalized groups. She argues that empowerment, based on knowledge gained through 
a black feminist epistemology, can inspire human agency against systems of domination 
and foster social justice. She writes: 
 
Black women’s empowerment involves revitalizing U.S. Black feminism as a 
social justice project organized around the dual goals of empowering African-
American women and fostering social justice in a transnational context. Black 
feminist thought’s emphasis on the ongoing interplay between Black women’s 
oppression and Black women’s activism presents the matrix of domination and its 
interrelated domains of power as responsive to human agency. Such thought 
views the world as a dynamic place where the goal is not merely to survive or to 
fit in or to cope; rather, it becomes a place where we feel ownership and 
accountability. The existence of Black feminist thought suggests that there is 
always choice, and power to act, no matter how bleak the situation may appear to 
be. Viewing the world as one in the making raises the issue of individual 
responsibility for bringing about change. It also shows that while individual 
empowerment is key, only collective action can effectively generate the lasting 
institutional transformation required for social justice. (Collins, 2000, p. 290) 
 
 
While Foucault discounts notions of foundational subjects whose actions can change 
history (Sawicki, 2005), the above passage from Collins posits that social change directly 
resulting from human action is possible. Although the structural and disciplinary domains 
of power are, in and of themselves, highly resistant to change, the relationships among all 
four domains (i.e. hegemonic domain links together structural, disciplinary, and 
interpersonal domains and the interpersonal domain constitutes transmission of 
hegemonic ideas into daily action) suggests that changes to the hegemonic and 
interpersonal domains will result in eventual transformation to all domains. Thus, 
Collins’ analysis presents a clear articulation of how resistance and change can occur in 
all four domains of power. 
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Why Resist? 
 By centering her analysis on the experiences of black women, Collins (2000) 
presents a clear argument for why black women should resist systems of power. Yet on 
surface, her analysis seems not to remedy the third major critique leveled at Foucault’s 
analysis of power/knowledge—that his circulating network of power blurs aspects of 
domination and subsequently makes it difficult to understand why individuals who are 
complicit in relations of power would resist (Hartsock, 1990). While Collins analysis is 
not constructed as an explicit contestation of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge, the 
focus of her work, which entails outlining strategies for the systematic resistance and 
transcendence of systems of domination, necessarily furthers understandings of power 
and knowledge in ways that Foucault’s specific and fragmented analyses (Gutting, 2005) 
did not. 
Though Collins work begins with the ways of knowing particular to U. S. black 
women, it does not privilege their experiences over those of other marginalized groups; 
she presents her analysis in ways that are inclusive to all marginalized groups. Her 
analysis originates from black women’s standpoint because, as a black woman, this is the 
intersectionality she is most familiar with. Collins makes it clear in the following passage 
that black women’s epistemology represents one piece of a larger social justice project 
when she writes:  
 
. . . it is important to remember that Black women’s full empowerment can occur 
only within a transnational context of social justice. While focused on U. S. Black 
women, U. S. black feminism constitutes one of many historically specific social 
justice projects dedicated to fostering the empowerment of groups within an 
overarching context of justice. In this sense, Black feminist thought constitutes 
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one part of a much larger social justice project that goes far beyond the 
experiences of African-American women. (Collins, 2000, p. 19) 
 
 
Collins articulates her belief that black feminist thought can be an important point of 
origin from which other groups can gain insights to previously unnoticed aspects of their 
oppression. By building on the unique knowledge gained from black women’s 
standpoint, these groups can further their own social justice causes. She writes: 
 
By advocating, refining, and disseminating Black feminist thought, individuals 
from other groups who are engaged in similar social justice projects—Black men, 
African women, White men, Latinas, White women, and members of other U. S. 
racial/ethnic groups, for example—can identify points of connection that further 
social justice projects . . . U.S. Black feminist thought fully actualized is a 
collaborative enterprise. It must be open to coalition building with individuals 
engaged in similar social justice projects. (Collins, 2000, pp. 37-38) 
 
 
Thus Collins’ black feminist thought is clearly inclusive towards social justice for all 
oppressed groups. Rather than simply paying lip service to the notion of social justice for 
all, Collins’ understanding of the matrix of domination necessitates that black women’s 
emancipation from systems of domination is intricately connected to the emancipation of 
all marginalized groups from these same mutually constructed systems.  
A major benefit of Collins’ presentation of intersectional oppression is that it 
provides a much fuller understanding of ways in which the matrices of oppression 
interact to produce variations in lived experiences. Rather than assuming that all women 
experience patriarchal oppression in the same way, for example, Collins’ model 
emphasizes ways in which oppressive spheres of race, class, and nation can interact to 
organize very different lived experiences for white women, U. S. black women, and 
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third-world women. In turn, these diverse lived experiences result in varied 
understandings of and strategies of resistance to oppression. Additionally, by 
emphasizing the relational nature of the matrix of domination, Collins demonstrates ways 
in which all individuals participate to varying degrees in systems of oppression. In the 
following passage, Collins discusses the significance of U. S. black women’s, U. S. white 
women’s, and non-U. S. women’s mutually constructed group histories within the matrix 
of domination. She writes: 
 
It is important to remember that U. S. Black women’s group history remains 
interdependent with those of other groups—patterns characterizing one group’s 
experiences are intimately linked to those of other groups. For example, in the    
U. S. context, the social construction of U. S. white womanhood as pure, fragile, 
and in need of protection from the assaults of “violent” African-American men 
required the use of differential patterns of institutionalized sexual violence against 
both African-American women and men. The transnational context reveals similar 
contradictions. U. S. nation-state foreign politics inflict comparable violence upon 
women outside U. S. borders. Both domestically and transnationally, through 
threats of violence or actual violence, groups actively police each other to ensure 
that domination is maintained. (Collins, 2000, p. 247) 
 
 
Collins’ analysis, therefore, like Foucault’s, prevents binary thinking in terms of 
categorizing groups as completely oppressed or purely oppressors and instead encourages 
both/and conceptualizations of oppression and power. In doing so, Collins’ analysis 
emphasizes the complicated ways in which groups participate in and are simultaneously 
subjected to domination. Collins differs from Foucault, however, in the conclusions she 
draws from these complex relations of power. For Collins, both/and conceptualizations of 
power necessitate that groups claiming to be oppressed must also be held accountable for 
their oppression of others. She argues that those groups claiming “moral positions as 
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survivors of one expression of systematic violence” (Collins, 2000, p. 247) lose 
credibility if they fail to acknowledge responsibility for other expressions of violence. By 
demonstrating the myriad ways in which oppressed groups are not only subjugated 
through the domains of power, but also the ways in which these groups yield power over 
others, Collins unmasks processes which sustain the matrix of domination. In doing so, 
her analysis provides a compelling rationale for why individuals should resist systems of 
domination. Simply put, no one can be free of oppression until everyone is free; everyone 
must resist the domains of power in order for social justice to be fully realized.  
Significance of Collins’ Analysis of Power for this Project  
Particularly useful for this project is Collins’ argument that individuals subjected 
to various forms of intersecting oppressions have a unique vantage point from which to 
articulate ideas about oppression and strategies for liberation. She refers to Black women 
as often having an ‘outsider within status’ that facilitates novel conceptualizations of 
oppression and resistance. Borrowing Collin’s concept of the ‘outsider within,’11 this 
project seeks to discover whether the accumulation of subjugated knowledge derived 
from various outsider within positions can yield new insights about oppression and new 
strategies for social justice.  
Although the thematic content of Collins’ analysis will be retained for this 
project, her focus on black women will not. Whereas Collins centered her black feminist 
epistemology on the experiences of black women, this project will instead initiate its 
thought project using various contemporary expression of black theology. This project 
                                               
11 Poet and activist Audre Lorde developed this phrase, but I am relying on Collins’ (2000) use of this term. 
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contends that as a form of oppositional knowledge developed in response to black 
oppression in the U. S., black theology should offer insights into both resistance 
strategies and methods to transcend systems of domination.  
The unique outsider within status experienced by black theologians (i.e. within 
their religion, their academic institutions, and U. S. society), is hypothesized to provide 
novel understandings of oppression capable of transcending systems of domination. 
Within black theology’s struggle to make sense of historical situations of enslavement 
and present-day oppression in light of beliefs that God is actively working to liberate the 
oppressed, this discipline tackles ultimate questions of meaning, appropriation, 
authenticity, and liberation. As such, black theology provides an apt starting point for this 
thought project on subjugated and oppositional knowledge. 
Chapter Outline 
The proposed analysis is necessarily context bound. Thus, the first step in 
analyzing contemporary black theological texts for their oppressive themes and 
transcendent potential is to trace the historical context within which these particularized 
discourses developed. Chapter II of this project, therefore, discusses in abbreviated form, 
the historical development of black theological discourse. Having situated the context of 
black theological discourse, Chapter III will analyze the libratory content of 
contemporary black theological texts.  
The fourth chapter of this project will focus on another important concept 
expressed in Collins’ analysis—transversal politics (i.e. empathetic dialogue with other 
political groups with the goal of building coalitions for social justice). For Collins, 
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transversal politics are necessary for social justice because “. . . each group possesses a 
partial perspective on its own experiences and on those of other groups” (p. 247). No 
group is capable of achieving social justice alone because their partial perspective fails to 
reveal the full complexities of relationships of domination. Collins’ understanding of 
transversal politics suggests that the libratory potential of black theology as an 
oppositional knowledge is also limited to a partial perspective on oppression. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this project, libratory black theological discourse will be engaged in 
dialogue with other social justice projects characterized by an ‘outsider within’ status. 
The purpose of this encounter will be to determine whether dialogue between these 
various forms of subjugated and oppositional knowledge can produce a re-articulated 
black theology capable of realizing a fuller understanding of oppression and capable of 
facilitating social justice for all marginalized groups. Finally, chapter five of this project 
will situate this thought experiment within a discourse of critical pedagogy in order to 
explicate practical ways in which these accumulated oppositional knowledge forms can 
be used in a pedagogy of social justice for all. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
BLACK RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (1619-1999) 
 
 
As scholars have noted, every text has a context (Hopkins, 1999); awareness of 
this context arguably leads to greater understanding of the text itself. Relevant to a 
primary goal of this project—ascertaining the libratory potential of black theological 
texts—this chapter examines the socio-historical context within which black theological 
discourse developed in the U. S. A complete historical account of the development of 
black theology would be a monumental task; such an undertaking is beyond the purpose 
and scope of this dissertation. Instead, this chapter provides an abbreviated history of the 
development of black religious thought from the arrival of the first enslaved Africans in 
America12 to the present. Such a historical review is necessary to accurately situate the 
religious discourse to be analyzed in the subsequent chapter.  
This review will be organized historically, along four epochs13 in black American 
history and in black religious thought. These time frames are: 1619-1808 (approximate 
period from the arrival of slaves in Virginia to the official end of the slave trade); 1808-
1865 (approximate end of the slave trade to the end of the Civil War); 1865-1960 (end of 
the Civil War to beginning of the Civil Rights movement); and 1960 –1999 (beginning of 
Civil Rights movement to end of the millennium). In order to honor the nuances and 
                                               
12 Cornel West (1982, 1993a) cites this event as the initiation of black theological reflection. 
 
13 Time frames loosely based on those provided by Raboteau and Wills (2003). 
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diverse streams of black religious thought that developed in each time period, an attempt 
has been made to present numerous excerpts from black Americans (along with socio-
contextual information on the authors) discussing themes of oppression, Christianity, and 
liberation in each period. While these excerpts certainly do not represent the entirety of 
documented black theological discourse, they are illustrative of the scope and breadth of 
black theology.  
1619-1808 
In Moral Evil and Redemptive Suffering: A History of Theodicy in African-
American Religious Thought (2002), Anthony Pinn argues that any investigation of 
African American religious thought/theological discourse must consider the 
psychological import of the Middle Passage of Africans from slave ports in Africa to the 
Americas—the passage into slavery. Not all Africans came to America as slaves, 
however; the first group of Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619 as indentured servants 
and were later freed on that basis (Finkelman, 2003; Woodson, 1925). Some Africans 
also came to America as explorers (Pinn, 2002). Still, most Africans in America were 
slaves and it was the condition of slavery that framed the worldview from which their 
theological discourse/reflection emerged.  
In the following excerpt, Olaudah Equiano, who was kidnapped from what is now 
Nigeria, discusses his experience on a slave ship destined for the New World. Equiano 
and his sister were kidnapped while playing outside and then separated from each other. 
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Here in an excerpt from his autobiography,14 he describes his experience on the Middle 
Passage. He writes: 
 
At last, when the ship we were in had got in all her cargo, they made ready with 
many fearful noises, and we were all put under deck, so that we could not see how 
they managed the vessel. But this disappointment was the least of my sorrow. The 
stench of the hold while we were on the coast was so intolerably loathsome, that it 
was dangerous to remain there for any time, and some of us had been permitted to 
stay on the deck for the fresh air; but now that the whole ship's cargo were 
confined together, it became absolutely pestilential. The closeness of the place, 
and the heat of the climate, added to the number in the ship, which was so 
crowded that each had scarcely room to turn himself, almost suffocated us. This 
produced copious perspirations, so that the air soon became unfit for respiration, 
from a variety of loathsome smells, and brought on a sickness among the slaves, 
of which many died, thus falling victims to the improvident avarice, as I may call 
it, of their purchasers. This wretched situation was again aggravated by the galling 
of the chains, now become insupportable; and the filth of the necessary tubs, into 
which the children often fell, and were almost suffocated. The shrieks of the 
women, and the groans of the dying, rendered the whole a scene of horror almost 
inconceivable. Happily perhaps for myself I was soon reduced so low here that it 
was thought necessary to keep me almost always on deck; and from my extreme 
youth I was not put in fetters. In this situation I expected every hour to share the 
fate of my companions, some of whom were almost daily brought upon deck at 
the point of death, which I began to hope would soon put an end to my miseries… 
Every circumstance I met with served only to render my state more painful, and 
heighten my apprehensions, and my opinion of the cruelty of the whites. (1789, 
pp. 78-80) 
 
 
By the time Equiano arrived in the New World a functioning slave system was 
well in place. The realization of a slave society began in 1660, when the Virginia 
Legislature began passing laws that recognized slavery and protected slaveholders’ 
interests (Finkelman, 2003). Slave legislation from other Southern colonies soon 
followed. Slavery, however, did not spread as rapidly in the North due to large number of 
                                               
14 Some evidence suggests Equiano may not have been born in Africa and may have used other slave 
accounts to describe the middle passage; no evidence suggests, however, that Equiano’s description 
whether about himself or other slaves was inaccurate. For information on this debate see for example 
http://www.brycchancarey.com/equiano/nativity.htm. 
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Quaker and Puritan settlers in the area (Finkelman, 2003). As the slave trade increased, 
debate arose about the Christianization of African slaves. Many slaveholders resisted 
attempts to provide religious instruction to slaves. Slaveholder resistance was largely 
related to time and linguistic constraints, racist beliefs, and concern over the implications 
of slave conversion (Raboteau, 2001).  
Prior to the first Great Awakening during the 1720’s and 40’s, Protestant religious 
conversion emphasized reading the Bible and understanding religious doctrine (Raboteau, 
1978). Thus, in order for slaves to be converted, they needed to be literate. Language 
barriers made catechesis extremely difficult; moreover, the slave work schedule left little 
time for comprehensive religious instruction (Raboteau, 1978; 2001). Many slaveholders 
also resisted attempts to Christianize slaves because they felt slaves lacked the humanity 
to understand Christian religious instruction (Raboteau, 1978). A large population of 
slaveholders also opposed the Christianization of slaves for a very different reason—they 
feared that conversion would make slaves impudent or, worse, lead to emancipation 
(Finkelman, 2003; Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 1978, 2001). For many slaveholders, 
slave conversion to Christianity threatened to subvert the notion of black inferiority/white 
superiority that under-girded the slave system in the South. Speaking to these 
implications of slave conversion, Raboteau (1978) writes: 
 
The danger beneath the arguments for slave conversion which many masters 
feared was the egalitarianism implicit in Christianity. The most serious obstacle to 
the missionary’s access to the slaves was the slaveholder’s vague awareness that a 
Christian slave would have some claim to fellowship, a claim that threatened the 
security of the master-slave hierarchy. Even after other fears had been removed 
by legislation or by argument, unease with the concept of spiritual equality 
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between master and slave caused slave owners to reject the idea of Christianizing 
slaves. (p. 102) 
 
 
The reluctance of many white slave owners to allow religious instruction and conversion 
of slaves led to legislation that denied that the baptism of slaves would allow them their 
freedom (Finkelman, 2003; Raboteau, 1978, 2001). Although some slaveholders began 
introducing Christianity to African slaves, the majority of slaveholders continued to resist 
slave Christianization well into the 18th century (Raboteau, 1978). The overwhelming 
initial resistance of many slaveholders to slave Christianization, despite legislation which 
protected slaveholder interests, highlights tensions that arose from the paradox of 
Christianizing (i.e. bringing to slaves a religion that supposedly offered liberation through 
the realization of right relationships with God and neighbor) a group of people relegated 
to lifelong enslavement. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the history of black 
religious thought reveals at the same time efforts to subvert the master-slave hierarchy 
and instances of reinforcing that hierarchy. 
Concerned with the propagation of Christianity and cognizant of the economic 
concerns of slaveholders, missionaries increased efforts to bring about the 
Christianization of African slaves through sermons and publications that presented 
Christianity as a means of slave control (Pinn, 2002; Raboteau, 1978). Clergy argued that 
the Christianization of African “heathens” was mandated by the gospel and would make 
slaves better servants by inculcating in them the Christian duty to love and serve 
(Raboteau, 1978). Discussing the Christianization of the North American slave system 
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Pinn (2002) explains how Puritan and Anglican missionaries used Christianity to justify 
African enslavement. He writes: 
 
Puritans and Anglicans, among others, often sought to bring these two concerns—
material wealth and spiritual conversion—into a functioning harmony by arguing 
that God required the conversion of these heathen creatures. Albeit important, this 
conversion affected the soul and had no bearing on the physical condition of 
chattel. Using the story of Ham and decontextualized segments of New Testament 
Epistles, slaveholders tried to provide divine sanction for the maintenance of the 
slave system. In this way they were able to maintain their property, and 
missionaries were able to feel as if they were working in accordance with the 
demands of the gospel…it was understood that Africans brought with them little 
cultural or religious value. They were considered inadequate creatures, 
subhumans, whose skin color was a clear sign of divine displeasure and therefore 
justified enslavement. (p. 2) 
 
 
Some missionaries15 argued for the humanity of African slaves and for blacks’ 
biblically-sanctioned equality with whites (Raboteau, 1978). Though such arguments did 
counter popular presentations of Africans as beasts, they still portrayed African culture as 
deficient and African people as the God-ordained servants of whites. Thus Pinn (2002) is 
correct when he contends that African culture was not valued in America. The colonists’ 
perceptions of enslaved Africans, their cultural worth, and their divinely mandated 
enslavement was connected to a belief in manifest destiny among the colonists who 
understood themselves to be God’s new elect—a chosen people constructing the kingdom 
of God (Pinn, 2002). As will also be demonstrated in this chapter, the colonial notion of 
manifest destiny is one of the meta-narratives appropriated by enslaved Africans and later 
                                               
15 See for example The Negro Christianized: An Essay to Execute and Assist that Good Work, The 
Instruction of Negro Servants in Christianity (1706) by Cotton Mather. 
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by African Americans as they have sought to make sense of their circumstances in 
America.  
Enslaved Africans brought diverse religious beliefs and practices (including 
elements of Islamic and Catholic faiths) with them to America (Raboteau & Wills, 2003). 
High death rates, separation of families and tribal groups, and strong efforts by whites to 
eradicate non-Christian religious practices were all factors that combined to make the 
preservation of these beliefs and practices difficult; some were preserved, however 
(Raboteau & Wills, 2003). The presence of forms of African religious traditions in the 
New World, as well as the practice of enslaved believers of all traditions borrowing from 
different religious practices to help them cope with enslavement (Raboteau & Wills, 
2003) makes it difficult to know what conversion really meant for the first African slaves 
converted to Christianity. Raboteau (1978) describes the complexities of African 
conversion to Christianity in the following passage. He writes: 
 
Adopting to the foreign culture of the Europeans meant for Africans not the total 
abandonment of their own cosmologies but, rather, a process of integrating the 
new into the old, of interpreting the unfamiliar by reference to the familiar. 
Catechesis moved in two directions. The slaves were taught the prayers, doctrines, 
and rites of Christianity, but as the missionaries realized, the slaves had to 
somehow understand the meaning of Christian belief and ritual if instruction was 
to become more than mere parroting. And here the whites had only limited 
control. For the slaves brought their cultural past to the task of translating and 
interpreting the doctrinal words and ritual gestures of Christianity. Therefore the 
meaning which the missionary wished the slaves to receive and the meaning 
which the slaves actually found (or, better, made) were not the same. (p. 126) 
 
  
Thus, the Christianized slave likely possessed elements of both traditional African 
religions and Protestant Christianity. Raboteau and Wills (2003) concur that surviving 
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Africanisms (i.e. isolated songs, rhythms, movements, belief in the curative power of 
roots, and belief in the efficacy of a world of spirits and ancestors) were often combined 
with various forms of Christianity. Several points of synchronicity between Christianity 
and traditional African religions likely made conversion to Christianity easier. African 
religious beliefs of a Supreme Being as creator of all, a realistic distinction between good 
and evil, a belief in after-life, and the usage of prayer to honor God were all Africanisms 
which paralleled the Hebraic background of Christianity (Matthews, 1995; Raboteau, 
1978) and likely provided African slaves with a frame of reference within which to 
interpret Christianity.  
Some slaves were converted to Christianity during the early 1700’s when the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel began efforts at conversion (Pinn, 2002), most 
slaves at that time, however, rejected the precepts of Christianity (Raboteau, 1978; 2001). 
The slaves most likely to be converted during this time were house servants, artisans, and 
urban slaves; slaves in rural areas and those who worked in the plantation fields had less 
opportunity for religious instruction and church attendance (Baer, 1998; Raboteau, 1978). 
Because Christianity was not accepted by most slaves at this time (Baer, 1998), the 
colonial debate over the Christianization of slaves had little practical influence on slave 
life and culture. It was not until the first and second Great Awakenings (1720-1740 and 
1790-1815, respectively) brought about a religious renaissance (Raboteau, 1978) that 
barriers to slave religious conversion (i.e., lack of religious practice among Southern 
colonists, short supply of clergy, lack of English speaking slaves, and lack of legal 
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support for the propagation of Christianity) decreased and Christianity became 
established as an overarching framework for black religious life (Raboteau, 1978).  
Black religious discourse16 that arose during this time, then, largely developed in 
the North. The following textual excerpts represent some of the earliest documented 
public black religious discourses. Written by a free black man, a former indentured 
servant, and a life-long slave, respectively, the works are diverse yet all speak to the 
issues of black oppression and Christianity. Although blacks certainly discussed issues of 
oppression and Christianity prior to 1776 (the date of the first black theological text for 
this chapter), it was not until that time that large numbers of blacks, resulting from the 
struggle for the rights of man, were afforded opportunities for literacy and public 
discourse (Woodson, 1925). It should be remembered then, that these texts are 
representative of some of the earliest documented black religious discourse, not the 
earliest black religious discourse. 
 Lemuel Haynes, an indentured Massachusetts servant born to a white mother and 
an African father, earned his freedom in 1774 and joined a military unit in Connecticut. 
Haynes fought in the Revolutionary War and, inspired by the Declaration of 
Independence, wrote Liberty Further Extended (1776) in which he urged the abolishment 
of slavery in revolutionary language. Likening the cause of black freedom to that of white 
Americans, he writes: 
 
Liberty is a Jewel which was handed down to man from the cabinet of Heave, and 
is Coeval with his Existence. And as it proceed from the Supreme Legislature of 
                                               
16 In this initial stage of black theological reflection, the discourse to be examined met three criteria. It was 
written or spoken to the public, it discussed black oppression, and it invoked a Christian frame of reference. 
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the universe, so it is he which hath a sole right to take it away; therefore, he that 
would take away a man's Liberty assumes a prerogative that Belongs to another, 
and acts out of his own domain . . . To affirm, that an Englishman has a right to 
his Liberty, is a truth which has Been so clearly Evinced, Especially of Late, that 
to spend time in illustrating this, would be But Superfluous tautology. But I query, 
whether Liberty is so contracted a principle as to be confined to any nation under 
Heaven; nay, I think it not hyperbolical to affirm, that Even an African, has 
Equally as good a right to his Liberty in common with Englishmen . . . But, as I 
observed Before, those privileges that are granted to us By the Divine Being, no 
one has the Least right to take them from us without our consent; and there is Not 
the Least precept, or practice, in the Sacred Scriptures, that constitutes a Black 
man a Slave, any more than a white one. (Haynes, 1776, p. 2) 
 
 
Here it is clear that Haynes interpretations of biblical text do not prevent him from 
critiquing the system of slavery and the hypocrisy of white Americans who recognize 
their own desire for ‘liberty or death’ but not those of African Americans.  
Illustrative of the diversity of black religious interpretations of Christianity during 
the first phase of black religious reflection is Jupiter Hammon. The following passage is 
taken from Hammon’s (1787) Address to the Negroes of the State of New York. In this 
address, Hammon (himself a New York slave) urges slaves to be obedient, hard working, 
and honest in order to secure a place for themselves in Heaven. While seemingly 
submissive to white domination, Hammon’s speech also is subversive because it indicates 
that the condition of slavery is one that should be destroyed by God. He writes: 
 
Now I acknowledge that liberty is a great thing, and worth seeking for, if we can 
get it honestly, and by our good conduct, prevail on our masters to set us free: 
Though for my own part I do not wish to be free, yet I should be glad, if others, 
especially the young Negroes were to be free, for many of us, who are grown up 
slaves, and have always had masters to take care of us, should hardly know how 
to take care of ourselves; and it may be more for our own comfort to remain as we 
are. That liberty is a great thing we may know from our own feelings, and we may 
likewise judge so from the conduct of the white-people, in the late war. How 
much money has been spent, and how many lives has been lost, to defend their 
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liberty. I must say that I have hoped that God would open their eyes, when they 
were so much engaged for liberty, to think of the state of the poor blacks, and to 
pity us. He has done it in some measure, and has raised us up many friends, for 
which we have reason to be thankful, and to hope in his mercy. What may be 
done further, he only knows, for known unto God are all his ways from the 
beginning. (Hammon, 1787/2002, pp. 32-33) 
 
 
Hammon’s speech was later reprinted by many groups opposed to slavery (Wikipedia, 
2006c) as part of the anti-slavery movement. Although a strong anti-slavery movement 
originally existed in the South among non-slaveholders, the invention of the Cotton Gin 
in 1793 initiated decline in Southern antislavery sentiments (Matthews, 1995). The cotton 
gin facilitated cotton production and made cotton a cash crop in the South; the South’s 
fortune would signal a decline in the well-being of slaves and free blacks in America 
(WGBH Educational Foundation, 1998). Increased cotton production led to concomitant 
increases in demand for labor. Yet with the likelihood of the end of the Atlantic slave 
trade (abolitionists began strongly pressuring congress to end the international slave trade 
in the 1790’s), dictated that new slave labor be limited to slaves already in America. 
Consequently, slaveholders began developing defenses of slavery that would help to 
ensure the labor they needed (Finkelman, 2003).  
Tobacco plantations, no longer profitable, sold their slaves to owners of new 
cotton lands in the south and west, tearing apart black families as they did so (WGBH 
Educational Foundation, 1998). The increased demand for cotton labor also threatened 
free blacks in the North. With the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 any white 
person could claim a black person as a fugitive and sell him or her into slavery; blacks 
(free or slave) were not allowed to testify against whites in court in the South and 
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therefore had no recourse against the Fugitive Slave Act unless another white person 
testified on their behalf (WGBH Educational Foundation, 1998).  
Yet in the midst of these oppressive conditions, blacks who fought during the 
Revolutionary War (such as Lemuel Haynes, mentioned earlier) complicated the 
legitimization of the master-slave hierarchy. The hypocrisy of fighting for emancipation 
from Great Britain while holding slaves in captivity was obvious. Moreover, the heroism 
of black soldiers who fought in defense of America subverted notions of black inferiority 
and suggested that enslaved blacks could be useful citizens (Finkelman, 2003). The 
hypocrisy of American slavery and the assertion of humanity by blacks combined with 
the economic need of slave labor to create tensions that would erupt at the end of the 
second phase of black theological development. Indicative of these tensions is the final 
black theological excerpt from this phase of black religious development.  
The final excerpt was written by a free black man using the pseudonym “Othello.” 
The exact date of the piece is uncertain (yet it was originally published in a collection of 
black literature in 1808). The use of a pseudonym was not uncommon for black men who 
spoke against slavery at this time because the freedom of speech afforded due to the 
struggle for the rights of man did not always include black men (Woodson, 1925). In the 
following passage, “Othello” expressed indignation that the plight of blacks in slavery 
does not arouse public outrage, given the emphasis on the rights of man. Understanding 
Christianity as antithetical to black enslavement, “Othello” warns that God will seek 
vengeance against those who enslave blacks. He writes: 
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The voice of injured thousands who have been violently torn from their native 
country and carried to distant and inhospitable climes…will ascend to the throne 
of Omnipotence, and, from the elevated heights of heaven, cause him, with the 
whole force of Almighty vengeance, to hurl the guilty perpetrators of those 
inhuman beings down the steep precipice of inevitable ruin into the bottomless 
gulf of final, irretrievable and endless destruction! …Ye sons of America, 
forbear!—Consider the dire consequences that will attend the prosecution, against 
which the all-powerful God of nature holds up his hands and loudly proclaims, 
desist! (“Othello,” 1925, p. 21) 
 
 
Further in the passage, “Othello” emphasizes the hypocrisy and egocentrism of American 
Christians who tend to view all others as uncivilized or barbarians. He continues: 
 
In the insolence of self-consequence we are accustomed to esteem ourselves and 
the Christian powers of Europe the only civilized people on the globe; the rest, 
without distinction, we presumptuously denominate barbarians. But, when the 
practices above mentioned come to be deliberately considered . . . we shall 
acknowledge, if we possess the smallest degree of candor, that the appellation of 
barbarian does not belong to them alone. While we continue those practices the 
term Christian will only be a burlesque expression signifying more than that it 
ironically denominates the rudest sect of barbarians that ever disgraced the hand 
of their creator. (“Othello,” 1925, p. 21) 
 
 
In his contention that “true” Christianity is incompatible with black enslavement, 
“Othello” invokes a critical interpretation of Christianity that would also be utilized by 
many black Christians in the following phase of black theological development. 
1808-1865 
The second phase of black religious discourse begins with the official end of the 
Atlantic slave trade on January 1st, 1808. Although slaves continued to be illegally 
transported to America after 1808, the numbers decreased dramatically allowing enough 
stability to form an authentic African American religious tradition (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). 
At this time, the second Great Awakening (1790-1815) consisted of camp meetings that 
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attracted both slaves and free blacks to Protestant evangelicism (Baer, 1998). With a 
majority English-speaking slave population, Christian instruction became more feasible 
(Raboteau, 1978). The rise of plantation missionaries brought religious instruction to 
rural and remote areas of the South so that slaves, now more capable of receiving 
religious instruction, could be Christianized. The number of plantation missionaries 
increased in 1845 when the Southern Baptist Convention initiated their own program of 
slave missionary work (Baer, 1998). The first Great Awakening, followed by the Official 
end of the slave trade, followed by second Great Awakening created an environment 
which marked a shift in black religious discourse and brought what would be the 
foundation for more stable black theological reflection.  
As early as 1804, all states north of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware had either 
abolished slavery or passed legislation for its gradual abolition, making slavery specific 
only to the South (Finkelman, 2003). Although both Northerners and Southerners 
profited from slavery, most Americans (in the North and South) considered slavery to be 
a necessary evil that had no future, given the hypocrisy of the natural rights ideology in 
the context of slave ownership (Finkelman, 2003; Matthews, 1995). The increased need 
for slaves in the South after the invention of the Cotton Gin encouraged southerners to 
defend slavery—not as a necessary evil, but as a positive good (Matthews, 1995). Yet the 
nation seemed to be moving, at least in some respects, in the direction of anti-slavery. 
The following excerpt is taken from a sermon delivered by Reverend Absalom Jones in 
honor of the official end of the international slave trade. Jones, who was born into slavery 
in Delaware, purchased his freedom in 1784 and later founded St. Thomas African 
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Church; he was ordained as the first black priest in the Episcopal Church (Wikipedia, 
2006a). Jones’ “Thanksgiving Sermon” (1808) appropriates the exodus motif and clearly 
identifies God’s active involvement in the liberation of enslaved blacks, manifested in the 
end of the international slave trade. He states: 
 
The history of the world shows us that the deliverance of the children of Israel 
from their bondage is not the only instance in which it has pleased God to appear 
in behalf of oppressed and distressed nations, as the deliverer of the innocent, and 
of those who call upon his name. He is unchangeable in his nature and character 
as he is in his wisdom and power. The great and blessed event, which we have 
met his day to celebrate, is a striking proof that the God of heaven and earth is the 
same, yesterday, and today, and forever. . . . He has seen the affliction of our 
countrymen, with an eye of pity. He has seen the wicked arts, by which wars have 
been fomented among the different tribes of the Africans, in order to procure 
captives, for the purpose of selling them for slaves . . . The ears of Jehovah have 
been constantly open to them: He has heard the prayers that have ascended from 
the hearts of his people; and he has, as in the case of his ancient and chosen 
people the Jews, come down to deliver our suffering countrymen from the hands 
of their oppressors. He came down into the United States, when they declared in 
the constitution which they framed in 1788, that the trade of our African 
fellowman should cease in the year 1808 . . . (Jones, 1808/2002, pp. 39-40) 
 
 
Significantly, Jones’ contention that God desires the liberation of enslaved blacks and his 
assertion that God acts in history to bring about black liberation lead him to ponder why 
such a God allowed blacks to become enslaved in the first place. As the passage 
continues, he reasons that slavery provided blacks a knowledge of the gospel that they 
might be able to bring back to Africa. He states: 
 
It has always been a mystery, why the impartial Father of the human race should 
have permitted the transportation of so many millions of our fellow creatures to 
his country, to endure all the miseries of slavery. Perhaps his design was that a 
knowledge of the gospel might be acquired by some of their descendants, in order 
that they might become qualified to be the messengers of it, to the land of their 
fathers. (Jones, 1808/2002, p. 42) 
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Jones’ ponderings speak directly to the tensions emanating from black Americans’ 
embrace of Christianity in light of black oppression. 
The 1819 debate over whether Missouri would enter the union as slave or free 
state brought tensions between the North and South to a head when Northern delegates 
suggesting the slave-holding Southerners were morally tainted (Matthews, 1995). As a 
result of the Missouri debate Southern politicians further enhanced pro-slavery arguments 
based on state’s rights and notions of black racial inferiority (Matthews, 1995). Though 
many Northern whites did not believe that African Americans should be enslaved, they 
(Northern abolitionists notwithstanding) still shared the belief of Southern whites about 
states’ rights and black inferiority to whites (Finkelman, 2003). It was within this context 
that some blacks began concerted efforts to obtain their own liberation from slavery. 
These actions influenced the presentation of religious instruction to slaves and also 
helped to bring about the resulting “crisis of fear” in the South. 
In 1822 Denmark Vessey (a slave who purchased his freedom for $600 after 
winning a $1,500 lottery) organized an insurrection that was stopped only shortly before 
its implementation (Matthews, 1995). Though there had been slave rebellions in the 
North and South prior to Denmark Vessey’s insurrection, the extensiveness of Vessey’s 
rebellion and the involvement of trusted house servants alarmed white Southerners and 
helped to create a “crisis of fear” in the South (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995). 
Because Vessey had studied biblical scripture and the issues of the Missouri debate 
before deciding to rebel, Southerners believed anti-slavery rhetoric was facilitating slave 
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rebellion (Lyerly, 1998; Matthews, 1995). They believed that curtailing slave literacy 
would prevent slaves from reading abolitionist literature.  
 During the resulting crisis of fear anti-slavery groups in the South that were once 
tolerated came to be seen as threats to domestic tranquility (Lyerly, 1998). Harsh new 
laws were passed prohibiting slaves to assemble, read and write; these laws also restricted 
the movement of free blacks in the South17 (Lyerly, 1998; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau & 
Wills, 2003). This crisis of fear also resulted in increased emphasis on instructing slaves 
in the ways of “true” Christians in hope that they might be meek and accept their lot in 
life (Matthews, 1995).  
The crisis of fear erupted on the heels of the second Great Awakening. The 
religious revivalism established through the second Great Awakening combined with the 
climate of fear and created a situation that was at the same time oppressive and also 
liberating for slaves and free blacks. The wave of religious revivalism (i.e. evangelical 
Protestantism) that took place in the South, as well as other regions of North America, 
differed qualitatively from the Protestant religion previously practiced in the colonies. 
The emphasis on experiential and more animated forms of worship in evangelical 
Protestantism was likely more appealing to slaves, free blacks, and whites in the South 
(Raboteau, 1978). As a result, a more hospitable climate was created in which Southern 
slaves, blacks and whites experienced large increases in religious conversion (Maffly-
Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 1978). 
                                               
17 In 1740 South Carolina enacted the Negro Act, making it illegal for slaves to gather in groups, earn 
money, or learn to read; it also enabled owners to kill rebellious slaves (WGBH Educational Foundation, 
1998). 
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Whereas Protestantism in the U. S. originally viewed religious conversion as a 
slow and deliberate process through which one comprehensively studied the Bible and 
religious doctrine, the type of evangelicalism popular during the Great Awakening 
privileged the experience of conversion over Biblical literacy and doctrinal knowledge 
(Raboteau, 1978, 2001). Thus slave illiteracy (as well as slaveholder illiteracy) was not a 
barrier to evangelical conversion.  
Congregations that were previously unsuccessful at converting slaves to 
Protestant Christianity refined their approaches by providing oral instruction (Maffly-
Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau, 1978). Special seating in churches were set aside 
for house slaves; some slave owners built “praise houses” and recruited black preachers 
to give services, while white foremen were present to monitor activities (Baer, 1998; 
Matthews, 1995).  
While Christianity was in many regards force fed to slaves on plantations, the 
slaves displayed agency in the Christian denominations they became affiliated with. The 
majority of blacks joined Methodist and Baptist denominations (Holifield, 2003; Maffly-
Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau, 2001; Raboteau & Wills, 2003). Evangelical 
faiths also were attractive to African Americans for practical reasons. Evangelical 
religious meetings allowed them to be temporarily reunited with relatives and friends 
from neighboring plantations and spread news to one another (Lyerly, 1998). 
Importantly, many clergy in these faiths promoted the idea that all Christians were equal 
in Gods sight; this message challenged racist ideology and gave slaves hope (Maffly-
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Kipp, 2000; Lyerly, 1998). Explaining the appeal of the Methodist faith to blacks, Lyerly 
writes: 
 
In Methodism slaves and free blacks found a God who did not see differences in 
color, caste, gender, or status. In Methodist doctrine, oppressed and victimized 
African Americans found a value system that prized individual choice and agency 
in a world where they had few choices and where their individuality was often not 
respected. In Methodist rituals, slaves and free blacks affirmed their sense of self-
worth and humanity and openly challenged the racist ideology of their oppressors. 
By registering support for Methodist values, slaves could express their disdain of 
their owners’ lifestyles, morally invert secular rankings, and proclaim their faith 
that God would avenge the wrongs done to them. (1998, p. 47) 
 
 
The relative autonomy blacks derived from evangelical Protestantism cannot be 
overstated. Raboteau (1978) discusses the autonomy provided by evangelical 
Protestantism (especially, the Baptist and Methodist faiths) in the following passage. 
 
The Baptists and Methodists did not insist on a well-educated clergy. A converted 
heart and a gifted tongue were more important than the amount of theological 
training received. If a converted slave showed talent for exhorting, he exhorted, 
and not only to black audiences. The tendency of evangelical religion to level the 
souls of all men before God became manifest when awakened blacks preached to 
unconverted whites. (Raboteau, 1978, p. 134) 
 
 
Through the policies and practices of these denominations, enslaved and free blacks were 
provided opportunities to hold church positions, appeal to the church for justice, and even 
preach (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 1978). That these denominations provided 
opportunities is noteworthy; Raboteau (1978) contends that black preachers were a 
crucial link in the Christianization of slaves because they served as ‘bicultural mediators’ 
between the paradigm of Christianity, the African perspective, and the slave experience. 
Discussing the importance of black preachers, Raboteau writes: 
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The importance of these early black preachers in the conversion of slaves to 
Christianity has not been sufficiently appreciated. Emerging in the latter half of 
the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth centuries, they acted as 
crucial mediators between Christian belief and the experiential world of the 
slaves. In effect, they were helping to shape the development of a bicultural 
synthesis, an Afro-American culture, by nurturing the birth of Christian 
communities among blacks, slave and free. (1978, p. 137) 
 
 
While evangelical Protestantism provided practical benefits to southern blacks 
(i.e. opportunities to reunite with family and friends, opportunities for autonomy) it also 
provided important existential benefits. Through its emphasis on individuality and the 
conversion experience, evangelical Protestantism provided the space for blacks to act on 
their faith according to their own standards (Raboteau, 2001). These actions were often 
manifested in the private sphere where blacks used “hush harbors” or clandestine worship 
places to act on their religious faith as they saw fit. 
Slaves who were permitted religious instruction often were required to worship 
under the supervision of whites. Slave masters frequently took house servants to church 
with them and required them to sit in separate balconies (Baer, 1998; Raboteau, 2001). 
Slave narratives reveal an oppressive element to these religious services where slaves 
were admonished to “obey their masters.” Catechisms were prepared to teach slaves 
obedience. Jones’ (1834) A Catechism for Colored Persons and Caspers’ (1832) A Short 
Catechism for the Use of the Colored Members on Trial of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church in South Carolina were popular (Raboteau, 1978). 
Not surprisingly, slaves preferred to worship in the “hush harbors” (Baer, 1998; 
Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 1978). Black evangelicalism was much more expressive 
than white evangelicalism; this expressiveness made many blacks uncomfortable in white 
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churches (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau & Wills, 2003). In private 
religious services, slaves could be less codified; their private styles of worship 
contributed to an “invisible institution”—a religious tradition that was their own (Maffly-
Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau & Wills, 2003). In slave quarters, they used 
signals and messages to organize secret meetings (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995). 
Here they mixed African rhythms, singing, and beliefs with evangelical Christianity 
(Maffly-Kipp, 2000). These meetings allowed slaves to freely express their desires for a 
better future; the meetings also were an organizing point for rebellions such as Nat 
Turner’s (1831) insurrection in Virginia (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). 
The agency slaves experienced in hush harbors is evidenced through their prayers 
for freedom even though they were forbidden to do so (Hopkins, 1991; Raboteau, 1978). 
That some slaves risked severe punishment to worship in hush harbors (Raboteau, 1978) 
is a testament to their dedication to their own form of Christian religion and to their 
desire to worship by their own standards. 
Black evangelical ministry also was significant in the North where independent 
evangelical black churches first developed (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 1978). 
Although educated blacks were often successfully assimilated into white religious culture 
(e.g. Phyllis Wheatley), spiritual equality was preached, but not frequently practiced 
(Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 2001). Thus, as early as 1790, black religious leaders in 
the North began efforts to form independent churches (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 
1978). Joy St. Baptist Church was founded in Boston in 1805. The African American 
Presbyterian Church was founded in 1807 by John Gloucester in Philadelphia, 
49 
 
Pennsylvania and spread to other northern states, although the Presbyterian support of 
slavery thwarted growth of this church in the South (Armstrong, 2001). Abyssinian 
Baptist Church was formed in New York in 1808. The African Methodist Episcopal 
Church, was founded in 1816 by Richard Allen and the African Methodist Episcopal 
Zion Church was founded in the early 1820s (Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Raboteau, 2001; 
Raboteau & Wills, 2003). Many of these early churches were formed out of protest to the 
discrimination faced in racially-mixed churches in the North (Baer, 1998). Other black 
evangelical independent churches would follow in the North and would also emerge in 
the South after the Civil War. There were also slave congregations in the South as early 
as 1758, but scholars debate whether these were actually independent black churches 
(Baer, 1998). 
With the institutionalization of black religion, many black preachers developed a 
significant following in the South, both among blacks and whites (Holifield, 2003; 
Lyerly, 1998; Raboteau, 2001). The sermons, essays, public addresses, and catechisms 
developed by these religious figures represent the historical antecedents of black theology 
(Holifield, 2003). Their subject matter was diverse; as was the case in the first phase of 
black religious history, some black religious figures spoke within the context of standard 
denominational themes while others developed protest literature (Holifield, 2003). Most 
black sermons, especially those of slave preachers in the South took the form of biblical 
narratives that were reminiscent of West African storytelling practices; most of their 
published writings were about slavery and the condition of slaves (Holifield, 2003). 
Many of the black sermons in the North also dealt with slavery; due to the difference in 
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lived experiences between many Northern and Southern blacks, however, Northern 
articulations often placed the issue of slavery in broader social and political contexts. As 
these articulations became disseminated, blacks in the South were sensitized to these 
broader contexts as well. The following sermon from Nathaniel Paul is a case in point. 
In 1827, Nathaniel Paul, pastor of the African Baptist Church in New York, gave 
a sermon in commemoration of New York’s official abolition of slavery. In his speech, 
Paul proclaims slavery as a morally corrupt institution for slaveholders and slaves. Paul 
argues that slavery prevents slaveholders from receiving salvation and also bars slaves 
from knowledge of God. He states: 
 
The great author of our existence has marked out the way that leads to the glories 
of the upper world, and through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, salvation 
is offered to all. But slavery forbids even the approach of mercy; it stands as a 
barrier in the way to ward off the influence of divine grace; it shuts up the 
avenues of the soul, and prevents its receiving divine instruction; and scarcely 
does it permit its miserable captives to know that there is a God, a Heaven or a 
Hell! (Paul, 1827/1925, p. 67) 
 
 
Further in the passage, Paul protests the hypocrisy of the existence of slavery in America 
because “. . . the very soil of which is said to be consecrated in liberty, and its fruits the 
equal rights of man” (1827/1925, p. 69). Yet he ends his speech confident that God wills 
the abolition of slavery. He states: 
 
The progress of emancipation, though slow, is nevertheless certain. It is certain 
because that God who has made of one blood all nations of men, and who is said 
to be no respecter of persons, has so decreed; I therefore has no hesitation in 
declaring from this sacred place that not only throughout the Unites States of 
America, but throughout every part of the habitable world where slavery exists, it 
will be abolished. (Paul, 1827/1925, p. 72) 
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Public discourse such as the above is significant, not only because they articulated 
specific messages about Christianity and black oppression in the North, but also for their 
influence on black religious discourse in the South. The oral and written literature 
emanating from the North eventually became available to blacks in the South, slave and 
free. Arguably, no better example of such discursive transmission can be provided than 
David Walker’s revolutionary (1829) Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World. 
Walker, born free in the South, relocated North and wrote his Appeal to inspire enslaved 
blacks to resist their oppression (WGBH Educational Foundation, 1998). The context 
within which Walker’s Appeal developed is noteworthy. 
Walker’s Appeal was written in the midst of heightened religious divide over 
slavery between the North and South that culminated in staunch Southern defenses of 
slavery. The religious divide over slavery that began with the 1819 Missouri debate grew 
more intense in 1832, during the Great Debate in the Virginia Legislature. The debate 
marked a change in the conceptualization of slavery in the South from a necessary evil to 
a positive good (Matthews, 1995). The decline of organized opposition to slavery in the 
South was matched by increasing abolitionism in the North by abolitionists (including 
free blacks) and Quakers (Finkelman, 2003; Matthews, 1995).  
Although only one in eleven Southerners owned slaves in the 19th century, those 
who did were usually molders of public opinion such as politicians and presidents; many 
slaveholders also were religious (Finkelman, 2003; Matthews, 1995). Not surprisingly 
then, those with the largest stake in the maintenance of slavery used all means of its 
defense at their disposal, biblical and otherwise. One of the most notable southern 
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defenses of slavery came from Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson’s defense centered on 
economic necessity and notions of racial inferiority. In Notes on the State of Virginia 
(1781), he argued that ending slavery would bring about the destruction of ‘civilized’ 
society because the Southern economy was dependent on slave labor and no viable 
alternative to this labor existed. Additionally, Jefferson argued that blacks were 
genetically inferior to whites and predisposed to sexual immorality; if emancipated, he 
argued, blacks would be permanently confined to serfdom and would threaten to taint the 
‘master class’ through miscegenation (Finkelman, 2003). The irony of Jefferson’s 
staunch defense of slavery is significant because he also (though unintentionally) 
provided a strong argument for slavery’s abolition when he wrote these words: “We hold 
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
Pursuit of Happiness” (as cited in Finkelman, 2003, p. 22).  
While David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World does not 
highlight the irony of Jefferson’s Notes, it does sharply criticize Jefferson’s argument of 
black inferiority as ridiculous and unfair, given the debilitating and dehumanizing effects 
of slavery. Walker’s Appeal was banned by Southern states because it urged slaves to 
resist their bondage by whatever means were available to them. He writes: 
 
Has Mr. Jefferson declared to the world, that we are inferior to the whites, both in 
the endowments of our bodies and our minds? It is indeed surprising, that a man 
of such great learning, combined with such excellent natural parts, should speak 
so of a set of men in chains. I do not know what to compare it to, unless, like 
putting one wild deer in an iron cage, where it will be secured, and hold another 
by the side of the same, then let it go, and expect the one in the cage to run as fast 
as the one at liberty. (Walker, 1829, p. 12) 
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Further in the text, Walker suggests that for enslaved blacks, submitting to white 
Americans is sinful because it subverts the legitimate role of Jesus Christ as the master of 
all humanity. Walker (1829) writes: 
 
Did our Creator make us to be slaves to dust and ashes like ourselves? Are they 
not dying worms as well as we? Have they not to make their appearance before 
the tribunal of Heaven, to answer for the deeds done in the body, as well as we? 
Have we any other Master but Jesus Christ alone? Is he not their Master as well as 
ours?—What right then, have we to obey and call any other Master, but Himself? 
How we could be so submissive to a gang of men, whom we cannot tell whether 
they are as good as ourselves or not, I never could conceive. However, this is shut 
up with the Lord, and we cannot precisely tell—but I declare, we judge men by 
their works. (Walker, 1829, pp. 19-20) 
 
 
As mentioned previously, Northern black religious discourse such as the above, found its 
way south and consequently influenced the religious discourse of the South. Within 
weeks of its publication, copies of Walker’s Appeal (though banned) were found in 
Georgia; a few months later, copies were found in Virginia and Louisiana (PBS online, 
2006). 
Jefferson’s was not the only popular defense of slavery in the South. Another 
popular defense was articulated by Richard Furman, 1982 president of the state Baptist 
Convention. Furman’s biblical defense of slavery posited that slavery was an accepted 
institution in the Bible—one that was participated in by biblical patriarchs and never 
condemned by Jesus (Matthews, 1995). Furman further argued that as descendants of 
Ham, blacks in America were predestined for enslavement (Matthews, 1995).  
Naturally, Southern slavery defenses were countered by Northern arguments 
against slavery. In the North, arguments against slavery often referred to the New 
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Testament passage that God created “Of one blood, all nations of men,” to the “Golden 
Rule,” and to the notion that slavery was antithetical to the spirit of Christianity; other 
anti-slavery arguments appealed to biblical hermeneutics and challenged the contention 
that Africans were descendents of Ham and therefore cursed into slavery (Holifield, 
2003).  
The debate over slavery spurred Quakers and Mennonites to gradually purge 
slaveholders from their communities; Methodists briefly attempted to ban slaveholding 
among its members but soon dropped the rule due to overwhelming resistance (Holifield, 
2003; Lyerly, 1998). Fearing the loss of church members, bishops of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church ordered their preachers to abstain from abolitionism (Matthews, 1995). 
As these brief illustrations attest, the debate over the ‘peculiar institution’ not only 
divided the nation, but also the religious denominations within the nation. 
Interpretations of Christianity  
As the religious renaissance continued, the sources from which blacks could 
receive messages of Christianity multiplied. The introduction and indoctrination to 
Christianity could come from slaveholders, non-slaveholders, missionaries, licensed or 
unlicensed black preachers (slave or free), from relatives, other slaves, or any 
combination of the above and such messages could be received in formal religious 
organizations or (for slaves) in hush harbors. It should not be surprising then, that the 
reactions to Christianity and interpretations slaves and free blacks derived from 
Christianity were diverse. Raboteau (1978) expresses the diversity of slave responses to 
Christianity in the following passage. He writes: 
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Some slaves resented the message of docility preached by the missionaries and 
rejected it out of hand as “white man’s religion.” Still another attitude toward 
religious practice was expressed by those slaves who complained that they were 
too weary to attend church, and that it was “hard for them to serve their earthly 
and heavenly master too.” And, of course, there were slaves who found meaning 
in the message spread by plantation missionaries, accepted it on faith and tried 
their best to incorporate it in their lives. (Raboteau, 1978, p. 177) 
 
 
Many scholars of black religious history argue that blacks in America who 
accepted Christianity adopted a critical hermeneutic that cut through oppressive 
renderings of the gospel (i.e. “white” religion) in favor of more liberating ones (Cone, 
1975; Lyerly, 2003; Maffly-Kipp, 2000; Matthews, 1995; Raboteau, 1978). Slave 
narratives reveal that many slaves believed the after-life to consist of a reversal of the 
earthly hierarchy wherein blacks would dominate and whites would be enslaved 
(Hopkins, 1991; Raboteau, 1978). Whatever else these beliefs may suggest, they reveal a 
strong suspicion about the ‘natural’ order of things as evidenced through the Southern 
master-slave hierarchy. These narratives also reflect a rejection of moral admonitions that 
slaves not steal or lie; many slaves viewed deceiving slaveholders or “putting on ole 
massa,” not as a sin, but as a strategy for survival in an unjust system (Hopkins, 1991; 
Raboteau, 1978). Moreover, “sins” such as stealing were considered by some slaves to be 
ridiculous when they themselves were stolen from their homeland (Raboteau, 1978).  
Critical interpretations of the Bible encouraged many slaves to resist their 
dehumanization and assert their autonomy. As previously discussed, slaves asserted their 
autonomy by joining denominations of their own choosing (Lyerly, 2003; Maffly-Kipp, 
2000) and by worshiping in hush harbors (Hopkins, 1991; Raboteau, 1978). Although 
slaves were forbidden from praying for physical freedom (Raboteau, 1978) many 
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believed slavery to be contrary to the will of God and prayed in the hush harbors for their 
freedom. In doing so, many slaves clung to the Old Testament exodus motif as 
representative of their inevitable freedom (Hopkins, 1991; Raboteau, 1978).  
There were also slaves and free blacks in America that did not appear to utilize a 
critical lens when interpreting Christianity. Raboteau (1978) contends that some blacks 
accepted the moral precepts of Christianity at face value and devoted themselves to lives 
of virtue while accepting slavery as their lot in life. Yet he points out that even those 
slaves who accepted the religious precepts of Christianity as provided can be viewed as 
asserting their humanity and self-definition (Raboteau, 1978). Many slaves who took the 
moral responsibilities of Christianity seriously viewed their morality in the face of 
slaveholders’ hypocritical and immoral actions as indicative of the slaves’ dignity and 
moral superiority over their masters (Lyerly, 1998; Raboteau, 1978).  
The following excerpts are indicative of the diversity of interpretations of 
Christianity by black Americans. The first is from Maria Stewart. Born in New England, 
Stewart moved to Boston with her husband and began public speaking after his death in 
1829 (Pinn, 2002). Steward was one of the first U. S. women to publicly lecture on 
political issues; not surprisingly, her speeches were often met by rude behavior and 
abrasive criticism, but Stewart was undeterred (Pinn, 2002). In the following excerpt, 
written while many blacks were still enslaved, Stewart expresses anger and frustration at 
the lack of blacks who “. . . never let their voices be heard, nor their hands be raised in 
behalf of tier color” (1833/2002, p. 69). In her speech: “An address delivered at the 
African Masonic Hall” (1833), Stewart implores blacks to take responsibility for their 
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racial uplift. Stewart, like many blacks interested in the betterment of black Americans, 
ponders the causes of black oppression. She reasons that African sinfulness resulted in 
enslavement. She states: 
 
History informs us that we sprung from one of the most learned nations of the 
whole earth; from the seat, if not the parent, of science. Yes, poor despised Africa 
was once the resort of sages and legislators of other nations, was esteemed the 
school for learning, and the most illustrious men in Greece flocked thither for 
instruction. But it was our gross sins and abominations that provoked the 
Almighty to frown thus heavily upon us, and give our glory unto others. (Stewart 
1833/2002, pp. 69-70)  
 
 
Stewart admonishes black men to be virtuous, abstain from vice, and concern themselves 
with mental and moral improvement. She urges black men, not to wait for racial uplift, 
but to initiate it. She states: 
 
It is of no use for us to wait any longer for a generation of well educated men to 
arise. We have slumbered and slept too long already; the day is far spent; the 
night of death approaches; and you have sound sense and good judgment 
sufficient to begin with, if you feel disposed to make a right use of it. Let every 
man of color throughout the United States, who possesses the spirit and principles 
of a man, sign a petition to Congress to abolish slavery in the District of 
Columbia, and grant you the rights and privileges of common free citizens,; fir if 
you had faith as a grain of mustard seed (Matthew 13:31), long before this the 
maintain of prejudice might have been removed. (Stewart, 1833/2002, p. 72) 
 
 
While Stewart attributes the original source of black oppression in America to sinfulness 
in Africa and places the onus of responsibility for racial uplift on blacks, she is highly 
critical of the system of slavery and attempts by whites to perpetuate it. Reasoning that 
black suffering in America was somehow pedagogical, Stewart declares that the necessity 
of such suffering is past. If whites continue to perpetuate black oppression, she suggests 
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they will face divinely-mandated wrath. Discussing the slave system in America, she 
states: 
 
It appears to me that America has become like the great city of Babylon, for she 
has boasted in her heart . . . She is indeed, a seller of slaves and the souls of men; 
she has made the African drunk with the wine of her fornication; she has put them 
completely beneath her feet, and she means to keep them there; her right hand 
supports the reins of government and her left hand the wheel of power, and she is 
determined not to let go her grasp. But many powerful sons an daughters of 
Africa will shortly arise, who will put down vice and immorality among us, and 
declare by Him that sitteth upon the throne that they will have their rights; and if 
refused, I am afraid they will spread horror and devastation around. I believe that 
the oppression of the injured Africa has come up before the majesty of Heaven: 
and when our cries shall have reached the ears of the Most High, it will be a 
tremendous day for the people of this land; for strong is the hand of the Lord God 
Almighty. (Stewart, 1833/2002, p. 73) 
 
 
Like Stewart, Henry Highland Garnet’s Address to the Negro Convention of 
Buffalo New York (1843) places the onus of responsibility for liberation on black people. 
Garnet identifies the problem of black oppression as an errant interpretation of 
Christianity which has led blacks to docility and acceptance of oppression instead of 
resistance. Garnet’s authorized violent resistance to slavery. For Garnet, those who first 
introduced Christianity to enslaved Africans presented only a mockery of the religion. He 
states:  
 
Two hundred and twenty-seven years ago the first of our injured race were 
brought to the shores of America. They came not with glad spirits . . . They came 
not with their own consent, to find an unmolested enjoyment of the blessings of 
this fruitful soil. The first dealings they had with men calling themselves 
Christians exhibited to them the worst features of corrupt and sordid hearts; and 
convinced them that no cruelty is too great, no villainy and no robbery too 
abhorrent for even enlightened men to perform, when influenced by avarice and 
lust . . . (Garnet, 1843/1925, p. 151) 
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For Garnet, slavery stands in opposition to the will of God because it requires 
submission to whites instead of God. Thus, slaves who accept their enslavement without 
resistance, according to Garnet, are colluding in their own oppression and therefore guilty 
of sin. Because slavery prevents blacks from fulfilling their God-given obligations, it 
should be resisted at all costs. He argues: 
 
TO SUCH DEGRADATION IT IS SINFUL IN THE EXTREME FOR YOU TO 
MAKE VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION (emphasis author’s). The divine 
commandments you are in duty bound to reverence and obey. If you do not obey 
then you will surely meet with the displeasure of the Almighty. He requires you to 
love Him supremely, and your neighbor as yourself—to keep the Sabbath day 
holy—to search the Scriptures—and bring up your children with respect for His 
laws, and to worship no other God but Him. But slavery sets all these at naught, 
and hurls defiance in the face of Jehovah. The forlorn condition in which you are 
placed does not destroy your obligation to God. You are not certain of heaven, 
because you allow yourselves to remain in a state of slavery, where you cannot 
obey the commandments of the Sovereign of the Universe. . . . Your condition 
does not absolve you from your moral obligation. The diabolical injustice by 
which your liberties are cloven down, NEITHER GOD NOR ANGELS, OR 
JUST MEN, COMMAND YOU TO SUFFER FOR A SINGLE MOMENT. 
THEREFORE IT IS YOUR SOLEMN AND IMPERATIVE DUTY TO USE 
EVERY MEANS, BOTH MORAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND PHYSICAL, 
THAT PROMISES SUCCESS. (emphasis author’s) (Garnet, 1843/1925, p. 153) 
 
Garnet’s Appeal distinguishes between false Christianity (as practiced by 
slaveholders) and true Christianity (that which mandates slaves to use all resources to 
liberate themselves). Such distinctions are common in black theology.18 In the following 
excerpt, Frederick Douglass picks up on this theme of true Christianity versus false 
Christianity. In his text “On the Union, Religion, and the Constitution” (1847) Douglass 
                                               
18 See for example Hopkins (1991) or Grant (1993) for an explanation of ways in which blacks 
distinguished between the false Christianity of their oppressors and the ‘true’ liberating meaning of 
Christianity. 
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discusses the criteria of both false Christianity and true Christianity. In short, false 
Christianity is unconcerned for the oppression of suffering masses while true Christianity 
liberates them. In the following passage, he explains the significance of true Christianity 
for the abolition. He writes: 
 
I dwell mostly upon the religious aspect, because I believe it is the religious 
people who are to be relied on in this Anti-Slavery movement. Do not 
misunderstand my railing—do not class me with those who despise religion—do 
not identify me with the infidel. I love the religion of Christianity—which cometh 
from above—which is pure, peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of good 
fruits, and without hypocrisy . . . By all the love I bear to such Christianity at this, 
I hate that of the Priest and Levite, that with long-faced Phariseeism goes up to 
Jerusalem and worships, and leaves the bruised and wounded to die. I despise that 
religion that can carry Bibles to the heathen on the other side of the globe and 
withhold them form the heathen on this side—which can talk about human rights 
yonder and traffic in human flesh here…There is another religion. It is that which 
takes off fetters instead of binding them on—that breaks every yoke—that lifts up 
the bowed down . . . It goes down after a long neglected race. It passes, link by 
link till it finds the lowest link in humanity’s chain—humanity’s most degraded 
form in the most abject condition. It reaches down its arm and tells them to stand 
up. This is Anti-Slavery—this is Christianity. (Douglass, 1847/1984, pp. 254-255) 
 
 
In a later speech, Speech at Rochester, July 5th, 1852, Douglass expresses 
impatience with the collusion of many churches in black oppression. He ridicules 
arguments that those interested in racial betterment should sugar coat their message so as 
not to offend potential allies. Sarcastically, he states: 
 
Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful 
owner of his own body? You have already declared it . . . How should I look 
today, in the presence of Americans, dividing, and subdividing a discourse, to 
show that men have a natural right to freedom? . . . To do so , would be to make 
myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding.—There is not a 
man beneath the canopy of heaven that does not know that slavery is wrong for 
him. (Douglass, 1852/1925, p. 208) 
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In the following passage, Douglass succinctly draws connections between false 
Christianity (as then practiced in the U. S.) and black oppression. Detailing the 
components of such false Christianity, he states: 
 
But the church of this country is not only indifferent to the wrongs of the slave, it 
actually takes sides with the oppressors. It has made itself the bulwark of 
American slavery, and the shield of American slave-hunters. Many of its most 
eloquent Divines, who stand as the very lights of the church, have shamelessly 
given the sanction of religion and the Bible to the while slave system. They have 
taught that man may, properly, be a slave; that the relation of master and slave is 
ordained by God; that to send back an escaped bondsman to his master is clearly 
the duty of all the followers of the Lord Jesus Christ; and this horrible blasphemy 
is palmed off upon the world for Christianity. (Douglass, 1852/1925, p. 215) 
 
 
This diverse collection of excerpts represents the varying interpretations of Christianity 
which, in turn, framed the ways these authors understood themselves and the black 
experience in the U. S.  
1865-1960 
The period from 1865 to 1960 provided opportunities for the perpetuation of 
religious traditions as well as religious innovation. After the Civil War, approximately 
four million ex-slaves were free to worship and organize their religious traditions by their 
own terms (Maffly-Kipp, 2000); some worshipped in the traditions they knew while 
others sought novel faith expressions. Northern black churches established missions in 
the south, resulting in a large growth of independent Southern black churches between 
1865 and 1900 (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Predominantly white churches also sponsored 
missions and opened schools for freed slaves (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). These schools 
increased the literacy rate of Southern blacks from approx. 5% in 1870 to 70% by 1900; a 
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major impetus for many freed slaves in attending these schools was the desire to be able 
to read the Bible for themselves (Raboteau, 1978).  
Most freed slaves chose to join the independent African American churches 
(Maffly-Kipp, 2000). According to Maffly-Kipp (2000), hundreds of thousands of 
African Americans joined the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) and African 
Methodist Episcopal Zion (AMEZ) churches after the Civil War. Additionally, in 1870 
the Colored (now “Christian”) Methodist Episcopal Church was founded by indigenous 
southern black leaders and in 1894 African American Baptists formed the National Black 
Baptist Convention (Maffly-Kipp, 2000).  
The large influx of northern churches and organizations to the South caused 
tensions to develop between southern and northern blacks (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Northern 
blacks saw southern black worship as heathen and wanted ex-slaves to give up African 
remnants and embrace the more sedate and intellectual styles of religion practiced in the 
North (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Southern blacks (many of whom had been forbidden to read 
during slavery) saw religion as an oral, emotional tradition; Northern blacks, on the other 
hand, felt true Christianity involved reading and understanding the Bible (Maffly-Kipp, 
2000). These tensions are exemplified in the sermons of two black preachers, both 
popular during this third phase of black theological development—John Jasper (1878) 
and Roscoe Conkling Bruce (1905).  
Jasper, who was born a slave, never fully learned to read. Nevertheless, he was a 
popular preacher who attracted crowds of both black and white listeners (Holifield, 
2003). In 1867, he founded the Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church in Richmond, Virginia; 
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Jasper’s church membership was almost 2,000 by the time of his death (Ross, 1996). In 
his 1878 speech entitled “De Sun Do Move,” Jasper speaks in vernacular and discusses 
God’s ability to alter nature when appropriate. While white listeners recalled Jaspers’ 
emotional sermons as entertaining, blacks hearing this sermons likely received a more 
pointed message—that the system by which blacks suffered oppression could be 
destroyed at whim by God (Holifield, 2003). In the following passage, Jasper’s sermon 
discounts scientific notions of the order of nature in favor of belief in God’s ability to re-
order nature and give victory to the oppressed. He states: 
 
Joshwer stop de sun, but heer de Lord mek de sun walk back ten dergrees; an’ yet 
dey say dat de sun stan’ stone still an’ nevur move er peg. It look ter me he move 
roun’ mighty brisk an’ is ready ter go ennyway dat de Lord ordurs him ter go. I 
wonder if enny uv dem furloserfers is roun’ here dis arternoon. I’d lik ter take a 
squar’ look at one uv dem an’ ax him to ‘splain dis mattur. He carn’t do it, my 
bruthr’n. He knows a heap ‘bout books, maps, figgers an’ long bulwarks, but I 
derfy him ter take up Heze- kier’s case an’ ‘splain it orf. He carn’t do it. De Word 
uv de Lord is my defense an’ bulwark, an’ I fears not what men can say nor do; 
my Gord gives me de vict’ry. (Jasper, 1878) 
 
 
In contrast to Jasper’s sermon which downplays academic knowledge, the following 
sermon by Roscoe Conkling Bruce extols the values of formal education. Bruce’s sermon 
is significant because it also speaks to the important role of black preachers (Raboteau, 
1978) in directing the religious climate of the black community. In the following excerpt 
of his sermon entitled “Freedom through Education,” Bruce (1905) contends that 
leadership of black churches should be limited to men with specific characteristics. He 
begins: 
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In cities the control of the church over the Negro’s life needs strengthening if only 
for restraint of crime. Everywhere the elaborate ecclesiastical organization should 
be directed and represented by men of high character and keen intelligence. 
(Bruce, 1905/1925, p. 592) 
 
 
Further in the passage, Bruce highlights the diverse spiritual needs of older blacks (who 
endured lived experiences of enslavement) and younger generations who were without 
this frame of reference. He continues: 
 
The divergence in views and sentiments between the older and younger 
generations of Negroes expresses itself very pointedly in religious matters. The 
church must remain the House of God, but at the same time the preacher must 
enrich the formalities of religion not only with the sweet spirit of sociability but 
also with the serious interests of daily life. The church, as well as the school, must 
be a social center rich in interest if it is to exercise a reasonable control over the 
more vigorous elements in the community. (Bruce, 1905/1925, p. 592) 
 
 
 In his solution to bridging the disconnect between younger and older generations of 
blacks, Bruce reveals a conflict between formally uneducated preachers and formally 
educated ones.  
 
The preacher faces a situation in which the utmost tact and intelligence and 
breadth of appreciation and power of leadership are requisite. Without unduly 
shocking the ingrained beliefs of the fathers, he must attach the religious 
sentiment to the moralities of common life. He must preach honesty, chastity, 
fidelity to contract, home-getting—the religion of character and thrift. How can 
such service be rendered by an illiterate?—a weakling? (Bruce, 1905/1925, p. 
592) 
 
  
In the South, the influx of Northern religious practices eventually diversified 
southern expressions of black religion (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Traditional black evangelical 
customs were usually retained among poorer and more rural churches in the South; many 
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of these traditions (i.e. root work and specific musical systems) were inherited from the 
hush harbors of slavery (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). The gradual rise of an educated middle 
class of black people in the South resulted, however, in a loss of many traditional 
evangelical customs and the adoption of more uniform and codified religious practices 
(Maffly-Kipp, 2000).  
In addition to tensions between formally and informally educated blacks, the third 
phase of black religious development also was marked by religious appropriation as well 
as religious innovation. As black Christians continued to search for meaning in their 
experiences of oppression in the U. S., some appropriated religious themes from 
predominantly white denominations. One salient theme was that of manifest destiny in 
which blacks in America would Christianize Africa, and thereby redeem the continent. 
This theme was appropriated from the Protestant notion of manifest destiny, through 
which God’s people would bring about a magnificent new kingdom on Earth (Pinn, 
2002).  
Alexander Crummell’s (1877) “The Destined Superiority of the Negro, a 
Thanksgiving Discourse” exemplifies this thematic appropriation of manifest destiny. 
Born to free parents in New York, Crummell was formally educated and ordained a priest 
of the Episcopal Church in 1844 (Pinn, 2002). Active in missionary endeavors to Africa, 
Crummell’s sermon contends that blacks are chosen by God to develop Africa, using 
skills and resources gained through their North American experience. In this sermon, 
Crummell argues that God utilizes vengeance and chastisement in dealing with the 
peoples of the world. For Crummell, God’s destructive vengeance is directed at nations 
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that are depraved and irredeemable, such as (according to Crummell) Native Americans 
and the indigenous population of New Zealand. He states: 
 
Some peoples God does not merely correct; He destroys them. He visits them 
with deep and abiding shame. He brings upon them utter confusion. This is a 
painful but certain fact of Providence. . . . When I am called upon to account for 
all this loss of national and tribal life, I say that God destroyed them. And the 
declaration is made on the strength of a principal attested by numerous facts in 
sacred and profane history; that when the sins of a people reach a state of hateful 
maturity, then God sends upon them sudden destruction . . . Such was the 
condition of the American Indian at the time of the discovery of America by 
Columbus. The historical fact abides, that when the white man first reached the 
shores of this continent he met the tradition of a decaying population. (Crummell, 
1877/2002, p. 113) 
 
 
Crummell argues that God chastises some races of people in discipline, but also 
leads them to greatness. He contends that blacks in America are one such group of chosen 
people. Crummell argues that worthy characteristics of the blacks in America were also 
shared by other “sterling” races such as the Greeks and Romans. The preservation of such 
characteristics connotes chosen-ness. He continues: 
 
The masterful nations are all, more or less, distinguished for vitality, plasticity, 
receptivity, imitation, family feeling, veracity, and the sentiment of devotion. 
These qualities may have been crude and unbalanced. They existed perchance 
right beside most decided and repulsive vices; but they were deeply imbedded in 
the constitutions of these people; and served as a basis on which could be built up 
a character fitted to great ends. (Crummell, 1877/2002, p. 116) 
 
 
For proof of the chosen nature of blacks, Crummell argues that the experiences of slavery 
and oppression served to discipline blacks and develop their moral capacities—not 
destroy them. He states: 
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What else, I ask, can be the significance of the African slave-trade? What is the 
meaning of our deep thralldom [sic] since 1620? Terrible as it has been, it has not 
been the deadly hurricane portending death. During its long periods, although 
great cruelty and wide-spread death have been large features in the history of the 
Negro, nevertheless they have been overshadowed by the merciful facts of great 
natural increase, much intellectual progress, the gravitation of an unexampled and 
world-wide philanthropy to the race, singular religious susceptibility and 
progress, generous, wholesale emancipation, inclusive of millions of men, 
women, and children. This history, then, does not signify retribution; does not 
forecast extinction. It is most plainly disciplinary and preparative. It is the 
education which comes from trial and endurance; for with it has been allied, more 
or less, the grand moral training of the religious tendencies of the race. 
(Crummell, 1877/2002, pp. 120-121) 
 
 
The preparation Crummell refers to is the Christianization of Africa.  
In addition to blatant religious appropriations such as the above example, blacks 
also were a part of more novel expressions of the black Christian religion at this time. 
These novel expressions are evidenced by the black holiness movement, the black 
Pentecostal movement, and Father Divine’s Peace Mission Movement. 
In 1895, Charles Harrison Mason began reviving and reorganizing the Pentecostal 
ministry (Armstrong, 2001). The results of his efforts was the formation of COGIC—the 
Church of God in Christ; followers of COGIC believe in the curative powers of prayer to 
heal the body (Armstrong, 2001). Born in Tennessee, Mason’s parents had both been 
slaves. The family moved to Arkansas where Mason briefly attended Arkansas Baptist 
College before deciding that salvation could not be found in schools or colleges (Harvey, 
1998). Although he received his preaching license as a Baptist, he began preaching 
holiness doctrines (i.e. doctrine of sanctification) and was rejected by his church (Harvey, 
1998). After visiting the Azusa street revival in Los Angeles he reportedly saw a vision 
and spoke in tongues (Harvey, 1998). When he returned to Tennessee, he broke with his 
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holiness affiliation and established the Church of God in Christ in Memphis (Harvey, 
1998). Mason traveled throughout the Mississippi Delta, preaching to and baptizing many 
blacks as they migrated North (Harvey, 1998).  
More diversification in black religion occurred early in the 20th century as blacks 
in increasing numbers migrated from the rural south to cities in the North and South 
(Baer, 1998). While many of the mainstream denominational churches attempted to 
accommodate the influx, most migrants felt more comfortable in smaller store-front and 
house churches that practiced holiness, Pentecostal (i.e. sanctified), spiritual, Islamic, 
Judaic, and other syncretistic faiths (Baer, 1998). Several of these groups will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
The Pentecostal movement came out of the Holiness movement prior to 1901 
(Synan, 1997). Established by Charles F. Parham in 1901, the Pentecostal movement’s 
connection to the black religious experience began when William Seymour attended 
Parham’s Houston Bible School—but was only allowed to listen outside the door because 
he was black (Synan, 1997). Seymour, born to freed slaves in Louisiana, was removed 
from the parish he ministered after being taught by Parham and developing a belief that 
speaking in tongues was evidence of baptism by the Holy Spirit (Synan, 1997; 
Wikipedia, 2006b). He relocated to Los Angeles, California and began a ministry in a 
run-down building on Azusa Street that he named the Apostolic Faith Mission 
(Wikipedia, 2006b). The revival lasted from 1906-1909 and consisted of frequent, 
spontaneous, and ecstatic worship (Wikipedia, 2006b). Seymour endorsed a doctrine of 
salvation, holiness (sanctification), speaking in tongues as evidence of the Holy Spirit, 
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divine healing, and the proximate return to Earth of Jesus Christ (Wikipedia, 2006b). 
Seymour’s ministry was significant because it endorsed racial unity and allowed women 
to obtain church leadership at a time when both racial segregation and patriarchal 
domination were prevalent; his ministry also is significant because through it, he 
established a world wide Pentecostal movement (Raboteau & Wills 2003; Synan, 1997). 
While some were skeptical of his teachings, others used them in their own congregations 
(Wikipedia, 2006b). Seymour’s movement became known as Pentecostalism. Though 
initially interracial, the movement split along racial lines in 1924 (Wikipedia, 2006b). 
Segregated Pentecostals reconciled and formally unified in 1998 in Memphis, Tennessee, 
renaming themselves the Pentecostal/Charismatic Church of North America (Wikipedia, 
2006b).  
In 1919 Father Divine (George Baker) began the Peace Mission Movement that 
provided food, shelter, employment, and reformation for his followers (Armstrong, 
2001). Known to his followers as Father Major Jealous Divine, the events of his life prior 
to 1914 are disputed. Most agree he was born George Baker in Georgia circa 1880. In 
1899 he became the assistant of an itinerate preacher known as Father Jehovia; the two 
split after Divine amassed his own following in 1912 (Institute for the Study of American 
Religion, 1997). By 1914, Divine and his then all black followers moved to New York; 
sometime after 1920 the first white members joined his movement (Institute for the Study 
of American Religion, 1997). According to the tenets of the religion, Father Divine was 
the messiah and his coming fulfilled the prophecies of the New and Old Testament as the 
Second Coming of Christ and the Jewish Messiah (Armstrong, 2001). Divine’s legend 
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began in 1931 when Divine, arrested for disturbing the peace, refused bail, pleaded not 
guilty and was summarily sentenced to one year in jail and a $500 fine. Two days after 
Divine went to jail, the judge (apparently healthy) died; from his jail cell Divine 
suggested he had caused the judges death (Institute for the Study of American Religion, 
1997). In response to the depression, Divine moved his mission to Harlem in 1932; there 
he purchased hotels for member lodging and provided them with food and jobs (Institute 
for the Study of American Religion, 1997). He died in 1965, but the movement continued 
under the leadership of Mother Divine. The movement was noteworthy because it offered 
a comprehensive political, economic, and religious program intended to reform 
individuals and restructure society; it included followers of all racial backgrounds and 
promoted equality (Institute for the Study of American Religion, 1997). The movement 
also was noteworthy because it was extensively studied as a “cult’ group; members live 
communally and all possessions are owned cooperatively (Armstrong, 2001; Institute for 
the Study of American Religion, 1997).  
Black Women’s Volunteer Societies 
Another development which altered the practices of black theology was the 
emergence of volunteer societies among black middle class women. The emergence of 
black middle class membership throughout the U. S. prompted questions of black 
women’s church participation (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Some middle class black women 
with enough leisure time to devote to church politics found themselves rebuffed by male 
hierarchy (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). These women formed missionary societies for job 
training and for the funding of black missionaries to Africa (Maffly-Kipp, 2000). Like the 
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missionary societies formed by white women, black women’s missionary societies 
allowed women access into the public sphere and provided them with useful information 
such as knowledge of social problems and world issues, practice in skills necessary for 
democratic participation, fundraising, and for those required to handle funds, financial 
management skills (Jeffrey, 2000). While most volunteer activity occurred in the North, 
moderate volunteer activity occurred in the south as well (Jeffrey, 2000). In the North, 
black women’s volunteer activity was not limited to middle class blacks; free black 
women living in urban areas of the North formed volunteer organizations directed 
towards racial uplift in black communities (Jeffrey, 2000). 
While such societies provided useful benefits to the people they served and to 
their members, they also perpetuated stereotypes of women and innately moral, virtuous, 
intuitive (instead of intellectual), and consequently well-suited for volunteer work 
(Jeffrey, 2000). Though there were black women at this time who did not embrace the 
cult of femininity19 in many instances, black women embraced these essentialized notions 
for political reasons. Anna Julia Cooper’s (1892) speech: “The Status of Woman in 
America” is evocative of such essentialized notions of femininity. In the speech, Cooper 
argues that black women are especially suited for moral discernment. Through their 
discernment, they can properly deal with the corruption of capitalism and lust of money 
that, for Cooper, plagued the nation at the time. She states: 
 
                                               
19 One such woman was Ida B. Wells, who launched an anti-lynching campaign in the 1890’s and argued 
that lynching served not only to terrorize blacks, but to constrain white women’s sexuality (WGBH 
Educational Foundation, 1998) 
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In this period, when material prosperity and well earned ease and luxury are 
assured facts from a national standpoint, woman’s work and woman’s influence 
are needed as never before; needed to bring a heart power into this money getting, 
dollar-worshipping civilization; needed to bring a moral force into the utilitarian 
motives and interests of the time; needed to stand for God and Home and Native 
Land versus gain and greed and grasping selfishness. (Cooper, 1892/2002, p. 144) 
 
 
Cooper’s speech clearly plays to stereotypical notions of women’s delicacy and virtue. 
Yet, it must be remembered that for many black women the dominant theme was not one 
of delicacy. Black women’s femininity was denied them by slavery as they were forced 
to perform heavy manual labor in the fields and also perform private sector duties. Thus 
for some black women, the invocation of Victorian ideals of femininity was politically 
necessary in order to subvert dominant themes of black women’s inhumanity (Roseboro 
& Ross, 2006). By declaring that black women can stand for “. . . the happiness of 
homes” (p. 145), Cooper is arguably subverting notions of black women’s inhumanity. 
Still invoking feminine ideals, she continues: 
 
Her kingdom is not over physical forces. Not by might, nor by power can she 
prevail. Her position must ever be inferior where strength of muscle creates 
leadership. If she follows the instincts of her nature, however, she must always 
stand for the conservation of those deeper moral forces which make for the 
happiness of homes and the righteousness of the country. In a reign of moral ideas 
she is easily queen. (Cooper, 1892/2002, p. 145) 
 
 
Significant in Cooper’s work is the recognition of black women’s unique role in 
the matrix of domination. She make is clear that black women’s oppression is 
different from that of white women and black men; unlike white women or black 
men, black women face the ramifications of both racial oppression and patriarchy 
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(hooks, 1984). Cooper expresses the multiple and competing forms of oppression 
experienced by black women in the following passage. She states: 
 
The colored woman of today occupies, one may say, a unique position in this 
country. In a period of itself transitional and unsettled, her status seems one of the 
least ascertainable and definitive of all the forces which make our civilization. 
She is confronted by both a woman question and a race problem, and is as yet an 
unknown or an unacknowledgeable factor in both. While the women of the white 
race can with calm assurance enter upon the work they feel by nature appointed to 
do, while their men give loyal support and appreciative countenance to their 
efforts, recognizing in most avenues of usefulness the propriety and the need of 
woman’s distinctive cooperation, the colored woman too often finds herself 
hampered and shamed by a less liberal sentiment and a more conservative attitude 
on the part of those for whose opinion she cares most….as far as my experience 
goes the average man of our race is less frequently ready to admit the actual need 
among the sturdier forces of the world for woman’s help or influence. (Cooper, 
1892/2002, p. 145) 
 
 
Yet for Cooper, the unique positionality of black women creates opportunities for human 
betterment. In the following passage, Cooper suggests that black women’s experiences 
constitute God’s “great push” designed to discipline them and facilitate their growth. 
Here Cooper’s suggestion—that black women’s experiences of oppression allow them to 
discern a truth hidden to others is illustrative of later womanist theological reflection. 
Discussing black women’s discernment of morality and truth she states: 
 
One needs occasionally to stand aside from the hum and rush of human interests 
and passions to hear the voice of God. And it not unfrequently happens that the 
All-loving gives a great push to certain souls to thrust them out, as it were, from 
the distracting current for awhile to promote their discipline and growth, or to 
enrich them by communion and reflection. And similarly it may be woman’s 
privilege from her peculiar coigne of vantage as a quiet observer, to whisper just 
the needed suggestion or the almost forgotten truth. (Cooper, 1892/2002, p. 147) 
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As the first year of World War I wore on, concerns in America logically 
connected with global concerns. Black Americans were not exempt from making these 
connections. The following excerpt by Alexander Walters is taken from a 1915 speech in 
which Walters attempts to connect the black experience in America with global concerns. 
In this speech, which thematically parallels Booker T. Washington’s (1899) speech “The 
future of the American Negro,”20 Walters argues that blacks were brought to the U. S. by 
Providence, so that whites could learn to treat blacks justly according to Christian 
principles and then spread Christianity around the globe. In short, Walters sees blacks as 
a sort of test case—an experiment in Christian democracy through which whites may 
perfect their democratic techniques before extending them to the world. Walters states: 
 
America is the leader in present-day civilization. She leads in commerce, 
invention, education, religion, and social reform. She is given a wonderful 
opportunity to do service for God and humanity in taking the lead in solving the 
race problem on Christian principles. I am of the opinion that the purpose of God 
in allowing the black man to be brought to these shores and to become a part of 
this civilization was to prepare the white man, by contract, discipline, and 
education for world leadership in the spread of pure democracy and of the 
brotherhood of man. Equal treatment, fair treatment, just treatment of the darker 
races is the test of the white man’s religion. When the white man can treat a 
Negro, Japanese, Chinaman, African, as a brother and accord him all the rights of 
a brother, that white man can pass—he is pure gold, and fit to lead any people and 
anywhere. (Walters, 1915/2002, p. 205) 
 
 
Throughout the development of the U. S., racial oppression remained constant. 
Despite the locales that they resided in, their political affiliation, and to a large extent, 
their educational background, blacks in American continued to be denied social, 
                                               
20 Washington (1899) argues that God brought blacks to the U. S. so that whites, through their dealings 
with blacks, might learn patience, forbearance, and supreme trust in God. 
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economic, and political opportunities. In the following excerpt: “The Faith of the 
American Negro” (1922), Mordecai Johnson articulates the faithfulness of black 
Americans in Christianity and democracy despite persistent racial oppression. Johnson’s 
oration is significant because it also touches on the factions of black Americans who tired 
of faithfulness to Christianity and/or democracy and pursued other avenues. He states: 
 
Since their emancipation from slavery the masses of American Negroes have 
lived by the strength of a simple but deeply moving faith. They have believed in 
the love and providence of a just and holy God; they have believed in the 
principles of democracy and in the righteous purpose of the Federal Government; 
and they have believed in the disposition of the American people as a whole and 
in the long run to be fair in all their dealings…In spite of disenfranchisement and 
peonage, mob violence and public contempt, they have kept this faith and have 
allowed themselves to hope with the optimism of Booker T. Washington that in 
proportion as they grew in intelligence, wealth, and self-respect they should win 
the confidence and esteem of their fellow white Americans, and should gradually 
acquire the responsibilities and privileges of full American citizenship. (Johnson, 
1922/1925, pp. 658-659) 
 
 
In the following passage, Johnson chronicles the factions of black Americans that, for a 
variety of reasons, have tired of being faithful to traditional avenues for black liberation. 
Instead these factions have placed their hope in Marxism or black nationalism, 
respectively. He continues: 
 
Some of our young men are giving up the Christian religion, thinking that their 
fathers were fools to have believed it so long . . . One group among us repudiates 
entirely the simple faith of former days. It would put no trust in God, no trust in 
democracy, and would entertain no hope for betterment under the present form of 
government. It believes that the United States Government is through and through 
controlled by selfish capitalists who have no fundamental good-will for Negroes 
or for any sort of laborers whatever . . . Another and larger group among us 
believes in religion and believes in the principles of democracy, but not in the 
white man’s religion and not in the white man’s democracy. It believes that the 
creed of the former slave States is the tacit creed of the whole nation, and that the 
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Negro may never expect to acquire economic, political, and spiritual liberty in 
America . . . (Johnson, 1922/1925, p. 661) 
 
 
Johnson maintains that the majority of black Americans do not belong to the fore-
mentioned factions. Instead, the majority remain faithful, yet frustrated because they have 
yet to receive the economic, social, or political advantages guaranteed them as American 
citizens. Here Johnson foreshadows the thematic thrust of the Civil Rights movement as 
he argues that the condition of blacks in America will not improve unless public policy is 
enforced to guarantee the rights of all American citizens. He continues: 
 
Whatever one may think of these radical movements and their destiny, . . . they 
are home-grown fruits, with roots deep sprung in a world of black American 
suffering . . . The larger masses of the colored people do not belong to these more 
radical movements. They retain their belief in the Christian God, they love their 
country, and hope to work out their salvation within its bounds. But they are 
completely disillusioned. They see themselves surrounded on every hand by a 
sentiment of antagonism which does not intend to be fair. They see themselves 
partly reduced to peonage, shut out from labor unions, forced to an inferior status 
before the courts, made subjects of public contempt, lynched and mobbed with 
impunity, and deprived of the ballot, their only means of social defense. They see 
this antagonistic sentiment consolidated in the places of power in the former slave 
States and growing by leaps and bounds in the North and West. They know that it 
is gradually reducing them to an economic, political, and social caste. And they 
are now no longer able to believe with Dr. Booker T. Washington, or with any 
other man, that their own efforts after intelligence, wealth, and self-respect can in 
any wise avail to deliver them from these conditions unless they have the 
protection of a just and beneficent public policy in keeping with American ideals. 
(Johnson, 1922/1925, pp. 661-662) 
 
Bishop “Sweet Daddy” Grace 
During the 1920’s and 30’s, Bishop Charles Manual “Sweet Daddy” Grace gained 
fame as the charismatic founder of the United House of Prayer for All People of the 
Church of the Rock of Apostolic Faith; Grace claimed to have curative powers and 
77 
 
invoked an evangelic style of preaching that encouraged ecstatic worship (Raboteau & 
Wills, 2003). Born Marceline Manuel De Graca in Cape Verde, Africa in 1881, his 
family immigrated to Massachusetts where he eventually Americanized his name to 
Charles Manual Grace (BookRags, 2005). Though baptized in the Roman Catholic faith, 
Grace gravitated to the holiness movement within Protestant worship (BookRags, 2005). 
He opened his first House of Prayer in 1919, with himself as bishop. Known for its 
eschatological focus and group baptism (eventually carried out by fire hose in the streets), 
the church quickly expanded into twelve states in the south and west (BookRags, 2005). 
Grace’s flamboyance (i.e. long hair, painted fingernails, brightly colored apparel, 
be-jeweled fingers, and entourage) contributed to his popularity and criticism and likely 
helped his church expansion (BookRags, 2005). While Grace originally performed 
healings (BookRags, 2005; Raboteau & Wills, 2003) he later encouraged believers to 
perceive the curative power of their own faith. As he aged, his church participation 
decreased to the point of simply making appearances; consequently, few records of 
Grace’s sermons exist (BookRags, 2005). Financially, Grace exhibited great skill. Using 
church donations, he built a corporate empire for the church; he purchased several 
manufacturing businesses that generated church income and eventually expanded to real 
estate investment. Grace purchased the headquarters of Father Divine’s Peace Mission 
Movement and evicted him in 1938 (BookRags, 2005). Church confusion after Grace’s 
death in 1960 led to the formation of at least one splinter group; the main body of the 
church under the new leadership of Walter McCollough was a multi-million dollar 
organization with almost one hundred Houses of prayer nationwide (BookRags, 2005). 
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Under McCollough’s leadership, the church focused on issues of social justice and 
eschatology (BookRags, 2005). Through Grace’s social and financial vision, and 
McCollough’s redirection of the church toward mainstream black religion, the House of 
Prayer has been very successful; it continues to thrive in the present.  
 Some black religious expressions that developed during this time were not based 
exclusively on Christianity, yet still influenced many in the black community. One such 
religious expression is the Nation of Islam. The Nation of Islam was founded by Elijah 
Poole (Muhammad) in 1931 in Detroit, Michigan and blended teachings from 
Christianity, the Islamic faith, freemasonry, and other New Age religious movements 
(Raboteau & Wills, 2003). The Nation of Islam focused on black oppression and during 
its formation, equated Satan and evil with the white race (Armstrong, 2001). In the 
1950’s Malcolm X was appointed as the national spokesman for the Nation of Islam; he 
left in 1964 when he converted to traditional Islam (Armstrong, 2001).  
In the early 1940’s, World War II initially granted a reprieve to blacks suffering 
from racial oppression (WGBH Educational Foundation, 1998). More than 2 ½ million 
black men and thousands of black women found themselves in the service of the war 
effort (National Atomic Museum, 2003). They faced widespread discrimination and were 
often forced into segregated working conditions, yet many served with distinction and 
honor (National Atomic Museum, 2003). As in the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, 
and World War I, the irony of blacks defending the ideals of a nation that blatantly 
disregarded their humanity was painful. One black theologian who addresses these issues 
is Pauli Murray.  
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Among her many accomplishments, Murray (who received a law degree prior to 
obtaining her divinity degree) was the first black deputy attorney general (male or 
female) of California, the first black person the receive the Doctor of Juridical Science 
degree from Yale in 1965, and the first black woman priest in the Episcopal Church in 
1977 (Pinn, 2002). In the following essay, Anna Pauli Murray (with Henry Babcock) 
eloquently speaks to the complications arising when blacks fight for democracy—namely 
that they are also implicitly fighting for the white supremacy that will inevitably continue 
to be used against them. Murray and Babcock, who proposes pacifism as an alternative to 
violence, detail these complications in the following essay entitled “An Alternative 
Weapon” (1942), they write:  
 
For the American Negro pacifist, both the confusion, and the courage required to 
work one’s way through it to the way of non-violence, are intensified. He has 
always lived under the crushing heel of racial supremacy. He has experienced the 
feel of this heel, he has felt himself pushed down to a subhuman status, he has 
known how this force seeks to keep him there. But he is told that if this country 
suffers military defeat, Hitlerism and its demonic race theory would become the 
national official policy rather than a sporadic or ingrown sectionalism adhered to 
by an all too large minority of misguided white Americans. He is told this and he 
knows that his fate is tied with the fate of democracy and freedom, as fumbling, 
blind, and stupid as some aspects of that democracy are when applied to 
him…Yet he also knows that after he has pulled white supremacy out of the fire, 
he may be sent back to the race ghettos to starve and despair. He knows that even 
now, as he is called upon to save democracy, democracy can find no democratic 
place for him in the fight to save it . . . (Murray & Babcock, 1942/2002, p. 218) 
 
 
The era from 1865 to 1960 reflects elements of religious inclusion as well as 
exclusivity; the shift towards global concerns and commonality that was begun during 
this period would be refined during the Civil Rights Movement. Raboteau and Wills 
(2003) suggest that during this period of time, the focus shifted away from orthodox 
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religious practices back to African tradition; focus also was extended to global concerns 
and awareness of the commonality among all persons of color. As in the previous era, 
black religious figures during this time also were concerned about black oppression. 
1960-1999 
 This era of black theological discourse represents a qualitative shift from previous 
eras. Rather than public addresses or sermons, the discourses in this period are more 
academic, in the sense that they are comprised largely of works by scholars of black 
theology. This shift was brought on by various historical and cultural developments that 
created civil and political unrest and, in so doing acted as catalysts for new ways of 
thinking about black theology.  
Important events in the 1950’s placed civil rights at the forefront of black 
American issues. In 1954, for example, the U. S. Supreme Court overturned the long-
standing doctrine of separate but equal in Brown v. Board of Education, ruling that 
segregated schools were not permissible (McElrath, 2006). The civil unrest that followed 
school integration attempts increased with the murder of Emmett Till, the organization of 
the Montgomery bus boycott, and the arrest of Rosa Parks in 1955 (McElrath, 2006). By 
1957 the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was organizing non-violent 
protests against the still rampant racism and discrimination against blacks in the US. By 
1960 the sit-in conducted by four NC A&T State University students in Greensboro, NC 
had sparked similar sit-ins throughout cities in the South (McElrath, 2006). Civil rights 
unrest nationally and political unrest abroad with the Vietnam conflict created a turbulent 
climate in the U. S. 
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Religiously, many African Americans espoused belief in a coming racial 
apocalypse within which white Americans would suffer violent retribution for their sins 
against blacks (Raboteau & Wills, 2003). Other black American beliefs that emerged 
during this phase identified blacks as the true descendants of the ancient Hebrews 
(Raboteau & Wills, 2003). In this phase of black theology like the preceding stages, 
many writings converge on interpretations and responses to black suffering. This phase 
differs, however, in that it realized—especially through the work of James Cone,21 the 
establishment of black theology as an academic discipline. With the institutionalization of 
black theology, the dissemination of black religious discourse was facilitated among 
scholars of black theology. As such, these works are often marked (either implicitly or 
explicitly) by thematic continuations of or responses to, other contemporary works of 
black theology. The markedly different nature of the excerpts in this section requires an 
alternative approach to their presentation. Because a majority of the sources are derived 
from book chapters and in some cases entire books, summaries will be provided of the 
thematic thrust of each work before the excerpts are presented. These discussions will be 
organized by decade. 
1960’s 
 Howard Thurman. Philosopher, ordained Baptist minister, and civil rights leader, 
Howard Thurman became the first black dean of Boston University in 1925 (Wikipedia, 
2006d). Thurman traveled extensively, headed Christian missions and was acquainted 
                                               
21 Cone is recognized as the father of academic black theology (Pinn, 2002);Cone’s (1969) Black Theology 
and Black Power and (1970) A Black Theology of Liberation were the first published works on liberation 
theology (Hopkins, 1999) 
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with Gandhi (Pinn, 2002; Wikipedia, 2006d). In 1944 Thurman helped establish the 
Church for the Fellowship of All Peoples in San Francisco, the first racially integrated 
and intercultural church in the U. S. (Wikipedia, 2006d). A prolific writer, many of 
Thurman’s works address issues of human pain and suffering. Given the tumultuous 
nature of the early 1960’s, it should be no surprise that the following excerpts by 
Thurman (originally published in 1963), also deal with the nature and purposes of 
suffering. 
Specifically, Thurman focuses on ways suffering can bring individuals a deeper 
understanding of their purpose in life and relationship to God. Thurman contends that 
suffering—a universal and therefore an inescapable fact of life for humans—can result in 
negative and positive outcomes. Negatively, suffering may result in humiliation of the 
individual and destruction of her/his spirit; positively it can facilitate transformation. He 
argues that “Openings are made in a life by suffering that are not made in any other way.” 
(p. 238). Such openings can lead to spiritual reinforcement. 
 For Thurman, individuals who suffer can enter into a “fellowship of suffering” by 
joining with a community of sufferers (1962/2002, p. 239). Thurman argues that such 
fellowship does not lessen suffering, but it allows the sufferer to gain perspective by 
understanding his or her suffering as inclusive of other people. In addition to fellowship 
with other sufferers, individuals also can gain sustenance through fellowship with Christ. 
Thurman writes:  
 
For many Christians, the sense of the presence of the suffering Christ, who in 
their thoughts is also the suffering God, makes it possible through his fellowship 
to abide their own suffering of whatever character. To know him in the fellowship 
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of His suffering is to be transformed by the glory of His life, and for these 
individuals this is enough—in His name they can stand anything that life can do 
to them. This is the resource and the discipline that comes to their rescue under 
the siege of pain. (1962/2002, p. 240) 
 
 
Thurman argues that suffering can bring about individual interior development by 
forcing individuals to confront issues of life and death and in so doing discover the 
meaning and purpose of life (i.e. God). Thurman contends that individuals suffer as part 
of the experience of freedom and part of the growth of life. Essentially, suffering allows 
each person to experience the meaning of death. He writes:  
 
The ultimate logic of suffering, of course, lies in the fact of death. The particular 
quality of death is to be found in what it says about the future. Death is a denial of 
the validity of the future. This is the logic of all suffering. It is what rallies the 
spirit and girds man to do battle . . . All religions, since man began his pilgrimage 
on the planet, have been forced to deal with this central issue: they must answer 
the challenge of the end of man’s life. . . . Life and death are the experience of 
living things, and here Life in some sense becomes identical with God. To say 
that man is driven to a face-to-face encounter with Life and its Creator, out of 
whom come life and death as experiences in Life. Death is seen as being an 
experience within Life, not happening to Life. (Thurman, 1962/2002, p. 242) 
 
 
When the individual who confronts her or his own death and discovers God, Thurman 
contends that she or he finds confirmation that her/his life and death are both contained 
within God. Discussing this confirmation, Thurman writes:  
 
I believe that such confirmation of life in us is the work of the Holy Spirit of God. 
For me, the love of God nourishes and confirms us and gives to us the assurance 
that, because life in all its vicissitudes is contained in Him, in Him we have the 
sense of ultimate finality in existence that makes total existence, and our life in it, 
purposeful and meaningful. I cannot escape the necessity of concluding that the 
answer to suffering is to be found in experiencing in one’s being the meaning of 
death. To state it categorically, it is to have one’s innermost self or persona 
assured that the finality of death, which is the logic of all suffering, is itself 
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contained in a more comprehensive finality of God Himself . . . This means that, 
at any point in human history, no event in the life of a single person can be 
separated from what are, in fact, the ends of God. (Thurman, 1962/2002, p. 244) 
 
 
Such confirmation, according to Thurman, renders questions about evil and undeserved 
suffering merely “academic.” Thurman argues that the suffering individual is ultimately 
concerned with managing her or his suffering. Thurman contends that for such 
reassurances/confirmation, philosophy and religion can assist but cannot sustain and 
confirm the individual—only the human spirit can do this. Through confirmation the 
individual can face his suffering and manage it rather than be ravaged by it. Thurman 
concludes: 
 
If the answer to his suffering is to force it and challenge it to do its worst (244) 
because he knows that when it has exhausted itself it has only touched the outer 
walls of his dwelling place. This can only come to pass because he has found 
something big enough to contain all violences, violations—he has found that his 
life is rooted in a God who cares for him and cultivates his spirit, whose purpose 
is to bring to heel all the untutored, recalcitrant expressions of life. Such a man 
knows that he cannot determine what may befall him, either as a child of nature, 
as a child of his time and age, or even as a child of God. He knows that suffering, 
the ultimate logic of which is death in life, is a part of the living stuff of his 
earthly adventure. He knows that even in his own strength he never quite explores 
the limits of his endurance, and beyond all this there is the possibility of a 
reinforcement of his life that transcends all the vicissitudes of his fortune and 
shares in a collective destiny in which God is all and in all. (1962/2002, pp. 244-
245) 
 
 
 Joseph Washington. Joseph Washington, Jr.’s book The Politics of God (1967) 
was published in the same year Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Declaration of Independence 
from the War in Vietnam” was published in Ramparts magazine and one year after Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panther party in Oakland, California 
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(McElrath, 2006). The continued unrest in the U. S. expressed itself in acts of violence 
and expressions of disillusionment. Amidst this backdrop Washington, who had been 
employed as a minister, dean, and professor of theology, argued that America’s hope for 
salvation lay in authentic black religion, which was compatible with the dominant theme 
of Christianity—reconciliation. Washington contrasts authentic black religion with 
“white folk's religion.” Washington describes white folks religion as demonic and 
contends that it stands in direct contradiction to reconciliation and the Kingdom of God 
(p. 254). For Washington, the hope for America’s reconciliation lies in black religious 
structures because they contain principles of brotherhood and equality—principles that 
for Washington, white religion has rejected. He writes:   
 
The only radical human challenge to white folk religion and its social-cultural 
establishment is the Negro. The element of reconciliation has been primary in the 
genuine religion of the Negro folk. They joined it with the democratic creed. Both 
have been at the heart of the Negro folk . . . (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 254) 
 
 
For Washington, black religion holds the theme of Christianity constant and also 
endorses the democratic creed. Washington says black religion developed out of black 
suffering. Because of the persistent suffering of black people and their remaining true to 
Christianity in spite of their suffering, Washington contends that black people are chosen; 
as such their suffering is redemptive. He writes: 
 
Freedom and equality with and for all—Negro folk religion—is the genius of the 
Negro folk. Developed out of an elite breakthrough of its minority but the 
suffering of its majority, it parallels the genius of religion and democracy rooted 
in biblical faith. As a result of this suffering by a whole people for four centuries 
and place in the perspective of the Bible, we contend here that the Negro cannot 
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be understood or understand himself except as another “chosen people.” By their 
stripes may all be healed. (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 254) 
 
 
For Washington, the lack of awareness black people have about their chosen-ness 
paradoxically serves as proof of their chosen status. In contrast to evangelical Puritans 
who, Washington contends, were self-appointed to a manifest destiny and thus not 
chosen, blacks do not claim chosen status and in fact are chosen people. Washington 
argues that true suffering servants have no escape hatch—this is what separates true 
chosen people from self-proclaimed chosen people. He states: 
 
The fact that Negroes do not perceive themselves as the people chosen by God to 
be His suffering servants for the “transgression” of all God’s people in America, 
if not elsewhere, is a positive rather than a negative sign of chosen-ness. In this 
the Negro is markedly different from the Anglo-Puritans who settled this nation in 
the conscious belief that it was the “promised land” and that they were 
specifically “chosen people . . .” (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 255) 
 
 
The task set for black Americans, Washington argues, is to free the black race, the 
white race, and then the world through reconciliation, exemplified through interracial 
sexual togetherness. Speaking of the task of black Americans Washington writes: “For 
God has called the Negro people to an infinitely more complex and responsible task—not 
only of being released from bondage but of releasing its captors from their shackles as 
well” (p. 256). Further in the passage he speaks specifically of the global task of black 
Americans. He states: “. . . the Negro is called to be the servant whereby all nations, not 
just America, will be redeemed . . . The mission of the Negro must be to unify mankind 
through acceptance of differences as blessings rather than punishment” (p. 259). 
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Washington argues that the period of black enslavement and resulting 
emancipation was not the end, but the beginning of the event binding black people with 
whites and with the world. In the following excerpt, Washington discusses the physical 
realization of reconciliation (i.e., sexual togetherness). He writes: 
 
God has called the Negro as the “suffering servant,” whereby mankind the world 
over will consciously, not accidentally, voluntarily, not by force as in times past, 
affirm first in principle and then in practice a life of full human oneness through 
the only biblical way of real knowing. Sexual togetherness is in the Bible the 
fullest expression of knowledge and union. (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 257) 
 
 
Blacks will lead conscious affirmations of “full human oneness” through sexual knowing. 
Through their suffering (i.e. the offering for the sin of racial separateness) unity will be 
realized. Washington argues: 
 
All mankind is in a state of deprivation and the Negro is the servant of release 
from this bondage of human separateness—this deprivation—being as he is 
externally the most deprived, though neither by his will or his doing can he undo 
the calling as “an offering for sin.” (1967/2002, p. 258) 
 
 
Believing reconciliation will not likely be achieved without bloodshed, Washington 
critiques Martin Luther King Jr.’s nonviolence movement as a narrow-minded (white) 
reading of the Bible. Washington argues that redemption is incomprehensible apart from 
bloodshed.  
 
Insofar as the Martin Luther King, Jr. non-violent technique dominates through 
calling men to bleed in social action for the purpose of a hamburger and calling 
them back from bloodshed in social intercourse, it is guided by faithlessness in 
God and distortion of the “suffering servant” mission. Moreover, King has 
followed the white rational line of white folk ethics which is steeped in white folk 
interpretation of the New Testament ignoring its unity with the Old Testament. It 
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is true that the New Testament demand is katallagete, but the key to being 
reconciled is not the Apostle Paul but his Master—Jesus, whose unbreakable link 
is with the Old Testament and in the death of Jesus Christ, incomprehensible apart 
from the offering of blood. Christ was the true sacrifice—not of materialism or 
ideas, but of his very life and blood. The Christian faith means nothing if it does 
not mean sacrifice. (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 261) 
 
 
Although Washington is confident of the black American’s mission, he questions 
whether blacks will accept their chosen task. Washington states that some blacks have 
forgotten Negro folk religion in their preoccupation with the Civil Rights movement. By 
interpreting freedom as the achievement of middle class status some blacks, he argues, 
have failed to answer the call of God to free humanity for the Kingdom of God. He 
ponders: 
 
The question is whether the people of God called Negroes can be faithful to their 
folk religion and still consciously accept their mission. Will the Negro choose to 
be what he is, “suffering servant,” the source of power, or fatalistically acquiesce 
in suffering, if not exploit if for personal gain rather than group salvation. 
(Washington, 1967/2002, p. 264) 
 
 
For Washington, the suffering of black Americans is to be celebrated; blacks are 
the instrument by which the world will be redeemed. Washington implies that blacks 
should gladly make this sacrifice. He writes: 
 
The Negro’s seemingly undeserved punishment is his opportunity to release all 
men from the sin of in-groupness. The “curse” of being Negro is really the 
blessed symbol of God’s paradoxical instrument and the means of His grace for 
all men. The inescapability from being black and its accompanying inhumane 
treatment by white humans is to be cherished and used for the purpose of God and 
not despised through the prejudices of men. (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 267) 
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 Martin Luther King, Jr. Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community 
(1967) was published one year before Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 had been passed, followed by increases in overt act of racism 
and riots in urban areas (King, 1967). Also during this time, the Vietnam conflict 
continued and much public sentiment in the U. S. was anti-war, prompting King to speak 
out publicly against the war. With rioting in many urban cities and persistent racism 
despite the advances of the Civil Rights movement, some blacks began embracing the 
black power movement instead of the non-violence King advocated.  
King’s book is a response to these issues; it provides a candid analysis of black 
and white responses to the civil rights movement. A central thesis of this work is that 
blacks and whites understood the civil rights movement in contrary ways. For whites, the 
civil rights movement was a project to establish decent treatment of blacks, not equality; 
for blacks, who believed in the promises of U. S. democracy, the civil rights movement 
was understood as a project of social, economic, and political equality. After blacks 
attained more humane treatment and persisted in attempts at equality, a ‘white backlash’ 
ensued. King describes these conflicting views of the civil rights movement in the 
following passage. He writes: 
 
When Negroes looked for the second phase, the realization of equality, the found 
that many of their white allies had quietly disappeared. The Negroes of America 
had taken the President, the press and the pulpit at their word when they spoke in 
broad terms of freedom and justice. But the absence of brutality and unregenerate 
evil is not the presence of justice. To stay murder is not the same thing as to 
ordain brotherhood. The word was broken, and the free-running expectations of 
the Negro crashed into the stone walls of white resistance. The result was havoc. 
Negroes felt cheated, especially in the North, while many whites felt that the 
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Negroes had gained so much it was virtually impudent and greedy to ask for more 
so soon. (p. 4) 
 
 
Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community is then an attempt to 
deconstruct the above situation, explicate its consequences (i.e. white backlash and black 
power), and articulate personal, structural, legal, and programmatic solutions that will 
enable the U. S. and the world to move past racism and the economic exploitation it 
spawned. 
A major focus in King’s work is the explication of the black power movement, 
which for King, developed from the frustration of black non-violence in the face of 
persistent white resistance. King acknowledges the positive aspects of black power—the 
movement encourages blacks to gain political and economic strength to achieve their 
goals provides a psychological call to manhood for black men spiritually wounded by 
racial segregation, and an opportunity to ‘glory in blackness’ (p. 40) and honor the 
African past. Despite these beneficial aspects of the black power movement, King argues 
that it is ultimately a desperate project, lacking hope and as such is incompatible with the 
goals of the civil rights movement. He writes: 
 
Beneath all the satisfaction of a gratifying slogan, Black Power is a nihilistic 
philosophy born out of the conviction that the Negro can’t win. It is, at bottom, 
the view that American society is so hopelessly corrupt and enmeshed in evil that 
there is no possibility of salvation from within. Although this thinking is 
understandable as a response to a white power structure that never completely 
committed itself to true equality for the Negro, and a die-hard mentality that 
sought to shut all windows and doors against the winds of change, it nonetheless 
carries the seeds to its own doom. (King, 1967, p. 44) 
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King (1967) argues that the desperation of the black power movement is 
insufficient to sustain a revolution and that black power precluded the cooperation 
between blacks and whites necessary for social transformation. In his disavowal of the 
violence accepted in the black power movement, King re-affirms his commitment to non-
violent coercion as a morally acceptable tool for social transformation. 
Much of King’s book is devoted to a candid discussion about white racism and 
white Americans’ responsibility for the status of blacks in the U. S. Discussing white 
resistance to change and the resulting white backlash against civil rights advances King 
writes: 
 
Ever since the birth of our nation, white America has had a schizophrenic 
personality on the question of race. She has been torn between selves—a self in 
which she proudly professed the great principles of democracy and a self in which 
she sadly practiced the antithesis of democracy. This tragic duality has produced a 
strange indecisiveness and ambivalence toward the Negro, causing America to 
take a step backward simultaneously with every step forward on the question of 
racial justice . . . The step backward has a new name today. It is called the ‘white 
backlash.’ But the white backlash is nothing new. It is the surfacing of old 
prejudices, hostilities and ambivalences that have always been there. It was 
caused neither by the cry of Black Power nor by the unfortunate recent wave of 
riots in our cities. The white backlash of today is rooted in the same problem that 
has characterized American ever since the black man landed in chains on the 
shores of this nation. The white backlash is an expression of the same vacillations, 
the same search for rationalizations, the same lack of commitment that have 
always characterized white America on the question of race. (1967, p. 68) 
 
 
King argues that American slavery, rooted in U. S. economic development, 
profoundly impacted the social, legal, and political structures of the U. S.; the doctrine of 
white supremacy was created to justify slavery and white morality while Christianity was 
used to further justify white supremacy. Given this long history of inequality, King 
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argues that many whites are more comfortable maintaining the status quo rather than 
committing to equality. 
In order to be true to the democratic impulse of the American psyche, King argues 
that national support be provided for the war on poverty, efforts be made to increase the 
dignity of the poor, and social programs be created for the eradication of poverty. While 
King places the onus of responsibility on whites for ending the race problem, he believes 
whites cannot achieve this goal in the absence of non-violent coercion for change. He 
writes: “. . . every ethical appeal to the conscience of the white man must be accompanied 
by nonviolent pressure” (p. 129). Additionally, King states that the church, once a 
collaborator in racism, must be a voice for equality and take the lead in social reform. 
King holds all of society responsible for social transformation, ending racism, and 
eliminating poverty. He writes: “No great victories are won in a war for the 
transformation of a whole people without total participation. Less than this will not create 
a new society; it will only evoke more sophisticated token amelioration” (p. 20). Yet 
while all share responsibility for change, blacks, according to King, must bear the greater 
burden. He writes: 
 
After 348 years racial injustice is still the Negro’s burden and America’s shame. 
Yet for his own inner health and outer functioning, the Negro is called upon to be 
as resourceful, as productive and as responsible as those who have not known 
such oppression and exploitation. This is the Negro’s dilemma (emphasis 
author’s). He who starts behind in a race must forever remain behind or run faster 
than the man in front. It is enough to cause the Negro to give up in despair . . . 
And yet there are times when life demands the perpetual doing of the impossible. 
The life of our slave forebears is eternal testimony to the ability of men to achieve 
the impossible. (King, 1967, p. 120) 
 
93 
 
Further in the chapter, King re-articulates the need for blacks to rise above their 
circumstances and lead the movement for social transformation. Blacks can, according to 
King, be the impetus for a more compassionate and humane United States. Describing the 
unique capabilities of blacks to accomplish these goals he writes: 
 
We are superbly equipped to do this. We have been seared in the flames of 
suffering. We have known the agony of being the underdog . . . We must have a 
passion for peace born out of wretchedness and the misery of war . . . So in 
dealing with our particular dilemma, we will challenge the nation to deal with its 
larger dilemma . . . This is the challenge. If we dare to meet it honestly, historians 
in future years will have to say there lived a great people—a black people—who 
bore the burdens of oppression in the heat of many days and who, through 
tenacity and creative commitment, injected new meaning into the veins of 
American life. (King, 1967, p. 134) 
 
 
 Albert Cleage. Ordained in the Congregational Church in 1943, Albert Cleage 
first pastored at an integrated church in San Francisco (Pinn, 2002). In 1951 he went to 
St. Marks Presbyterian mission, but soon ran into disagreements with white church 
leaders over his leadership; in 1953 Cleage and some of his followers left the church to 
form Central Congregation Church where they ministered and provided programs for the 
communities poor (The Faith Project, 2003). By the 1960’s, Cleage, influenced by the 
black nationalist movement, began to espouse a more radical approach to civil rights (The 
Faith Project, 2003). In 1967 he initiated the Black Christian National Movement (later 
renamed the “Shrine of the Black Madonna” and began re-interpreting Jesus’ teachings 
relevant to the political and socio-economic needs of the black community (Pinn, 2002). 
Amidst racial unrest in Detroit, Cleage published The Black Messiah in 1968. His work is 
significant because its central theme of a black God who is involved in the liberation of 
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blacks in the U. S. was later integrated into a systematic theology by James Cone, 
resulting in the birth of academic black theology. 
In the following excerpt from this work, Cleage argues that God is on the side of 
the oppressed who must actively seek out their liberation. Cleage further argues that 
Eurocentric gospel interpretations hid God’s/Christ’s identification with black people’s 
struggle for freedom (Pinn, 2002). Black’s are, for Cleage, God’s chosen people; he 
argues that blacks continue to suffer in America because of faithlessness (i.e. they are not 
proactive in the freedom struggle). 
Cleage’s sermon deals specifically with biblical accounts of Israel’s attempts to 
enter the Promised Land and their reluctance to make necessary sacrifices. Cleage draws 
a parallel between Israel’s wandering in the wilderness and black people’s experience in 
America as “shepherds in the wilderness” (p. 275). For Cleage, acceptance of black 
oppression is an indication of faithlessness. He writes: 
 
. . . the people who accept oppression, who permit themselves to be downtrodden, 
those people are faithless because God did not make men to be oppressed and to 
be downtrodden. And many times a man faces the choice between living as a 
slave and dying as a man. And when we choose to live as slaves, we are faithless 
and our children will be shepherds in the wilderness. (Cleage, 1968/2002, p. 276) 
 
 
Cleage focuses on the national unrest and resulting legislative attempts to suspend 
laws regulating police search and seizure as part of governmental attempts to curb 
violence. Cleage chronicles the violence against blacks in America and argues that 
present attempts to control violence are hypocritical. He states: 
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I would like to suggest that crime in the streets didn’t just start in Watts two years 
ago. Crime in the streets is not something new in these United States. Crime in the 
streets is part of the American tradition. It is part of the American way of life. 
Why, all of a sudden, are people concerned about crime in the street? (Cleage, 
1968/2002, p. 276) 
 
 
Cleage’s sermon strongly criticizes black people for not taking responsibility for 
their own liberation. He argues that through cowardice, interest in self-preservation, and 
lack of faith in their own power, blacks in America have colluded in their own racial 
oppression. He argues: 
 
For more than one hundred years we permitted this kind of thing to happen. That 
was our faithlessness. We let it happen! They could go into the middle of a black 
community and take a black man out and lynch him. They would often round up 
black people from miles around, and make them watch. That was our 
faithlessness. And that is what God is talking about. Our children shall be 
shepherds in the wilderness and shall suffer for our faithlessness. (Cleage, 
1968/2002, p. 278) 
 
 
Cleage argues that blacks in the U. S. must be cleansed of their tendencies towards 
cowardice and self-interest before they can enter the Promised Land. The duration of 
their suffering, then, must be understood as a time of learning and atonement. 
Responding to followers who argue that blacks have suffered enough and should be 
allowed to enter the Promised Land now, Cleage states: 
 
God cannot wipe out our weakness and faithlessness to each other. We must make 
amends for more than one hundred years. For every moment of cowardice, when 
our grandfathers hid under their beds while black men died, there has to be a 
moment of courage before we can dare think about entering the Promised land . . . 
We can’t enter the promised land like this. There’s too much blood on us. We still 
carry the mark of slavery. (Cleage, 1968/2002, p. 278) 
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In preparation for leaving the wilderness, Cleage argues that the black community 
must create a program that allows blacks to be “a black nation in the middle of the white 
man’s world” (p. 279). Cleage suggests that such a programmatic thrust would promote 
self-determination, manifested through black control over education, the police, 
economics, and politics. He chronicles difficulties in building the black nation in the 
following excerpt. 
 
Today our basic task consists of bringing together a Nation, bringing together 
black men, women and children with courage, who believe in themselves and who 
love each other. This means that we must conquer individualism. We must realize 
that our strength, our power, our hope, everything that we dream of, lies in our 
coming together. We will wander in the wilderness until we find a way to unite as 
one people. (Cleage, 1968/2002, p. 279) 
 
 
1970’s 
 James H. Cone. James Cone is considered to be the father of academic black 
theology (Pinn, 2002). His theology laid the foundations for a formal black theology 
movement that addressed themes of black oppression and liberation (Raboteau & Wills, 
2003). James Cone’s God of the Oppressed (1975) represents a crystallization of his 
earlier works in black theology—Black Theology and Black Power (1969) and A Black 
Theology of Liberation (1970)—because it rearticulates themes in the first two works in 
response to criticisms of both. In God of the Oppressed, Cone argues that connections 
exist between the experiences of oppressed blacks in America and religious truth (Pinn, 
2002). Cone contrasts the western theological tradition, which for Cone, engages religion 
as a “spectator sport,” with the black religious perspective that is grounded in experiences 
of slavery and racial oppression. 
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Cone takes the issue of black suffering seriously. He emphasizes that the pain of 
black suffering is real and discusses Christian and non-Christian responses to this 
suffering. Cone chronicles various non-Christian responses to black suffering (i.e. black 
humanism, reliance on non-Christian religions, and political engagement), but contends 
that for the majority of blacks such responses do not reflect their lived experiences. Most 
black Christians, according to Cone, understand God as primary for making meaning and 
fostering liberation out of black life in white society. For Cone, then, black Christians are 
faced with a paradox. Their faith in God as liberator of the oppressed seemingly 
contradicts their persistent oppression in North America. 
Thus, Cone uses the rest of this chapter to tease out answers to the paradox of 
black suffering in ways that honor the sovereignty of God and the horrific nature of black 
suffering. Cone chronicles appeals to divine Providence by black preachers of the past to 
explain black suffering in America but says this appeal is inadequate. He argues that 
appeals to the mystery of God’s sovereignty are helpful, but fail to provide complete 
answers to the question of black suffering. Cone also discounts black humanist attempts 
to adequately deal with black suffering, but contends that William Jones, author of Is God 
a White Racist was correct in arguing that no observable proof existed to support the 
claim that God sides with the oppressed. Cone writes: 
 
Nevertheless, William Jones is right! There is no historical evidence that can 
prove conclusively that the God of Jesus is actually liberating black people from 
oppression . . . In responding to Jones, Christian theologians have to admit that 
their logic is not the same as other forms of rational discourse. . . . There is the 
experience of suffering in the world, and no amount of theological argument can 
explain away the pain of our suffering in a white racist society. But in the 
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experience of the cross and resurrection, we know not only that black suffering is 
wrong but that it has been overcome by Jesus Christ. (1975, p. 191) 
 
 
Cone attempts to counter arguments that black religion emphasizing the suffering 
of Jesus encourages passivity. For Cone, such beliefs encouraged oppressed blacks to 
“express visions of freedom in a situation of servitude” (p. 192). Cone argues that the 
idea that Jesus made blacks passive is simply a misreading of the black religious 
experience. He argues that it was knowledge of God/Jesus that gave enslaved blacks the 
knowledge that they were divinely created for freedom. He writes: 
 
To be sure, they could not rationally explain why they were slaves or why God 
permitted them to suffer so much. The meaning of black suffering remains a part 
of the mystery of God’s will. But the presence of Jesus in their social existence 
did reveal that God was at work liberating them from bondage. (Cone, 1975, p. 
192) 
 
 
Though taking pains to emphasize the terrible nature of black suffering, Cone argues that 
black suffering also is good when undertaken in the liberation struggle. Such suffering, 
he contends, is a sign of God’s presence breaking into history. Blacks are then called to 
suffer as a way of redefining their humanity in the fight for freedom. He writes:  
 
But suffering that arises in the context of the struggle for freedom is liberating. It 
is liberating because it is a sign of Jesus’ presence in our midst. Black people, 
therefore, as God’s Suffering Servant, are called to suffer with and for God in the 
liberation of humanity. This suffering to which we have been called is not a 
passive endurance of white people’s insults, but rather, a way of fighting for our 
freedom. (Cone, 1975, p. 193) 
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1980’s 
 
 Cornel West. In Prophesy Deliverance!: An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity (1982), Cornel West develops a seemingly eclectic interpretive framework 
for judging the appropriateness of Black responses to white supremacy. For West, a 
defining characteristic of the Black experience in the U. S. has been and continues to be 
responses to the white supremacy that is part of the social and institutional fabric of the 
United States. He writes: 
 
The Afro-American encounter with the modern world has been shaped first and 
foremost by the doctrine of white supremacy, which is embodied in institutional 
practices and enacted in everyday folkways under varying circumstances and 
evolving conditions. (West, 1982, p. 47) 
 
 
West develops his Afro-American religious philosophy from elements of 
prophetic Christianity, American pragmatism, and progressive Marxism. West’s 
Prophesy will be discussed in detail to adequately convey the comprehensive and 
unorthodox nature of his analytic framework. For West, prophetic Christian thought in its 
unadulterated form presents a fundamentally democratic notion of “. . . a transcendent 
God before whom all persons are equal” (West, 1982, p. 16) and who desires the social 
and existential well-being of every person regardless of sex, class, race, caste, etc. West 
argues that prophetic Christian thought also subscribes to a belief in the dignity and 
depravity of human beings—the inevitable gap between individual possibilities for hope 
and transformation and individual lived realities as fallen, imperfect beings. The dialectic 
between human dignity and depravity results for West in the possibility for humans to 
improve but never perfect their lived realities. This dialectic makes democracy and 
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accountability requisite for any prophetic Christian social vision so that the masses can 
participate “. . . in the decision-making processes of institutions that regulate and govern 
their lives (West, 1982, p. 18). West argues that through democratic participation, the 
tendency toward human depravity is checked and individuals are provided opportunities 
to pursue individual and community well-being.  
West’s religious philosophy utilizes elements of American pragmatism and 
progressive Marxism to frame his understanding of the purpose of philosophy as a tool 
for understanding history in ways that improve life in the present. For West, American 
pragmatism provides a specific way of understanding the purpose of knowledge. 
Knowledge claims, according to this paradigm, “. . . are secured by the social practices of 
a community of inquirers, rather than the purely mental activity of an individual subject” 
(West, 1982, p. 21). Such a framework eschews notions of the given and rejects the idea 
that knowledge is objective.  
Knowledge, for West’s purposes, is based on the cultural and political norms of 
the black community that are subject to change when the needs of the community change. 
West adds to this framework the Marxist emphasis on class struggle and in-depth social 
analysis. He uses this framework to re-interpret the history of the black experience 
(through a de-mystification of the development of white supremacy in the U. S.) in order 
to ameliorate social and existential conditions for blacks in the present.  
Utilizing this interpretive framework, West identifies black responses to white 
supremacy as either furthering or detracting from black social, political, and economic 
liberation (i.e. the enhancement of black self-image and self-determination) and black 
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existential liberation—the receipt of divine grace that sustains blacks in the struggle for 
earthly liberation and which ultimately grants relief from existential suffering (West, 
1982).  
West’s classification of black responses to white supremacy is based on four 
traditions: (a) exceptionalist, which contains knowledge claims that either ontologically 
or sociologically support black superiority (e.g. divine chosen-ness, genetic, sociological, 
cultural, or behavioral superiority) and distinctiveness, especially from white Americans; 
(b) assimilationist, whose knowledge claims present black American culture to be 
ontologically and/or sociologically pathological; (c) marginalist, whose knowledge claim 
critiques the ways in which black American culture suppresses individuality and 
discourages non-conformity; and (d) humanist, which makes no claims about black 
genetic or sociological superiority/inferiority but instead “. . . accents the universal 
human content of Afro-American cultural form” (West, 1982, p. 71) by focusing on ways 
black American cultural expression shares themes with other racial, ethnic, and national 
groups. West’s classification provides a useful heuristic for organizing elements of black 
theology around themes of black economic, social, political, and existential well-being. 
West’s work represents both a departure from and a connection to the work of 
earlier black theologians. Importantly, West’s work overcomes the essentialized notions 
of good and evil that were prevalent in earlier eras of black theological development. 
West’s chapter “A Genealogy of Modern Racism” identifies the development of white 
supremacy as a confluence of culture, history, science, pseudo-science, and classic 
revivalism that encouraged the emergence of white supremacy and the cultural ideals and 
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social norms it spawned. By identifying white supremacy as a cultural-historical 
development rather than a genetic condition of whites in America, West’s analysis 
affords the possibility, albeit unlikely, of altering present social and economic realities. 
Additionally, West’s analysis represents an advancement over earlier black theological 
discourse because it delineates what black liberation will look like relevant to the lived 
experiences of black people and connects black liberation to the larger reality of the 
liberation of poor people of the world.  
The theological advances of West’s work notwithstanding, he also retains more 
traditional notions of black theology. Like the theology of James Cone, West retains in 
his religious philosophy the paradoxical notion of a God who is at the same time 
historically present and transcendent and who sides with the oppressed against oppressors 
in their liberation struggle. Like Cone, West also argues that such a divine figure will 
ultimately bring about existential salvation. He writes:  
 
Ultimate triumph indeed depends on the almighty power of a transcendent God 
who proleptically acts in history but who also withholds the final, promised 
negation and transformation of history until an unknown future. (West, 1982, p. 
96) 
 
 
West argues that the prophetic Christian prospective cannot (and need not) be validated 
or justified beyond its ability to encourage ways of understanding the world that help one 
effectively cope with the unavoidable limit situations of human existence. It is within this 
context that West defines human history as the ‘realm of the pitiful and the tragic’ (1982, 
p. 17). He writes: 
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The pitiful are those who remain objects of history, victims manipulated by evil 
forces; whereas the tragic are those persons who become subjects of history, 
aggressive antagonists of evil forces. Victims are pitiful because they have no 
possibility of achieving either penultimate liberation or ultimate salvation; 
aggressive antagonists are tragic because they fight for penultimate liberation, and 
in virtue of their gallant struggle against the limits of history they become prime 
candidates for ultimate salvation. In this sense, to play a tragic role in history is 
positive: to negate and transform what is, yet run up against the historical limits of 
such negation and transformation, is candidacy for transcending those limits. 
(West, 1982, p. 18) 
 
 
Thus for West, like Washington, King, Cleage, and Cone before him, tragedy and 
suffering are transmuted to positive ends. For West, such suffering becomes the criteria 
for otherworldly reward. 
 J. Deotis Roberts. J. Deotis Roberts is a Baptist preacher who has researched, 
preached, and lectured globally; he has greatly influenced black theology and has 
expanded its scope to concerns of cross-cultural, international, and inter-religious issues 
(Pinn, 2002). Like the other black theologians discussed in this phase of black religious 
development, Robert’s also concerns himself with issues of black suffering. Roberts’ take 
on suffering differs from all previous theologians, however, in that it incorporates themes 
of both reconciliation and liberation and also addresses issues of globalization. In so 
doing, Roberts like West, presents a response to black suffering that also is inclusive of 
other local and international forms of oppression.  
Like Cone’s God of the Oppressed, Roberts essay is an exploration in theodicy—
an attempt to explain suffering in ways that affirm the goodness of God and the reality of 
undeserved suffering. It is important for Roberts that the integrity of both God and the 
sufferer be maintained when exploring the problem of suffering (Pinn, 2002). In this 
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book chapter, “Faith in God Confronts Collective Evils,” Roberts (1987) criticizes the 
majority of Euro-American theologians who, for him, have largely ignored the problem 
of undeserved suffering. Roberts argues that humans are doomed to experience “animal 
pain” due to the constraints of the physical body and the natural environment. Roberts 
says that ethically, there are no easy answers to the sources of evil (in a world that God 
created good) that produce innocent suffering; there are only responses to suffering. For 
Roberts, the faith response that centers around “God’s redemptive work in Christ.” (p. 
307) is the best response.  
Roberts conceptualizes humans as co-sufferers and co-laborers with God and 
argues that through a faith-response, suffering can be transmuted for constructive ends. 
He states: “The Easter story, rightly understood, enables us to engage evil and suffering, 
transmute it for constructive ends, and move forward in hope to God’s future and ours” 
(Roberts, 1987/2002, p. 307). 
Roberts emphasizes that one can call attention to undeserved suffering without 
questioning the goodness of God by focusing on free moral agency. Theology, in this 
sense, is not absolute, but is purposefully directed by the goodness of God and the reality 
of human suffering. He continues: 
 
Could not God have made human beings unresponsible and unfree, morally 
speaking? Doesn’t God possess the power to contradict logic and ethics as 
understood by finite minds? To suggest such a possibility about God makes us 
uncomfortable. But to transcend logic and ethics does not and should not 
necessarily require contradiction. We have a sense that God embodies the best 
that we know as finite persons and yet baffles our ability to comprehend fully. In 
other worlds, we may know in part, but we do not know. We see through a glass 
darkly, but we do see. Theology should direct us to the place where faith 
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possesses reasonableness and certitude even if certainty is not within our grasp. 
(Roberts, 1987/2002, p. 305) 
 
 
Even though human knowledge about the origins of evil is limited, Roberts argues 
that much evil, results from abuses of freedom (i.e., possessing the knowledge and 
freedom to choose and act, one deliberately chooses the lesser good). This is Roberts’ 
explanation of individual evil. He contends:  
 
Much moral evil can be explained through God’s self-limitation in order to create 
beings who are both free and morally responsible. Much suffering is present in 
our personal lives because of the perversion of our nature. Freedom is abused and 
we have not been responsive or responsible as co-creators with God. We are 
endowed to scale angelic heights, but we have sunk to diabolical depths. Much of 
the answer we seek is in the recovery of the creative purpose of human life in the 
design of God. (Roberts, 1987/2002, p. 308) 
 
 
When confronted with undeserved suffering, Roberts suggests that faith in God 
becomes a resource for dealing creatively with suffering when such faith leads to 
commitment to values and goals of ultimate concern. Such faith, however, is not provided 
by “one-dimensional” manifestations of religion (i.e. exclusive focus on personal 
salvation without regard for others’ suffering, short-sighted projections of God as the 
author of one’s success, complete reliance on human achievement, and emphasis on 
biblical inerrancy). Roberts discusses two of these limited conceptualizations of religion 
and their consequences in the following passage. He writes: 
 
For some Christians, personal salvation is the solution to everything. This is 
undergirded by a sentimental Jesusology and biblical inerrancy. There is nothing 
wrong with spiritual formation, the deepening of the inner life, or a radical 
personal conversion. But this answer is inadequate, because the conception of 
both sin and salvation is limited. The trouble with the simple view of the gospel is 
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that it is unaware or ill-equipped to deal with the difficult questions that human 
beings face in this world. This type of gospel can easily become demonic when it 
is preached to people who are undergoing gross suffering, deprivation, and 
injustice. If one is privileged, this gospel can also serve diabolical ends. When the 
Christian God is understood as the author of success and pride of race, religion 
becomes destructive both to its advocates and to its victims. (Roberts, 1987/2002, 
p. 310) 
 
 
Roberts also raises concern over issues of globalization. He points out 
connections between racism in the U.S. and economic issues abroad that all impact our 
“global village” in ways that make the realization of local, national, and global 
reconciliation necessary for the relief of suffering (p. 311). As such, attempts to eradicate 
instances of suffering must transcend racial, ethnic, gender, local, national, and 
international borders. Roberts states: 
 
Our approach to human rights must be broader than the Christian covenant. It 
must be interfaith, interreligious, interethnic, and intercultural. It must be based 
upon mutual respect for the equal dignity of people, something like the 
cosmopolitanism of the Stoics which influenced the development of the natural 
law-natural rights tradition in the West. Our dignity must now be inherent in our 
humanity. This affirmation could be undergirded by the ethics from the great 
religions, but not dependent upon them for its validity. According to our 
confession, Christians should lead the way. (1987/2002, p. 313) 
 
 
 Deloris Williams. Within the debate over black oppression and liberation, issues 
of gender and class also developed. Thus at the same time Black theology was 
developing, Womanist theology (though not termed as such at the time) also was 
emerging (Raboteau & Wills, 2003). With the 1983 publication of Alice Walker’s In 
Search of our Mothers’ Gardens, many black Christian women found inspiration and 
appropriate terminology for their unique theological reflections which differed in kind 
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from white feminist theology and black theology. Known for her specific articulations of 
womanist theology, Deloris Williams emerged in the late 1980’s as, arguably, one of the 
most well-known womanist theologians. In the following excerpt, Williams (1987) 
discusses what was then the emergent discipline of womanist theology. She writes: 
 
What then is a womanist? Her origins are in the black folk expression “You acting 
womanish,” meaning, according to Walker, “wanting to know more and in greater 
depth than is good for one—outrageous audacious, courageous and willful 
behavior.” A womanist is also “responsible, in charge, serious.” She can walk to 
Canada and take others with her. She loves, she is committed, she is a universalist 
by temperament. Her universality includes loving men and woman, sexually or 
nonsexually. She loves music, dance, the spirit, food and roundness, struggle, and 
she loves herself. “Regardless.” Walker insists that a womanist is also “committed 
to survival and wholeness of entire people, male and female.” She is no separatist, 
“except for health.” A womanist is a black feminist or feminist of color. Or as 
Walker says, “Womanist is to feminist as purple to lavender.” Womanist 
theology, a vision in its infancy, is emerging among Afro-American Christian 
women. Ultimately many sources—biblical, theological, ecclesiastical, social, 
anthropological, economic, and material from other religious traditions will 
inform the development of this theology. (Williams, 1987, p. 1) 
 
 
In application, womanist theology attempts to deconstruct the suppressed role of 
black women in the church and the larger society (Thomas, 1998). Additionally, 
Womanist theology asserts the inherent power in women, with which they can resist 
oppression (Williams, 1993).  
1990’s 
During the 1990’s, womanist theology experienced tremendous growth. In 
addition to veteran voices such as Katie Cannon and Deloris Williams, a second 
generation of womanist theologians emerged and broadened the content of womanist 
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reflection to include not only sin, ethics, and survival but also biblical interpretation and 
issues of sexuality.22 
A significant contribution of womanist theology has been its ability to provide an 
internal critique of black theology. By articulating both the ways in which black religion 
has served to help and hinder black women’s liberation, womanist theology provides a 
space within which positive change can occur. The following passage by Deloris 
Williams highlights the dual role the church has served for black women—as a source of 
both healing and hurt. She writes: 
 
I realize my theological preoccupation with faith seeking understanding cannot 
romanticize black women’s Christian faith. I cannot ignore how this faith has also 
been shaped by a process in black and white communities that I recognize as 
“colonization of female mind and culture.” Nor can I ignore the fact that the 
African American denominational churches, in their patriarchally and 
androcentrically biased liturgy and leadership, have been primary agents of this 
mind-culture colonization with regard to black women. Yet the churches have 
also been psychosocial places where black women could find some relief from the 
terrible burdens in their lives . . . This means, then, that the African-American 
denominational churches function like two-edged swords. They sustain black 
women emotionally and provide “theological space” for black women’s faith 
expressions. But they suppress and help to make invisible black women’s thought 
and culture. Through their uncritical use of the Bible and through their patriarchal 
theology, many of the African-American denominational churches prohibit black 
women from asking many critical questions about women’s oppression and about 
the support and reinforcement of that oppression by the Bible and by the Christian 
church in all its male dominated forms. (Williams, 1993, p. xiii) 
 
  
 Through its critical questioning of patriarchal church practices, social policy, and 
even biblical passages, womanist theologians have created a space for once-marginalized 
voices in black theology. 
                                               
22 See for example Emilie Townes’ (Ed.), A Troubling in my Soul (1993) and James Cone and Gayraud 
Wilmore’s (Eds.), Black Theology: A Documentary History Volume Two: 1980 – 1992 (1991). 
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Other changes to black theology occurred during the 1990’s include the increased 
growth of black Catholics and blacks identifying with the Eastern Christian traditions 
(Raboteau &Wills, 2003). In 1990, Archbishop George Stallings, Jr. founded the Imani 
Temple Catholic Church after claiming that the orthodox Catholic Church was racist and 
failed to be adequately inclusive to African Americans (Armstrong, 2001). Though 
modeled after the orthodox Catholic church, the Imani Temple allows women to be 
ordained and provides optional celibacy for priests (Armstrong, 2001). Also during this 
time, the black Baptist and Methodist denominations that once dominated black religion 
were surpassed in membership by Holiness and Pentecostal churches such as 
C.O.G.I.C.—the Church of God in Christ (Raboteau & Wills, 2003). The diversity of 
these religious expressions is indicative of the broad range of religious interpretations 
blacks in the U. S. have constructed. 
Conclusion 
While the articulations of black theological reflection presented in this chapter are 
not representative of the entirety of black theological discourse, their diversity 
nonetheless reveals the absurdity of attempts to narrowly define the project known as 
‘black theology.’ Black Nationalist, womanist, pacifist, globalist, and pragmatic are but a 
few of the diverse perspectives articulated in this chapter. While all of these articulations 
were developed in response to black oppression, to make additional meaningful 
comparisons among these works is difficult. For example, Mordecai Johnson’s 
(1922/1925) call for effective public policy to ensure citizenship rights of blacks, Pauli 
Murray’s and Henry Babcock’s (1942/2002) call for black pacifism, and Cornel West’s 
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(1982) combination of prophetic Christianity and progressive Marxism resist all but the 
most broad comparison—that each of these works is ultimately concerned with 
alleviating black suffering.  
However, theological articulations presented in this chapter do share broadly 
recurring themes such as appropriations of the biblical Exodus motif (Cleage, 1968/2002; 
Cone, 1975; Jones, 1808/2002), distinction between false and true Christianity (Douglass, 
1847/1984; Garnet, 1843/1925; Washington, 1967/2002 ), the idea that blacks must 
actively resist oppression and participate in their liberation (Garnet, 1843/1925; King, 
1967; Stewart, 1833/2002; Walker, 1829), the belief that God desires black freedom 
and/or God is actively involved in the liberation of black people (Cone, 1975; Cleage, 
1968/2002; Garnet, 1843/2002; Hammon, 1787/2002; Jasper, 1878; Jones, 1808/2002; 
“Othello,” circa 1808/1925; Paul, 1827/1925; Stewart, 1833/2002), and the notion of 
redemptive and/or pedagogical suffering (Cone, 1975; Crummell, 1877/2002; Jones, 
1808/2002; Stewart, 1833/2002; Thurman, 1963/2002; Walters, 1915/2002; Washington, 
1967/2002; West, 1982) even though they vary widely in content.  
Given both the diversity and commonality evidenced in these articulations, what 
conclusions can be drawn about ‘black theology’? Perhaps the greatest commonality of 
these works is that each was developed in response to specific historical contingencies 
that shaped the author’s understanding of the social construction of blackness23 and the 
subsequent religious responses to black oppression each author articulated (Hill, 1999). 
                                               
23 The social construction of race, including blackness, is presupposed here. What it means to be black is 
determined by the social, historical, and cultural contingencies of the author (i.e., the ‘black identity’ 
articulated in the 1960’s differs markedly from black identity as articulated in the 1990’s).  
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Just as there are multiple and competing forms of blackness (Anderson, 1995; Hill, 
1999), there also are multiple and competing articulations of black theology.  
Still, the recurrence of themes relevant to the pedagogical or beneficial nature of 
black suffering merit closer scrutiny given the libratory intent of this book. For all of the 
diversity in religious expression discussed in this chapter, most of the texts share reliance 
on two concepts: the goodness of God in relation to blacks and the very real suffering of 
black people. The discourse presented in this chapter, particularly the discourse from 
1865 forward appears to struggle between those concepts—the affirmation of an all-
powerful God that loves blackness and the reality of radical black suffering. Given these 
constraints, it is understandable that black theologians have resolved tensions around 
these two ideologies through an assertion of the pedagogical nature of black suffering. 
Thus Absalom Jones (1808/2002) had few alternatives but to suggest that U. S. 
slavery ultimately benefited the will of God for the betterment of Africa. What 
conclusions could Maria Stewart (1833/2002) draw about black suffering except that it 
was (originally) pedagogical? That Alexander Crummell (1877/2002) interpreted the 
decimation of Native Americans and indigenous New Zealand populations as acts of 
Providence and that Booker T. Washington and Alexander Walters (1915/2002) both 
interpreted the condition of black oppression in the U. S. as similarly providential should 
not be surprising given the fore-mentioned ideological constraints on black theology? 
Beginning in the 1960’s, the theme of black chosen-ness also became dominant in 
the black theological texts presented in this chapter. Not surprisingly, however, chosen-
ness involved undergoing more black suffering. For Joseph Washington (1967/2002), 
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black suffering was to be ‘cherished’ because it demonstrated both a chosen status and a 
responsibility for blacks to “. . . be the servants whereby all nations not just America, will 
be redeemed . . .” (Washington, 1967/2002, p. 259). At the same time, Martin Luther 
King, Jr. (1967) argued that blacks held a greater burden of responsibility for social 
change. While not employing the explicit language of chosen-ness, King nevertheless 
invokes the spirit of black chosen-ness when he states that blacks are especially equipped 
to bear the brunt of responsibility for social transformation because they “. . . have been 
seared in the flames of suffering” (King, 1967, p. 134). 
As he transcended theological boundaries to create what became the foundation 
for black theology as an academic discipline, James Cone (1975) also ironically limited 
the discipline’s ability to articulate new visions of liberation through his retention of fore-
mentioned themes of black chosen-ness and providential suffering. This theme also is 
apparent in the work of Cornel West (1982) who, although arguably one of the most 
profound intellectuals of this century, also found it necessary to retain the notion that 
suffering of the oppressed (in the interest of social transformation) is beneficial. 
The recurrence of the chosen-ness/providential black suffering theme raises 
concerns. To the extent that such discourse remains prevalent in contemporary black 
theological texts, the libratory potential of such texts to ameliorate black suffering and 
ultimately all suffering is questionable. If black suffering is presented as beneficial and 
black people are presented as divinely chosen for suffering, from where does the impetus 
come to relieve suffering? If one attempts to relieve divinely mandated black suffering, 
does this act constitute a violation of the will of God? Finally, what are the psychological 
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implications of being divinely mandated to suffer in order to save the world? The 
following chapter will analyze select contemporary black theological texts in an effort to 
explore these questions relevant to the goals of social justice.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SELECT BLACK THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES 
 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the arguments set forth in the theological 
discourses of five purposefully chosen black theologians whose texts are concerned with 
black liberation. The intent of this analysis is to respectfully interrogate the selected texts 
to identify the meta-narratives they employ. Where oppressive meta-narratives are found, 
the intent is to push against these boundaries of theological interpretation in order to 
increase their libratory possibilities. 
James H. Cone: God of the Oppressed (1975) 
The first work to be analyzed is James Cone’s (1975) God of the Oppressed. 
Subsequent texts to be analyzed in this chapter are organized historically and include M. 
Shawn Copeland’s (1993) “Wading through Many Sorrows: Toward a Theology of 
Suffering in Womanist Perspective”; Cornel West’s (1993a) “Black Theology of 
Liberation as Critique of Capitalist Civilization”; Jacquelyn Grant’s (1993) “The Sin of 
Servanthood: And the Deliverance of Discipleship”; Jacquelyn Grant’s (1999) 
“Servanthood Revisited: Womanist Explorations of Servanthood Theology”; and 
Anthony Pinn’s (2004) “Embracing Nimrod’s Legacy: The Erotic, the Irreverence of 
Fantasy, and the Redemption of Black Theology.” These works (subsequent to Cone’s 
seminal work) were purposefully chosen because they are indicative of the diversity 
among black theological themes and also because their discourses, though temporally 
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separated from God of the Oppressed, exhibit clear linkages and/or responses to themes 
presented in Cone’s (1975) work.  
Analysis in this chapter employs an abbreviated method of deconstructive 
analysis. The original method of deconstructive analysis created by Jacques Derrida is an 
elaborate process of textual analysis that focuses on the etymology of words, their 
connotations, and denotations, in order to demonstrate the derivative and unstable 
structure of the text (Stafford, 2004). A complete rendering of Derrida’s deconstructive 
method lies beyond the scope of this chapter; the abbreviated method of deconstruction 
employed here does, however, remain faithful to the intent of Derrida’s deconstructive 
method—the identification of logical weaknesses within texts to create spaces for the 
hearing of previously silenced voices (Caputo, 1997; Stafford, 2004). Textual 
deconstruction for the purposes of this chapter will be limited to analysis of binary 
oppositions, marginalized voices (i.e., groups whose interests are not served by the 
dominant reading of the texts), implicit meta-narratives or ideological assumptions (i.e., 
modes of thought considered originary, given, or natural within the text), and the 
implications of these elements for black liberation. A deconstructive analysis of God of 
the Oppressed follows. 
God of the Oppressed (hereafter GOTO) was a seminal work for black theology 
because it deconstructed the taken for granted marriage of white racism and Christianity 
that had long been used as a tool of control and pacification against black Americans. 
Cone argued in GOTO that white racism was antithetical to the ‘true’ meaning of the 
gospel; his black theology of liberation effectively demonstrated how oppressed blacks 
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could be both black (in a political sense) and Christian at the same time (Evans, Jr. 1993; 
Hopkins, 1999). Although there were black theologians before Cone who reflected on the 
relationship between black American oppression and Christianity, none so systematically 
identified the social a priori that gave rise to white Christian racism in America. 
Consequently, Cone is recognized by most contemporary black theologians as integral to 
the formation of black theology as an academic discipline (Earl, Jr., 1993; Hopkins, 1993, 
1999; West, 1993a). For this reason, Cone’s work is the first to be deconstructed in this 
chapter. 
In God of the Oppressed, Cone links his knowledge of classical theology to the 
black experience in America in so doing, argues that black theology is faithful to the 
central theme of gospel—Jesus Christ’s active involvement in the liberation of the 
oppressed (i.e. black Americans). Much of GOTO elaborates on the relationship between 
social context and theology. For Cone, one’s social context frames the way theological 
problems are conceptualized and responded to. Cone refers to the social context as a 
“social a priori”—a mental sieve which distinguished between relevant and irrelevant 
theological data (Cone, 1975).  
Although Cone’s understanding of the social a priori is largely derived from a 
sociology of knowledge framework, he extends the framework to a novel conclusion. 
Cone argues that theology, regardless of whom it is articulated by, is highly 
particularized. Though presumed to be universal Cone argued that American theology 
(i.e. white Christian theology) actually was ideologically biased towards a Eurocentric 
worldview. Cone’s systematic analysis of white American Christianity was important 
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because it created a space for the justification of another particularized form of god-talk 
(i.e., black theology) to be heard. Thus, Cone’s formulation effectively challenged the 
dominance and presumed universal nature of white Christian theology. (Earl, Jr., 1993; 
Walker, Jr., 1993). 
Cone’s work was libratory for some black Americans because it aligned their 
political interests with Christian gospel. Yet, as this analysis will demonstrate, the 
knowledge claims set forth in his book are necessarily constrained by the context of 
racism, patriarchy, and domination that GOTO critiques. GOTO culminates in a virtual 
inverted hierarchy of what was presumed to be given in white American Christian 
theology. This inversion is accomplished through Cone’s employment of binary 
oppositions to differentiate (a) black and white social a priori, (b) black theology from 
white theology, (c) black Americans from white Americans, and (d) black salvation from 
white salvation. These binaries will now be discussed. 
The Social A Priori in Black and White 
For Cone, the existence of the social a priori did not mean black and white 
Americans had different interpretations of reality, it meant that black Americans’ social 
position as oppressed in America afforded them a True understanding of the gospel and 
white Americans’ social position guaranteed their perpetual misinterpretation of the 
gospel. 
Cone identifies the white social a priori as being shaped by white socio-political 
interests that are aligned with the advantaged class (Cone, 1975). For Cone, this social a 
priori was rooted in Enlightenment thought that “. . . failed to question the consequences 
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of the so-called enlightened view as reflected in the colonization and slavery of that 
period” (1975, p. 47) and therefore misinterpreted the gospel according to white values. 
Consequently white theologians failed to see the necessary connections between 
race/ethnicity and theological discourse. Cone states: “Again, it is obvious that because 
white theologians were not enslaved and lynched and are not ghettoized because of color, 
they do not think that color is an important point of departure for theological discourse” 
(Cone, 1975, p. 53). 
In contrast to the white social a priori, the black social a priori was shaped by 
extreme experiences of oppression; black experiences of slavery essentially kept black 
theological reflection honest because is prevented sharp distinctions between the gospel 
and black theological interpretations (Cone, 1975). Cone argues that black Americans 
daily toil as slaves left them little leisure time for philosophical discussions of God’s 
validity or ontology. Referring to the links between black oppression and black theology 
he states: 
 
Such were not their philosophical and theological problems as defined by 
social reality. Blacks did not ask whether God existed or whether divine 
existence can be rationally demonstrated. Divine existence was taken for 
granted, because God was the point of departure for their faith. The divine 
question which they addressed was whether or not God was with them in their 
struggle for liberation. (Cone, 1975, p. 55) 
 
 
Moreover, blacks understood God as a historical rather than a metaphysical reality. This 
understanding of God as breaking into history encouraged, according to Cone, blacks to 
struggle for freedom in the physical world. Cone writes: 
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While white preachers and theologians often defined Jesus Christ as a 
spiritual Savior, the deliverer of people from sin and guilt, black preachers 
were unquestionably historical. They viewed God as the Liberator in 
history. That is why the black church as involved in the abolitionist 
movement in the nineteenth century and the civil rights movement in the 
twentieth. Black preachers reasoned that if God delivered Israel from 
Pharaoh’s army and Daniel from the lion’s den, then he will deliver black 
people from American slavery and oppression. (1975, p. 57) 
 
 
 While white theology had the luxury of addressing abstract theological concerns, 
the black experience in America necessitated a concern with the real and with God’s 
presence in their lived experience. For Cone, this concern with the real provided an 
appropriate lens through which black Americans discerned divine partiality for the 
oppressed (i.e. black Americans).  
For Cone, Christ’s relation to culture is not general, but specific, with partiality 
for the oppressed. White Americans social a priori as oppressors necessitated that their 
theological reflection was in fact heretical; by colluding in black oppression white 
theology ran counter to God’s partiality for the poor and God’s desire that their 
oppression be relieved. In so far as whites clung to their white theology and white values, 
Cone argued that they positioned themselves in opposition to God. In short, Cone’s 
analysis suggests that Christ is for African Americans and against whites. Cone discusses 
the divine opposition to white culture in the following passage: 
 
. . . if the biblical Christ is the Liberator of the oppressed from the sociopolitical 
bondage inflicted by the oppressors, then can it be said that Jesus Christ relates to 
both cultural expressions in the same way? Of course not! The biblical Christ 
stands in opposition to all cultural expressions that have their point of departure in 
human slavery. (Cone, 1975, p. 90) 
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Whiteness as Evil, Blackness as Good . . . and Bad 
White American values then, come to signify badness or evil that oppresses 
African Americans. Cone specifically refers to the evil of white Americans in relation to 
their failure to put into practice their biblical knowledge. He states: “Black people learned 
a long time ago that there is no connection between education and Christian living. That 
much they picked up from observing white people who intellectually knew much about 
God but whose behavior made them the children of the devil” (Cone, 1975, p. 214). 
 Just as Cone essentializes white American theology, white culture, and whiteness 
as oppressive and evil, he signifies black theology and the black experience as oppressed 
and good. In opposition to the evil of whiteness, blackness is goodness embodied by 
Christ. Indeed, he argues that Christ, the ultimate representation of goodness, is black. 
Cone describes his justification for the blackness of Christ as follows: 
 
Christ’s blackness is both literal and symbolic. His blackness is literal in the sense 
that he truly becomes One with the oppressed blacks, taking their suffering as his 
suffering and revealing that he is found in the history of our struggle, the story of 
our pain, and the rhythm of our bodies . . . Christ’s blackness is the American 
expression of the truth of his parable about the Last Judgment: “Truly, I say to 
you, as you did not to one of the least of these, you did it not to me” (Matt. 
25:45). The least in America are literally and symbolically present in black 
people. To say that Christ is black means that black people are God’s poor people 
whom Christ has come to liberate. (Cone, 1975, p. 136) 
 
 
Blackness as Good, Blackness as Election 
 
In GOTO, oppressed black Americans alone have the appropriate social a priori to 
discern the liberating truth of the gospel (Cone, 1975). They are thus called into service 
for the purpose of liberating humanity. Cone writes:  
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Because the phrase ‘all are oppressed’ can be understood only from the 
perspective of the poor, only they are in a position to take seriously the universal 
dimension of the gospel of liberation. This places an awesome responsibility upon 
them, for when the dialectic of oppression and liberation is seen correctly, the 
oppressed recognize that their call is to be God’s “Kingdom of priests” to all 
peoples of the earth. Election involves service, even to the oppressors. (1975, p. 
150) 
 
 
Cone argues that as the chosen of God, oppressed black Americans are ethically 
responsible to none other than themselves while engaged in their project of liberation. 
Because Cone limits the ability to receive God’s liberating vision to black Americans 
(and the rare few others who undergo conversion to the oppressed), there is no external 
means of verifying/ensuring that black Americans are acting on God’s will. Cone writes:  
 
Because the oppressed community is the place where one encounters God’s 
liberating deed, it is also the only place where one can know the will of God . . . 
Thus the criteria of ethical judgment can only be hammered out in the community 
of the victims of injustice. (1975, p. 207) 
 
 
While Cone acknowledges a lack of absolute principles for discerning God’s will, he 
argues that discernment must be reached in dialogue with Scripture, tradition, and other 
oppressed people. Yet the greater weight is given to the judgment of the oppressed, with 
the biblical actions of Jesus used as signs or pointers rather than examples of God’s will 
in the present black liberation struggle. The practical means of liberation are for Cone, to 
be decided by the oppressed community. Discussing this matter, he writes: 
 
In a society where white is equated with good and black is defined as bad, 
humanity and divinity mean an unqualified identification with blackness. The 
divine election of the oppressed means that black people are given the power of 
judgment over the high and mighty whites. (p. 225) 
 
122 
 
Blackness as Bad 
 
 As the preceding excerpts from GOTO demonstrate, blackness is positioned in 
opposition to whiteness as goodness manifested through both Christ’s embodiment of 
blackness and through God’s election of black Americans as his “Kingdom of Priests.” 
Importantly, blackness also is signified negatively as epitomizing the victimhood, 
brokenness, and helplessness of oppression.  
When, for example, Cone attributes the presence of God in the lives of African 
Americans as determinant of their survival Cone states: “It was the divine presence in 
their situation that held their humanity together in the midst of the brokenness of black 
existence” (Cone, 1975, p. 57). The description of black existence as brokenness is 
significant in that it suggests that the black experience has only negative aspects 
(Williams, 1993). Additional evidence of the negative signification of blackness is found 
in Cone’s designation of African American’s as victims. Contrasting the cultural context 
of white and African American theology, Cone states: “. . . black people’s religious ideas 
were shaped by the cultural and political existence of the victims in North America” 
(Cone, 1975, p. 53). Still further evidence of the negative connotation of blackness is 
found in Cone’s discussion of the risk of faith involved in proclaiming the relevance of 
the biblical message for black existence. According to Cone, theologians must take the 
risk of faith and be “. . . prophetic by doing theology in light of those who are helpless 
and voiceless in the society” (Cone, 1975, p. 82). 
 
 
123 
 
Liberation/Salvation in Black and White 
Cone devotes much of the discussion of the meaning of liberation In God of the 
Oppressed to its application for African Americans. The sparse mention of the meaning 
of liberation for white Americans creates an absence in the text that places these two 
processes of liberation in binary opposition to each other.  
According to Cone (1975), liberation for black Americans is both a transcendent 
and an historical reality that culminates in a divine-human encounter of reconciliation. 
Liberation is transcendent because it provides a self-knowledge and an “expression of the 
image of God” (p. 145) such that the oppressed come to realize that they are divinely 
created for freedom and that regardless of historical outcomes, the victory of the 
oppressed is guaranteed by God. Liberation for black Americans also is the historical 
project of freedom whereby the vertical encounter with God provides “God’s gift of 
freedom” (p. 144) which propels the oppressed into political action against their 
oppression. Cone is clear that, for black Americans, there is no liberation disconnected 
from the struggle for freedom in this world nor is their freedom disconnected from a 
communal effort for that freedom. In the fore-mentioned context of liberation, Cone 
clearly limits the beneficiaries of liberation to the oppressed in America (i.e. black 
Americans). 
Although reconciliation is given to African Americans unreservedly, only white 
Americans who freely shed their ‘white values’ may be reconciled with God. This is 
Cone’s concept of white conversion. In the few sections of God of the Oppressed that 
speak explicitly to the issue of white American reconciliation/salvation, Cone expresses 
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strong skepticism about white American conversion. In the following passage, Cone 
expresses the difficulty of white conversion as follows: 
 
I am not ruling out the rare possibility of conversion among white oppressors . . . 
But conversion in the biblical sense is a radical experience, and it ought not to be 
identified with white sympathy for blacks or with pious feeling in white folks’ 
hearts. In the Bible, conversion is closely identified with repentance . . . (1975, p. 
241) 
 
 
In order for this conversion to oppression to occur, white Americans must “. . . 
free themselves from their culture to join the cultural freedom of the poor” (p. 148); they 
must, in other words, participate in the project of black American liberation. Cone clearly 
links white conversion to political action for the oppressed by arguing that white 
consciousness must be born anew in light of black liberation. In the following excerpt, he 
further argues the point. 
 
Indeed, because the values of white culture are antithetical to biblical revelation, it 
is impossible to be white (culturally speaking) and also think biblically. Biblical 
thinking is liberated thought, i.e., and thinking that is not entrapped by social 
categories of the dominant culture. If white theologians are to understand this 
through process, they must undergo a conversion wherein they are given, by the 
Holy Spirit, a new way of thinking and acting in the world, defined and limited by 
God’s will to liberate the oppressed. To think biblically is to think in light of the 
liberating interest of the oppressed. Any other starting point is a contradiction of 
the social a priori of the Scripture. (Cone, 1975, p. 97) 
 
 
In order for white Americans to be free (receive salvation) they must be 
reconciled with God through a relinquishing of white values. Again, this is Cone’s 
understanding of white conversion. Cone contrasts black American and white American 
reconciliation succinctly when he writes: “While divine reconciliation, for oppressed 
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blacks, is connected with the joy of liberation from the controlling power of white people, 
for whites divine reconciliation is connected with God’s wrathful destruction of white 
values” (Cone, 1975, p. 237). 
Black Suffering as Good, Black Suffering as Bad 
Although Cone makes it clear that oppression is a negative condition which God 
does not desire for humanity, Cone’s binary formulation necessitates that he also attribute 
positive qualities to the condition of oppression. Indeed, it is only the oppressed (i.e. 
those who suffer from economic, political, and social oppression) who are free enough 
(i.e. who have the appropriate social a priori) to receive God’s liberating vision for the 
world. Cone’s binary opposition between liberation and oppression creates what is for 
him an unavoidable paradox of freedom. Although “. . . freedom is the opposite of 
oppression, . . . only the oppressed are truly free” (Cone, 1975, p. 147). Only those who 
are oppressed can see that the true liberation of self is found in the community in struggle 
of freedom. In short, true liberation can only be found through struggle. Cone takes for 
granted that the service required of God’s elect requires suffering. For Cone, the 
oppressed are called to suffer and be slaves for all because all must be liberated for black 
liberation to be fully realized. This God-sanctioned [good] suffering differs from the 
[bad] suffering due to unjust social structures. Cone describes the purpose and content of 
this suffering in the following passage. It is cited at length to accurately reflect Cone’s 
argument. 
 
. . . Christians are called to suffer with God in the fight against evil in the present 
age. This view gives us a new perspective on suffering. The oppressed are called 
to fight against suffering by becoming God’s suffering servants in the world . . . 
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suffering therefore is reinterpreted in the light of Jesus’ cross and resurrection and 
of our call to become liberated sufferers with God. There is joy in our suffering 
insofar as we have to suffer for freedom . . . when suffering is inflicted upon the 
oppressed it is evil and we must struggle against it, but when suffering arises out 
of the struggle against suffering, as in the fight against injustice, we accept it as a 
constituent of our calling and thus voluntarily suffer, because there is no freedom 
independent of the fight for justice. (1975, p. 177) 
 
 
Meta-narratives Implicit within God of the Oppressed 
Up to this point, the binary oppositions within GOTO have been identified. These 
included: blackness versus whiteness, the black social a priori versus the white social a 
priori, black theology versus white theology, and black salvation versus white salvation. 
Implicit within these binaries are meta-narratives, or ideological assumptions that endorse 
certain views as given. When such binaries run counter to the libratory goals of GOTO, 
they serve as a hindrance rather than a facilitator of liberation. Articulating such 
oppressive binaries is necessary if libratory efforts are to be realized. Thus, the focus of 
this analysis now shifts to the explication of counter-libratory binaries in GOTO. 
In describing biblical thought, Cone says: “Biblical thinking is liberated thought, 
i.e. thinking that is not entrapped by social categories of the dominant culture” (Cone, 
1975, p. 97). If Cone is to be held to his own definition, his reliance on the black/white 
good/bad binary is indicative of non-biblical thinking because his theology merely inverts 
the racist hierarchies of Western society he critiques. His reliance on this binary, 
therefore constrains the libratory force of his conceptualizations. The political 
implications of these binaries will now be discussed. 
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The Black Social A Priori Versus the White Social A Priori 
Cone argues that the black social a priori permits honest interpretations of the 
gospel while the white social a priori only affords distorted interpretations of scripture, 
due to the oppressive and inherently evil nature of white culture and white values. Indeed, 
Cone portrays white Americans as ‘children of the devil.’ Yet this presentation is 
questionable given Cone’s own argument that white theology and white values have been 
derived from the social a priori of the Enlightenment. He writes: 
 
The difference between Black theology and white theology does not lie in the 
absence of a social a priori in the former. Like white theologians, black 
theologians do theology out of the social matrix of their existence. The 
dissimilarity between Black theology and white theology lies at the point of each 
having different mental grids, which account for their different mental approaches 
to the gospel. While I believe that the social a priori of Black theology is closer to 
the axiological perspective of biblical revelation, for the moment the point is 
simply the inescapable interplay between theology and society—whether white or 
Black theology. (1975, p. 45) 
 
 
Here Cone clearly links both black theology and white theology to socio-contextual 
influences. If white theology and white values are a result of the social context of white 
Americans, it seems unfair to condemn whites as ‘children of the devil’ because of their 
theological interpretations. To be children of Satan suggests an inherent evil; to be 
insensitive to the oppression of African Americans because those issues fall outside one’s 
social a priori does not. Cone acknowledges that white theology is context specific, yet he 
also presents whites as inherently evil. Of the American values that he suggests resulted 
from the social a priori of whites he states:  
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The principalities and powers of evil, mythically expressed in the figure of Satan, 
represent not only metaphysical realities but earthly realities as well. They are the 
American system, symbolized in Gerald Ford and other government officials, who 
oppress the poor, humiliate the weak, and make heroes out of rich capitalists. 
(Cone, 1975, p. 232) 
 
 
It seems that Cone wants to have it both ways. He is forced to acknowledge the 
influence of the social a priori in white theology because he argues that the social a priori 
of oppression allowed black theology to maintain faithful biblical interpretation. Yet he 
also wants to discount the social a priori of white Americans by presenting them as 
inherently evil. Certainly, such a presentation is understandable. In response to the 
silence of white America regarding the persistence of black suffering in America (and 
this silence certainly was tantamount to collusion in black suffering) it is understandable 
that Cone would portray whiteness as evil. Yet this portrayal locks Cone into a logical 
argument that is not compatible with his libratory aims.  
Faced with the prospect of evil, one has few options of resistance except prayer 
(Purpel & McLaurin, Jr., 2004). If white American oppression of black Americans 
resulted from the inherent evilness of whites, black Americans are left with few options 
for alleviating this oppression, except praying. What is the use of fighting given such a 
scenario? Cone (1975) argues that the vertical encounter with God propels black 
Americans to fight for their God-given freedom, yet one is lead to wonder about the 
political usefulness of such struggle if there are no realistic expectations of human victory 
against the inherent evil of whiteness. 
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Salvation and Reconciliation in Black and White 
For Cone, white Americans cannot escape God’s destruction of white values, as 
this is the meaning of God’s liberating actions in the U. S. Through a process of 
conversion, they can, however, repent of their sins of oppression and be reborn to 
struggle against oppression. Although Cone is not specific about the exact process 
through which white conversion occurs, he is clear that this decidedly rare occurrence 
necessitates that the white American “. . . die to whiteness and [become] reborn anew in 
order to struggle against white oppression and for liberation of the oppressed . . .” (Cone, 
1975, p. 242).  
 That whites will not likely be saved in Cone’s mind is evidence of what bell 
hooks (2003) terms oppositional thinking. In a system of domination, such thinking 
reflects the belief that one group’s gain must necessarily be associated with another 
group’s loss. Relevant to Cone’s theology this suggests that the end of oppression for 
African Americans must necessarily mean the beginning of oppression (e.g. eternal 
damnation) for white Americans. There is no possibility for both African Americans and 
white Americans to be reconciled with each other and with God, thereby transcending the 
cycle of domination and subjugation entirely. 
In essence, Cone’s formulation locks blacks and whites into static positions of 
victim and oppressor, with no possibility for transcending these identities. In the 
following quote, bell hooks speaks to the problems of designating African Americans as 
victims and whites as inherently evil: 
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By investing in the notion that they can only be “victims” in relation to those who 
have power over them, who may more often than not deploy that power in a way 
that reinforces oppressive hierarchy, they lose sight not only of their strength to 
resist but of the possibility that they can intervene and change the perspective of 
those in power. (2003a, p. 73) 
 
 
Such a scenario is suggestive of the theory of power formulated by Michel 
Foucault—in relationships of power, those dominated and subjugated can switch places 
(i.e. whites can be portrayed as children of the devil and Jesus Christ can be proclaimed 
the black messiah), but never completely escape the mechanisms of power. Thus Cone’s 
formula is left without realistic means of reconciliation between oppressor and oppressed; 
evil cannot be reconciled by human activity, but only through God’s eschatological 
activity.  
God the Father 
In GOTO, salvation (i.e. reconciliation), if it is to be received, must come from 
God. Thus, implicit in GOTO is a sense of defeatism; Cone enlists a patriarchal metaphor 
of God the Father as the only solution to black oppression. His reliance on God, to the 
virtual exclusion of humanity to end black suffering is significant. Such a scenario is 
especially problematic in terms of liberation efforts because it discourages agency and 
responsibility on the part of humans and promotes instead a patriarchal ideology in which 
God the father must save his children.  
Sallie McFague (1982) highlights the problematics of the religious metaphor of 
‘God the Father.’ Such a metaphor implies that humans are infantile children who can 
only be saved from our destructive tendencies by God, our patriarchal leader. The 
metaphor of God the Father plays prominently in Cone’s theology. African Americans 
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are presented as the helpless children whose Father (e.g. God) must protect them from 
harm (i.e. white oppression). McFague rightly argues that such a conceptualization is 
irresponsible because it allows humans to evade responsibility for social justice. She 
writes: 
 
Moreover, it appears increasingly to be the case that our health and well-being, 
which is to say, our “salvation,” depends in part on ourselves, on our willingness 
and ability to work cooperatively and with all our intelligence and strength. Any 
notion of salvation which presumes that individuals can be rescued from the 
world; that does not take seriously our necessary efforts to participate in the 
struggle against oppression and for well-being; or that allows us to abjure our 
responsibility by appealing as children to a father who will alone protect and 
save—any such notion must be seen as immoral, irrelevant, and destructive. 
(McFague, 1982, p. 186) 
 
 
In addition to discouraging human agency for social transformation, Cone’s 
depiction of the black/white binary is fundamentally erroneous. Essentialized notions of 
good and evil, victim and oppressor suggest that all whites are evil oppressors and all 
blacks are good and oppressed (Anderson, 1995).  
When the politics of domination are understood as interlocking spheres in which 
everyone enjoys some degree of privilege and is inflicted by some degree of oppression 
(Collins, 1990, 2000; hooks, 1984), Cone’s essentialized presentations appear 
implausible. Oppositional thinking perpetuates domination because it allows individuals 
to remain uncritical and therefore complicit in systems of domination (hooks, 2003). 
Cone’s depiction of whites as the evil enemy essentializes both whites and blacks by 
limiting the possible ways these identities can be understood.  
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Such a view blocks from Cone’s conceptual grid the patriarchal oppression of 
women (regardless of race/ethnicity) by men and particularly, the oppression of African 
American women by African American men (Williams, 1993). His failure to recognize 
the patriarchal oppression of African American women is just one example of the manner 
in which his discourse is implicated in a patriarchal meta-narrative that discounts his 
assertions of theological purity. If, as Cone contends, Christ stands in opposition to white 
Americans because their culture oppresses African Americans, would not Christ also 
stand in opposition to African American males because their culture oppresses African 
American women? Taking this line of thought further, would not Christ the Liberator 
stand with African American women and white women against African American men 
and white men because the patriarchal ideology of the latter have historically been 
implemented against the former? While such complications of social position reflect the 
reality of the human experience, they are treated as ‘irrelevant data’ in GOTO because 
they don’t fit Cone’s binary model. 
God Sides with Blacks, God is against Whites 
Arguably an even more compelling example of Cone’s reliance on counter-
libratory binaries is to be found in his declaration that God is on the side of black 
Americans against white Americans. Tellingly, Cone (1975) writes:  
 
Reconciliation between blacks and whites means that God is unquestionably on 
the side of the oppressed blacks struggling for justice. His justification is his 
righteous and total identification with black existence, taking it upon himself and 
revealing that he will not tolerate the wrong committed against his people. (p. 
235) 
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 Only from the perspective of oppositional thinking is it necessary for God to be 
on the side of either oppressors or the oppressed. Acknowledgement of the interlocking 
spheres of domination begs the question of just who God supposedly sides with. If all are 
oppressed in some way, would not God be continuously switching allegiances, depending 
on the context of oppression?  
Of course, Cone addresses the idea that all are oppressed in GOTO, yet he 
concludes that although there is truth in this statement, the truth of it can only be 
understood from the perspective of those who are oppressed by unjust social structures. 
He writes: “For it is material reality (i.e. social, economic, and political existence with the 
poor) that makes for the proper understanding of spiritual reality (‘all are oppressed’)       
. . .” (Cone, 1975, p. 149). 
For Cone, the danger of conceding the spiritual reality that all are oppressed runs 
the risk of glossing over real material differences in the lived experiences of poor and non 
poor people. Thus conceding the fact that all are in some way oppressed and privileged 
could decrease the force of his argument against the inhumane oppression of black 
Americans. Black American oppression in this context, could be construed as no better or 
worse than other oppressions. Stated differently, Cone privileges the suffering and 
oppression of black Americans because conceding the significance of other suffering runs 
the risk of making all suffering a matter of relative perception.  
While the dangerous political implications of such a concession of relativity are 
clear, Cone’s own formulation suggests an ideological argument (i.e. the relationship 
between black election and suffering) that is arguably more politically dangerous than 
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acknowledgement of the interlocking dimensions of oppression. Oppression is bad, but 
suffering is good (the problem with black election as service to God). 
As previously stated, much of GOTO is based on oppositional thinking that 
presents essentialized notions of blackness and whiteness. Blacks are victims of whites’ 
oppression; blackness represents virtually unqualified goodness while whiteness 
represents almost absolute evil. Yet in order for Cone to maintain his dual arguments of 
white oppression/black victimhood and black goodness/white evil, he is forced to engage 
in mental gymnastics whereby blackness is conflated with both positive and negative 
connotations and the suffering endured by blacks also is portrayed as positive and 
negative. 
Cone’s designation of whites as evil necessitates that he also portray blacks as 
victims. Indeed, much of his discourse highlights the brokenness, helplessness, and 
victimhood of black Americans under oppression. Cone’s usage of blackness as a dual 
signifier for both goodness and negativity is significant in that it highlights contradictions 
within his theology. The signification of blackness as ‘brokenness’ and despair must be 
maintained to emphasize what is in Cone’s view the utter evil of whiteness. Were the 
black experience not codified by Cone as ‘brokenness,’ then the treatment of blacks by 
white Americans would arguably not seem as detestable.  
Yet this presentation is problematic for libratory efforts. Those who are 
completely helpless are at the mercy of their oppressors because they have no power or 
resources to mobilize resistance. Cone’s continued depiction of blacks as helpless victims 
suggests a lack of power on the part of blacks in Cone’s view. Yet in the following 
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passage Cone explicitly expresses the need for power in the struggle for liberation. 
Arguing that black people must have resources mobilized in order to effectively battle 
white Americans for liberation, he states that black Americans must “. . . be ready to do 
battle with the powers of evil. For the oppressors will not grant freedom merely through 
shouting. The oppressed must have the power to take it” (Cone, 1975, p. 212).  
Cone’s previous designations of blacks as broken and helpless beg the question of 
where these victims will amass the power needed to take their liberation. Indeed, it has 
been previously argued in this analysis that given Cone’s formulation, black liberation 
cannot be realized through human achievement. Cone employs a metaphor of God the 
Father to fix black oppression. The political implications of this metaphor also have been 
discussed in preceding sections of this analysis.  
Also problematic in Cone’s argument for blackness as a dual signifier of goodness 
and negativity is his appropriation of black Americans as God’s elect. Cone appropriates 
the theme of election from biblical references to Israel’s election by God, yet his 
appropriation is uncritical. Several womanist scholars24 have observed the problematics 
associated with appropriating the theme of election uncritically. While Israel enjoyed 
election in the Bible, Israelites participated in the destruction of an entire nation of 
people—the Canaanites (Williams, 1993). An uncritical appropriation of Israel’s election 
to black American liberation suggests an implicit endorsement of the Canaanite genocide 
and consequently raises ethical concerns regarding the appropriateness of such 
identification.  
                                               
24 See for example Weems (1993) and Williams (1993). 
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Cone’s presentation also raises questions about the accountability of black 
Americans as they engage in their political struggle. As has been previously argued in 
this analysis, Cone’s portrayal of blackness as unqualified goodness influences his 
assertions that black Americans alone, must determine the moral and ethical limits of 
their struggle (Cone, 1975). Thus, as in the historical case of Israel’s biblical election, 
those deemed elect by God are in danger of becoming the very oppressors that God seeks 
to destroy. Again, if whiteness is evil then black Americans must struggle without them 
in the fight against oppression while they await God’s eschatological cessation of 
oppression. 
That Cone suggests as unqualified identification with blackness implies that 
oppressed blacks can do little wrong in their liberation struggle. Yet given Cone’s own 
admittance that varying degrees of clarity exist regarding God’s will among the 
oppressed (i.e. some of the oppressed have internalized values of their oppressors) and 
the fact that Cone’s vision of liberation takes for granted the inevitability of violence in 
the liberation struggle, it seems doubtful that liberation efforts not intended to “. . . make 
the oppressors the slaves but to transform humanity” (Cone, 1975, p. 217) could be 
successful when grounded in an uncritical view of black election. 
Cone (1975) readily asserts that ultimate liberation will only be achieved by black 
Americans through God’s eschatological activity. Yet, while black Americans cannot 
achieve liberation on their own, neither apparently can God. In an amazing display of 
mental gymnastics, Cone superimposes onto the metaphor of God the Father another 
metaphor of blacks as God’s suffering servants. Cone argues that God’s elect are called 
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into service for human liberation. Cone takes for granted that this service will involve 
suffering. Discussing this idea he writes:  
 
Suffering therefore is reinterpreted in the light of Jesus’ cross and resurrection and 
of our call to become liberated sufferers with God. There is joy in our suffering 
insofar as we have to suffer for freedom…Therefore when suffering is inflicted 
upon the oppressed, it is evil and we must struggle against it. But when suffering 
arises out of the struggle against suffering, as in the fight against injustice, we 
accept it as a constituent of our calling and thus voluntarily suffer . . . (Cone, 
1975, p. 177) 
 
 
Thus, “Black people, therefore, as God’s suffering servant, are called to suffer with God 
in the liberation of humanity” (Cone, 1975, p. 193). Consequently, the onus of 
responsibility for fighting for freedom rests solely with the oppressed and those who 
freely convert to the oppressed. Cone writes: 
 
. . . the oppressed recognize that their call is to be God’s kingdom of priests to all 
peoples of the Earth. Election involves service, even to the oppressors . . . the 
struggle for liberation is the service the people of God render for all, even those 
who are responsible for the structure of slavery. (p. 151) 
 
 
The mental gymnastics employed to maintain this argument is dizzying. If the 
suffering of God’s elect is divinely mandated, it becomes difficult to understand why 
Cone argues so much against black suffering. He argues that suffering arising from unjust 
social structures is evil, yet suffering in the benefit of liberation is joyful and should 
therefore be reinterpreted as good. Therefore, if one simply accepts one’s suffering, it is 
bad, but if one embraces the suffering as requisite for human liberation, it is good. The 
difference between good and bad suffering then, can be understood simply as a state of 
mind. 
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What is disturbing about this argument is that it adheres closely to the logic of 
Cartesian duality—the argument for a mind body split utilized to keep African slaves 
oppressed. As the argument went, enslaved Africans could convert to Christianity and 
receive otherworldly salvation while remaining the physical chattel of their slave owners 
(Pinn, 2002). In essence, this mind body split permitted the Christianization of the 
American slave system. Yet Cone relies on this same mind body split to justify his 
argument that suffering black Americans are divinely mandated to endure more suffering 
for the liberation of humanity. The very real physical aspects of black suffering (physical 
abuse, hunger, unemployment, incarceration, infant mortality, inadequate healthcare, etc.) 
are trivialized. Suffering in this sense, becomes spiritualized, treated as an abstract rather 
than a physical reality. Cone argues that there is joy in black suffering (once the correct 
frame of mind is obtained) because it carries the promise of ultimate liberation. This is 
Cone’s mind/body split that privileges the idea of suffering for liberation over the real 
physical consequences of black suffering. 
Cone takes it for granted that black Americans must suffer for the liberation of all 
humanity. But why is this so? Implicit here is a meta-narrative of exceptionalism (West, 
1982). The idea that black Americans are special (i.e. elect) and therefore somehow more 
suited for service and suffering than other human beings (West, 1982). Certainly, this line 
of exceptionalist thinking is not new in black theological discourse. This discourse was 
apparent in Martin Luther King’s moral suasion tactics and his argument that suffering 
was redemptive (West, 1982). Yet exceptionalist discourse is politically disastrous for 
oppressed black Americans. There is something very insidious and dangerous in 
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promoting the act of suffering to people who are already vulnerable to suffering and 
abuse (Williams, 1993). That Cone promotes suffering as joyous is politically 
irresponsible because it depicts suffering positively—as a condition to be aspired to 
because it indicates pleasure in God’s sight (i.e. chosen-ness). 
Concluding Thoughts on GOTO 
Cone’s insistence on maintaining the black/white binary marginalizes 
black women, poor whites, and other groups failing to fit into his essentialized 
projections of blackness and whiteness. This formulation creates circumstances 
that are ripe for black Americans (as God’s elect) to change positions with white 
Americans as oppressors, but it does not allow enough space and creativity for 
transcendence.  
Most troubling, however, is the fact that Cone’s analysis calls upon the 
oppressed to not only survive their oppression (certainly this should be considered 
an accomplishment in and of itself) but to bear the responsibility for liberating 
themselves and their oppressors. In truth, those who are intent on keeping black 
Americans oppressed would be hard-pressed to devise a better means of 
perpetuating black oppression than Cone’s formulation. By relieving unconverted 
oppressors of their responsibility to change and placing the onus of liberation on 
the already overburdened, abused, and socially, politically, and economically 
exploited/excluded, Cone all but guarantees that his vision of a transformed 
humanity will never come to pass. Blacks are elected to inaugurate a new vision 
for humanity but they must do it alone because white oppressors (unless they are 
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born anew to oppression) can’t be trusted. Excluded from the loop of liberation, 
whites continue perpetuating the status quo, while oppressed blacks, as God’s 
suffering servants are required to struggle in isolation against the status quo.  
There is a great deal of political danger in Cone’s discourse because it mortgages 
black liberation at the expense of black humanity. The cost of Cone’s black liberation is 
too high; given Cone’s own acknowledgement that GOTO is (as is all theology) a faith 
claim that bears no historical proof of God’s liberating activity for the oppressed. He 
writes: 
 
In the final analysis we must admit that there is no way to ‘prove objectively’ that 
we are telling the truth about ourselves or about the One who has called us into 
being. There is o place we can stand that will remove us from the limitations of 
history and thus enable us to tell the whole truth without the risk of ideological 
distortion. As long as we live and have our being in time and space, absolute truth 
is impossible. But this concession is not an affirmation of unrestricted relativity. 
We can and must say something about the world that is not reducible to our 
subjectivity. (Cone, 1975, p. 102) 
 
 
Absolute truth is impossible; what is possible (indeed highly likely) is that the 
joyful suffering Cone advocates could be in vain. As Cone rightly points out, such 
is the stuff of faith claims. Still, a more liberating faith claim would not glamorize 
suffering for those who are already exploited economically, socially, emotionally, 
etc. Clearly, a more liberating vision is needed. 
GOTO is exceptional in its ability to firmly grasp and explicate the false 
connections between racism and (white) theology. Cone’s insights correctly challenged 
the dominance and presumed universality of white theology. He also correctly argued 
that the issue of black liberation was appropriate and relevant not only for black theology, 
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but for all theological reflection. Yet Cone’s analysis of structures of domination also is 
complicit in perpetuating counter libratory meta-narratives.  
Admittedly, this analysis of Cone’s work benefits from hindsight because it takes 
advantage of and summarizes responses to GOTO by voices not represented in his 1975 
book. His theology in GOTO was in large part an apologetic—a response to the subtle 
and overt forms of racism that he experienced as a black male in the United States. The 
starting point of his analysis determined in large measure the content of his theological 
discourse. As Cone himself recognized, such is the mechanism of the social a priori. It 
constrains the ability to conceive of contexts as being otherwise.  
Trapped within a racist social system, Cone’s vision in GOTO25 was largely 
limited to an inversion of the white/black hierarchy that oppressed him. Cone’s inability 
to see outside the constraints of his oppression does not, however, preclude the possibility 
of more inclusive and libratory articulations. As Cone (1975) argues, “we can and must 
say something about the world that is not reducible to our subjectivity” (p. 102). Given 
the ideological problematics identified within GOTO, it is imperative that the search for 
more inclusive and politically beneficial God-talk continue. 
M. Shawn Copeland: “Wading through Many Sorrows: Toward a Theology of 
Suffering in Womanist Perspective” (1993) 
Though understandably limited in applicability to diverse segments of the black 
religious community, Cone’s black theology of liberation nevertheless resonated with 
                                               
25 Recognition is given here to the fact that Cone’s theology has evolved to reflect a greater awareness of 
the limitations discussed in this chapter. For an example of Cone’s theological evolution see Martin & 
Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare (1991) by James Cone. 
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many black theologians. His continued influence manifests itself in the work of second 
generation black theologians, and womanist black theologians. M. Shawn Copeland is 
one such theologian who has maintained ties to Cone’s theological reflection in GOTO. 
A deconstruction of her 1993 work: “Wading through Many Sorrows: Toward a 
Theology of Suffering in Womanist Perspective” follows. 
Womanist theology developed in the early 1970’s (Pinn, 2002); its current 
conceptualizations are broadly based on delineations of the term womanist, coined by the 
author Alice Walker in her work In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens (1984). Womanist 
theology is prophetic in that it engages in theological reflection on the nature of suffering 
and on the multiple forms of oppressive structures/circumstances that constrain black 
women in order to liberate all humanity (Townes, 1993). Womanist theology also 
highlights black women’s active strategies of resistance to oppression. 
In this sense, M. Shawn Copeland’s (1993) “Wading through Many Sorrows: 
Toward a Theology of Suffering in Womanist Perspective” is representative. Copeland’s 
essay focuses on the disproportionate amount of suffering endured by black women in 
America in an attempt to reinterpret its purpose and function. Understanding suffering to 
be universal and inescapable, Copeland’s essay chronicles black women’s experiences of 
suffering (especially during slavery) and identifies resources supportive of black 
women’s resistance to oppression. In doing so, she argues for a ‘theology of suffering’ (p. 
111) that is sensitive to both the multidimensional sources of suffering for black women 
and their active strategies to endure and transform these sources. 
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For Copeland, suffering is understood to be “. . . the disturbance of our inner 
tranquility caused by physical, mental, emotional and spiritual forces that we grasp as 
jeopardizing our lives, our very existence” (p. 109) which can result in positive goods 
even though it is connected to evil. In the following excerpt, Copeland explains the 
relationship between evil, suffering, and positive good. She writes: 
 
Evil is the negation and deprivation of good; suffering, while never identical with 
evil, is inseparable from it. Thus, and quite paradoxically, the suffering caused by 
evil can result in interior development and perfection as well as in social and 
cultural good. (Copeland, 1993, p. 109) 
 
 
Guided by the above understanding of suffering, Copeland’s essay conceptually explores 
the good that can result from black women’s experience and resistance to oppression. 
 Methodologically, Copeland explores Harriet Jacobs’ slave narrative, chronicling 
the extensive sexual and racial oppression that Jacobs was forced to endure. Copeland 
supplants this narrative with slave narratives from other women that also are indicative of 
the particularized oppressive forces thrust upon black women. Despite the harrowing 
accounts of abuse and oppression in these accounts, Copeland argues that the spirits of 
those black women she discusses were not destroyed. Although they were: 
 
. . . caught in the vicious nexus spawned in chattel slavery—full of arrogant self-
assertion of white male power and privilege; white female ambivalence and 
hatred, the suffering of black women and men . . . the women may be caught but 
they are not trapped. These black women wade through their sorrows, managing 
their suffering, rather than being managed by it. (Copeland, 1993, p. 118) 
 
 
For Copeland, black women’s ability to wade through their sorrows was a result of their 
resistance resources, specifically their Christianity. However, Copeland argues that this 
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resource was utilized selectively by black women. According to Copeland, black slave 
women appropriated the biblical revelation they received, especially the Exodus event 
and the crucifixion, into an understanding of God as the ‘author of freedom’ (p. 120) who 
encouraged them to resist their oppression.  
 Copeland cites memory as another resource for black women’s resistance because 
it allowed slaves to recover and reconstruct those aspects of themselves that countered 
the negative identities and definitions of self and culture forced upon them by chattel 
slavery. The final resource Copeland identifies for black women’s resistance is language 
and particularly the sharp back-talk referred to as sass. Sass was an important resource 
for black women because it allowed them to “. . . guard, regain, and secure self-esteem; 
to obtain and hold psychological distance; to speak truth; to challenge . . .” (Copeland, 
1993, p. 121) oppressive structures. 
 Because womanist theology understands the experiences of black women to be an 
appropriate point of departure for theological reflection, all understanding of oppression 
and strategies for resistance must be understood in light of black women’s experiences. 
This, for Copeland, is especially true in terms of black women’s usage of the Bible. 
Because the Bible’s intended use under the slave system in colonial America was to 
promote a religious ideology to keep slaves oppressed, black women who appropriated 
liberating messages from the Bible and from Christian religion were required to develop 
‘distinctive Christian responses to suffering’ (p. 123) based on hermeneutics of suspicion 
and resistance. These interpretive frameworks allowed black Christian women to reflect 
on their oppression, resist it, and transform it (Copeland, 1993). Copeland argues that 
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engagement in these critically interpretive frameworks required a great deal of work for 
black women. Explaining the process through which Christian black women obtained a 
liberating and empowering biblical messages from a religion tainted by a historical 
foundation of oppression to black Americans, Copeland writes: 
 
In its teaching, theologizing, preaching, and practice, this Christianity sought to 
bind the slaves in their condition by inculcating caricatures of the cardinal virtues 
of patience, long-suffering, forbearance, love, faith, and hope. Thus to distance 
itself from any form of masochism, even Christian masochism, a theology of 
suffering in womanist perspective must reevaluate those virtues in light of black 
women’s experiences. Such reevaluation engages a hermeneutic of suspicion and 
a hermeneutic of resistance; but hat reevaluation and reinterpretation must be 
rooted in a critical realism that rejects both naïve realism and idealism as adequate 
foundations for a theology of suffering. (1993, p. 122) 
 
 
 In addition to this selective use of Christianity, Copeland’s theology of suffering 
also employs resistance strategies of memory and language. Memory is needed to recount 
the stories, wisdom, and cultural heritage of those who came before; language is needed 
to retell stories of the past and rearticulate oppressive elements of the present into more 
liberating ones (Copeland, 1993). 
 Copeland argues that black women utilize these resources of resistance to make 
their suffering redemptive. By making their suffering meaningful (i.e., interpreting their 
suffering as the price of freedom) Copeland argues that black women redeemed the true 
biblical message and gave new meaning to touted yet unrealized Christian virtues. 
Speaking directly to the black woman’s power to transform oppressive elements of 
Christianity, Copeland writes: 
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. . . black women invite God to partner them in the redemption of black people . . . 
And by their very suffering and privation, black women under chattel slavery 
freed the cross of Christ. Their steadfast commitment honored that cross and the 
One who died for all and redeemed it from Christianity’s vulgar misuse . . . 
Moreover, in their resistance, black women’s suffering redeemed caricatured 
Christian virtues. Because of the lives of suffering of black women held in chattel 
slavery—the meanings of forbearance, long-suffering, patience, love, hope, and 
faith can never again be idealized. Because of the rape, seduction, and 
concubinage of black women under chattel slavery, chastity or virginity begs new 
meaning. (1993, p. 124) 
 
 
 Copeland’s essay is laudable in its acknowledgement of the potentially oppressive 
force of the Bible for black American women and for its careful attention to the forms of 
subjugated knowledge utilized by black women in oppressive circumstances to make 
sense of their reality. Her essay extends the concept of blackness beyond James Cone’s 
essentialized notions articulated in God of the Oppressed. By highlighting the complex 
web of oppression and resistance experienced by black women, Copeland complicates 
understandings of what it means to be black and oppressed. In doing so, Copeland 
demonstrates that rather than being monolithic, the black community has diverse needs 
and that the particularized suffering and strengths of black women also are appropriate 
points of departure for theological reflection. 
Though empowering for these reasons, Copeland’s account of black women’s 
suffering and their responses to it can be clearly traced back to James Cone’s notions of 
election, redemptive suffering, and exceptionalism as explicated in God of the Oppressed. 
Copeland’s application of these concepts for black women will now be discussed. 
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Election 
 It is understandable that given the enormity of black women’s suffering, Copeland 
desires to articulate a response to this suffering that does not suggest it is undertaken by 
black women in vain. Indeed, an initial reading of her text suggests empowering themes 
for black women. Specifically, Copeland embraces a metaphor of God the partner that 
appears to move beyond the metaphor of God the Father espoused in God of the 
Oppressed. Although Copeland does not explicitly express a belief in black women as 
God’s elect, such a belief is nevertheless espoused in her discourse. 
Copeland (1993) argues that black women seek partnership with God in the 
redemption of black lives. In doing so, she implicitly espouses a model of black women’s 
election. Hers is not an image of God as the patriarchal hero who rescues black women 
from the world. Instead, black women appear, in Copeland’s model, empowered; they are 
eager to do the work of redemption/salvation and initiate this process by inviting God to 
assist them in the project of liberation (Copeland, 1993). While the metaphor of God the 
Partner indeed appears to hold more libratory promise than that of God the Father, when 
analyzed more closely it espouses themes of election and redemptive suffering. 
The magnitude of work Copeland designates black women as being responsible 
for in her article is astounding. Black women are assigned the unenviable task of saving 
black Americans and rescuing Christianity from its tainted legacy (Copeland, 1993). 
Essentially, they are elected to liberate humanity. This election is implicit in Copeland’s 
model. Black women are not presented as partnering with black men to redeem black 
people, nor are they depicted as partnering with other Christians to redeem Christianity. 
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In contrast, it is the unique suffering experienced by black women (as a result of 
oppression from black men, white men, and white women) that black women are 
provided the appropriate interpretive framework for carrying out the project of 
redemption. Because they were “. . . caught in the vicious nexus spawned in chattel 
slavery—full and arrogant self-assertion of white male power and white female 
ambivalence and hatred, the subjugation of Black women and men . . .” (Copeland, 1993, 
p. 118). Copeland argues that black women developed resources of resistance and 
transcendence that hold the promise for black redemption and for Christian redemption as 
well. Thus, black women represent a group of elect people charged with human 
redemption. 
Redemptive Suffering 
Copeland articulates a discourse in which black women (in partnership with God) 
are called to the service of redemption, but their tools of use for this project are not their 
resources of resistance. Instead they are elected to redeem the world through their 
suffering. As such, the oppressive nature of black women’s ‘partnership’ with God 
becomes transparent. Black women in this model seem to do all the work required of 
redemption. They endure ‘pain, privation, and injury’ (Copeland, 1993, p. 124), risk life 
and limb, and are reduced to concubinage, and endure rape—all in the service of others 
(Copeland, 1993). It is important to keep in mind here that while black women are 
engaged in the project of others’ redemption, they themselves are in need of saving. 
Obviously, black women need to be relieved of their suffering, their pain, and their 
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deprivation, but in the model presented, their needs are sacrificed for the good of 
humanity.  
While black women are suffering, Copeland argues that God provides them with 
divine grace which enables them to turn “. . . victimization into Christian triumph” 
(Copeland, 1993, p. 119). Here Christian triumph is to be understood as an altered frame 
of mind producing knowledge that “. . . triumph over the principalities and powers of 
death, triumph over evil in this world” (Copeland, 1993, p. 120) had been realized 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus, in Copeland’s model, it seems that God’s 
grace provides black women an altered reality within which to perform their service. 
Such an altered reality is not unlike that espoused by Cone in God of the Oppressed when 
he argued that black suffering in the name of liberation was joyful. Cone’s argument 
forced him to employ a Cartesian duality in God of the Oppressed that downplayed the 
physical suffering of black Americans. In “Wading through Many Sorrows,” Copeland is 
forced to employ a similar application of the mind/body split. 
Exceptionalism 
Although Copeland is careful to note that a theology of suffering based on the 
womanist perspective cannot endorse “. . . idealism distanced from critical knowledge of 
experience . . . of black’s reality” (Copeland, 1993, p. 123) one is left to wonder why an 
idealized image of black women’s suffering is so prominent in Copeland’s model. Her 
text suggests that black women are uniquely suited with the moral character and 
interpretive framework for needed to liberate the world. Though Copeland is careful to 
chronicle the verbal, physical, and sexual assaults endured by black women under 
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circumstances of oppression, she detracts from the perceived severity of black women’s 
suffering by attributing to it redemptive significance. Copeland argues that many positive 
goods came out of black women’s suffering including the redemption of black humanity, 
the redemption of the meaning of Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection, and the re-
inscription of Cardinal virtues of forbearance, long-suffering, etc. (Copeland, 1993).  
Implicitly, Copeland’s discourse suggests the following question: If there is such 
great benefit attached to the suffering of black women, would it not be in the best interest 
of everyone (except, of course, black women) for their suffering to continue? After all, 
black women in Copeland’s model are compensated for their suffering through moral 
victory over their oppressive circumstances.  
Such are the components of an idealized understanding of suffering. Copeland 
privileges the moral victory of black women over their physical suffering. They become 
Christ figures, sacrificing themselves for the redemption of all. It may even be argued 
that, in Copeland’s model, black women serve as surrogates for Christ because they are 
somehow able to—through their suffering—imbue the meaning of the Christ event with 
more realness, more soul than it would have otherwise had. Here Copeland, like Cone 
before her, clearly embraces a meta-narrative of exceptionalism; Black women, as 
presented by Copeland, are specially suited to bear the responsibility for redeeming and 
transforming the world.  
Concluding Thoughts on “Wading Through Many Sorrows” 
The exceptional characteristics and capabilities of black women are certainly 
noteworthy, yet Copeland’s laudatory presentation of black women’s successful 
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resources of resistance make it easy to lose sight of the very real physical suffering black 
women endure. Copeland’s stated purpose of this article was to think about black 
women’s suffering in novel ways—to realize some meaning which precluded their 
suffering from being in vain. Unfortunately, her model inscribes the suffering of black 
women with so much meaning that it becomes legitimated. Black women suffer for the 
world and in so far as their suffering helps everyone, it is justified. If consideration were 
not given to the physical realities of suffering, one could easily argue that the sacrifice of 
black women is a small price to pay for the redemption of humanity. Yet it must be 
remembered that black women’s moral victory (i.e. Christian triumph) is essentially 
meaningless if it does nothing to end their very real physical suffering.  
Moral victory cannot prevent the horror of rape, stop physical assault, ease hunger 
pangs, provide adequate housing, or keep one’s children safe. Moral victory derived from 
physical suffering cannot release one from physical suffering. For black women living in 
situations of oppression, the benefits of moral victory are, therefore, dubious. Thus for all 
the emancipatory promise Copeland’s metaphor of God the Partner invoked, the end 
result is a persistent meta-narrative suggestive of black people’s (and in this instance 
black women’s) ontological status as servants and sufferers for the world. Black women 
suffer and receive moral victory through God’s grace. It is indeed ironic that black 
women, in partnership with God, can in many ways redeem the Redeemer, while their 
own redemption is realized in mind only. Rather than imaging God and black women as 
co-partners, such a scenario at best images black women as ‘suffering servants’ and God 
as ‘silent partner.’  
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Still more needs to be said about the redemptive nature of suffering Copeland 
projects. While the focus of this analysis has been on the historical ‘benefits’ of black 
women’s suffering, Copeland also discusses present-day benefits that continue to be 
derived from black suffering. She rationalizes that the suffering of black Americans has 
produced wonderful music, art, and religious expressions. That these expressions 
originated from black suffering is not in question. What is contested here is whose 
benefits these ‘fruits’ of suffering serve (Spelman, 1997). These fruits of black 
suffering—particularly black expressions of music and art have traditionally been 
commodified, usurped by those outside the black community for profit (Cashmore, 
1997). As enjoyment for others, these fruits service a parasitic type of enjoyment derived 
from black suffering.  
Moreover, it is not overstating the obvious to say that without experiences of 
African enslavement, Jim Crowism, de facto segregation, and contemporary apartheid in 
the U. S., blacks would not have needed to produce these mediums. Black theological 
reflection originated in enslaved Africans’ attempts to make sense of their enslavement 
(West, 1982). It is not difficult to imagine that most black Americans, given the choice of 
suffering and retaining these cultural treasures or not suffering and not having them, 
would choose the latter. That suffering enabled black Americans to produce soulful 
theology, beautiful art, and innovative music does not redeem suffering. These 
expressions simply represent forms of adaptation to suffering that facilitate survival. 
Similarly, black women’s resistance strategies in the context of suffering enables them to 
survive suffering—these strategies to not redeem suffering. Suffering does not ennoble 
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(Townes, 1993); any attempts to imbue suffering with redemptive qualities run the very 
real danger of discouraging those who suffer from resisting their circumstances. Such 
arguments act as a detriments to rather than facilitators of liberation. 
One needs look no further than one of the subjects of Copeland’s analysis, Harriet 
Jacobs, for evidence of the detrimental effects of certain resistance efforts black women 
employ. Copeland argues that black women’s resources sustained them as they suffered 
to liberate humanity. Yet her concluding paragraph attests to the psychological trauma 
Jacob’s endured while struggling to resolve conflict between the sexual choices she made 
and the biblical teachings she aspired to follow. While Copeland argues that black 
women’s selective reading of the Bible allowed for liberating visions in oppressive 
circumstances, Jacobs' emotional trauma refutes such claims. Copeland admits that:  
 
Harriet Jacobs’ sexual liaison with Mr. Sands caused her great remorse and she 
experiences a loss of self-esteem. Indeed, for Jacobs, this spiritual and existential 
agony shadows the remainder of her life. A theology of suffering in womanist 
perspective ought to offer her comfort . . . (1993, p. 124) 
 
 
 That Jacobs was not comforted by her resistance efforts is noteworthy. Jacobs’ 
angst begs the question of how useful such a theology, based on the experiences of 
women who themselves were not liberated by their resistance practices, can help 
contemporary black women in their struggles. In essence, Copeland’s theology is an 
attempt to idealize the liberating effects of the suffering these black women endured. As 
previously stated, idealized suffering is suffering nonetheless, and it is to be avoided, not 
embraced (Townes, 1993; Williams, 1993).  
154 
 
If the purpose of black theology (and womanist theology) is to provide liberating 
messages to blacks about their purpose in life and ultimate meaning, a theology of 
suffering must be found lacking. Jacob’s questioning and conflict underscore the fact that 
a theology of suffering does little to alter physical consequences of suffering (i.e. 
physical abuse, starvation, economic exploitation) and does even less to assuage the 
historical consequences of sacrificing black women’s bodies for some abstract greater 
theological good.  
 Any theological discourse that attempts to uncover moral value in the suffering of 
black bodies runs the danger of further exploiting oppressed blacks. The risk is too great 
because the suffering of blacks in America has gone on for too long; such interpretations 
must therefore be abandoned in favor of more liberating visions of African American 
purpose and meaning.  
The brilliance of James Cone’s theological reflection in God of the Oppressed 
arguably lay in its ability to strike a resounding chord with diverse segments of the black 
community despite its fore-mentioned limitations of theological vision. Cone articulated 
a liberating hermeneutic that connected what he identified as the “true” message of the 
gospel—decisive action on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. Among those for whom 
this hermeneutic resonated loudly was philosopher and scholar of African American 
studies, Cornel West. In the following article, West enhances Cone’s work on black 
theology by extending it to what is, for West, its logical progression—a critique of 
capitalist civilization.  
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Cornel West: “Black Theology of Liberation as Critique of Capitalist Civilization” 
(1993a) 
  Cornel West’s (1993a) article “Black Theology of Liberation as Critique of 
Capitalist Civilization” is an important work because it provides a concise analysis of the 
historical development of black theology and also provides insights on the future 
direction of black theological reflection. In this article, West identifies what he believes 
to be the limitations and the positive aspects of black theology as previously articulated. 
Additionally, he argues that a re-articulation of black theology, supportive of both the 
prophetic Christian tradition and the progressive Marxist tradition, is needed for black 
theology to adequately address the present-day oppressive structures impacting black 
American life (West, 1993a). 
 West relies heavily on the Marxist understanding of human fallibility, which he 
terms the ‘tragic aspects of being human’ (p. 422) to frame his understanding of black 
theological development. He argues that although progress can be made, no human 
endeavor can ever be perfected due to the constraints of human limitation. Speaking to 
this aspect of human fallibility West (1993a) writes:  
 
I believe that any social vision, political praxis or existential concern must take 
seriously the tragic aspects of our fallen, finite conditions and circumstances. To 
take seriously the tragic aspects of being human means to acknowledge the 
inevitable gap between human aims and human accomplishments, between human 
aspirations and human achievements. (p. 421) 
 
 
Thus for West, stages of black theological reflection are evidenced by leaps and limits in 
human understanding. Leaps in black theology are demonstrated through increases in 
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black American understandings of and critiques against the sources of oppression that 
most immediately threaten black life (West, 1993a). Limits in human understanding are 
demonstrated through instances of blindness to certain interconnecting dimensions of 
oppression and their existential consequences (West, 1993a). 
 West identifies four criteria indicative of Marxist critique and uses these criteria 
to evaluate the effectiveness of each stage of black theological development. These 
criteria include: (a) appreciation of the moral significance of the plight of exploited and 
oppressed individuals; (b) utilization of high level social theory to identify and demystify 
sources of exploitation and oppression; (c) the real ability to alter the status quo; and (d) 
either a “. . . faith praxis or a political movement with organization, power, and social 
vision, with leaders of impeccable integrity” (West, 1993a, p. 417). 
 West then chronicles five stages in the development of prophetic black theology; 
he describes the first (1650-1863) as a critique of the institution of slavery. This critique 
was grounded, according to West, in the black slave experience and began “. . . when 
African slaves first tried to make sense of their servitude in light of biblical texts” (West, 
1993a, p. 410). West identifies the second stage (1864-1969) in the development of black 
theological reflection as a critique of institutional racism and identifies Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and the black power movement both as its constituent elements. West’s third 
stage (1969-1977) of black theological reflection is a critique of white North American 
theology. A key element of this stage was the emergence of systematically codified 
articulations of black theology such as James Cone’s (1975) God of the Oppressed. As 
awareness grew of the connections between white racism and U. S. capitalism, West 
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argues that the fourth stage (1978-present) of black theological development evolved. In 
this stage black theologians identified U. S. monopoly capitalism as an exploitative 
system that organized life in ways that were detrimental to humanity and especially to 
black humanity. Here a closer look at West’s explication of the limits of understanding in 
black theological reflection’s fourth historical stage is necessary.  
 For West, the critique of U. S. capitalism resulted in a praxis that was inadequate 
for promoting black liberation. According to West, the absence of an explicit social 
theory in this stage prevented black theologians from articulating and carrying out 
practical elements of socio-economic and political liberation. West’s stated purpose for 
the present article is to correct the aforementioned lacks by engaging black theology in 
dialogue with progressive Marxist social theory in order to articulate black theological 
discourse which explicates relationships between capitalist civilization and black 
socioeconomic and existential oppression. He writes: 
 
I claim that the present challenge to black theologians is to put forward an 
understanding of the Christian gospel in light of present circumstances which 
takes into account the complex ways in which racism (especially, white racism) 
and sexism (especially, male sexism) are integral to the class exploitative 
capitalist system of production as well as its repressive imperialist tentacles 
abroad; and to keep in view the crucial existential issues of death, disease, 
despair, dread and disappointment that each and every individual must face within 
the context of the present circumstances. (West, 1993a, p. 416) 
 
 
West’s article is then, an attempt to imbue prophetic black theology with progressive 
Marxist social theory while retaining what he feels to be positive aspects of the previous 
stages of black theology. In West’s own words, he offers a re-articulation of black 
theology that “. . . preserves the positive content of its earlier historical stages, overcomes 
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its earlier (and inevitable) blindness and makes explicit its present challenges” (West, 
1993a, p. 416). Positive content of black theology includes for West the notions that (a) 
white racism is a central aspect and defining feature of U. S. exploitative capitalism; (b) 
religion can either serve as opiate or source of struggle for liberation; and (c) the 
theological faith claim that “God sides with the oppressed and acts on their behalf” (p. 
416). 
West’s re-articulation of black theology includes both a Marxist critique and a 
theological critique of capitalist civilization that together explicate interconnections 
between capitalism occurring in the U. S. and abroad, socioeconomic exploitation, 
existential despair, and black American oppression.  
Marxist Critique of Capitalism 
West’s Marxist analysis presupposes that capitalism is a fundamentally 
undemocratic system because it allows producers no decision-making capacity regarding 
their product; as such, West argues that capitalism is antithetical to the socioeconomic 
well-being of the masses of producers living within capitalist systems. West further links 
capitalism to imperialism, arguing that multinational corporation profit margins are 
enhanced by controlling land and means of production in developing countries and by 
discouraging organizing efforts on the part of workers. For West, such tactics facilitate 
gross disparities in economics that exacerbate class inequalities. West then links 
imperialism to oppression, reasoning that the juxtaposition of capital accumulation by 
multinational corporations and the exclusion of workers from decision-making “. . . often 
leads to military rule and abominable oppression” (West, 1993a, p. 418) to protect the 
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interests of developed countries. Finally, West identifies four types of oppression (i.e., 
imperialist oppression, class exploitation, racial oppression, and sexual oppression) which 
form the contours of capitalist civilization and cause “. . . poverty, disease, lack of self-
esteem, and despair [and] also the suppression of individuality . . .” (West, 1993a, p. 
418).  
 West identifies both the Industrial Revolution and bourgeois political revolutions 
as paving the way for capitalist civilization because in each case, various forms of 
oppression were utilized to fuel the revolutions. In a discussion of the role oppression 
played in maintaining and perpetuating the ways of life required for capitalist civilization 
West (using the Americas and Britain as examples) writes: 
 
Forms of class exploitation occurred in both the cotton plantations in the 
Americas and in the mines in Britain; imperialist oppression took place in 
Britain’s control of territory, resources and people in the Americas; racism 
provided the chief ideological justification for the use of Africans as 
slaves in the Americas; and sexism was employed to defend the abuse of 
women on both the plantations in the Americas and within the mills in 
Britain. (1993a, p. 419) 
 
 
Thus, West’s Marxist critique of capitalist civilization reveals the relationship between 
capitalism in the U. S. and black American oppression as symptomatic of an overarching 
capitalist civilization.  
Theological Critique of Capitalism 
West begins the theological dimension of his critique of capitalist civilization by 
articulating the theological commitments which inform his article. These include 
commitment to a Christian notion of the self-realization of individual within community, 
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a Christian notion of original sin, and an understanding of the gospel “. . . as inescapable 
penultimate tragedy and the persistent hope for ultimate triumph” (West, 1993a, p. 420). 
The relationship of these commitments to West’s theological articulation will now be 
discussed.  
 Self-realization of individuality within community. West identifies as 
Christianity’s central theme the ‘principle of self-realization of human individuality 
within community’; although the articulation of this principle has, according to West, 
typically focused on salvation in heaven. West argues that the prophetic Christian 
tradition understands socioeconomic well-being (i.e. earthly salvation) and existential 
salvation to be of equal importance to God. Referring to this equality, West writes: “The 
notion of a transcendent, Wholly Other god before whom all men and women are equal 
endows the well-being and salvation of each person with equal value and significance” 
(1993a, p. 420). The maintenance of capitalist civilization, which exacerbates economic 
disparities and creates ways of life that breed disease and despair is for West, antithetical 
to the will of God—that every person have socioeconomic and existential salvation. It is 
therefore on the basis of the principle of self-realization of human individuality within 
community that West founds his critique of capitalist civilization and his demand for the 
liberation (both socio-economic and existential) of the working and underclass people 
living within capitalist civilization. 
 Original Sin. For West, a major aspect of human fallibility is a proclivity towards 
self-interested behavior that can be addressed but never completely overcome; this 
human fallibility is an outcome of original sin. To guard against human selfishness, West 
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advocates the creation of a socialist civilization “. . . in which the socioeconomic well-
being, political liberties, cultural diversity and existential salvation (if chosen) of persons 
is promoted . . .” (West, 1993a, p. 421) through the democratic participation of all people 
in the decision-making processes relevant to institutions that regulate their lives. West 
argues that such participation is required to promote human accountability, provide some 
measure of protection against human fallibility, and in doing these things, facilitates well-
being. 
 Gospel as tragedy and hope for triumph. The notion of original sin also frames 
West’s understanding of the gospel as penultimate tragedy. The tragic aspect of humanity 
is, for West, condemnation to a “. . . life-and-death struggle between good and evil, 
forces of liberation and forces of oppression . . .” (West, 1993a, p. 422) that one must 
either side with or against, while simultaneously dealing with the existential realities of 
disease, dread, despair, and death. West admits that a socialist civilization will not relieve 
the tragic aspects of humanity, but he feels such a civilization will be preferable to 
capitalist civilization; the establishment of such a system is therefore, a cause worth 
dying for. He writes: 
 
I believe this socialist civilization will neither perfect human beings nor eliminate 
many of the tragic aspects of being human. But it will be much better than our 
deplorable, abominable capitalist civilization. I also believe that it is a historical 
possibility, not a historical necessity, that this socialist civilization will be 
established. And given the most probable means of establishing it—namely, 
ultimately by some form of armed struggle—it may be unlikely that a socialist 
civilization, which reflects the best of both traditions, will ever be established. But 
for the committed prophetic Christian or progressive Marxist, it is a cause worth 
dying for. (West, 1993a, p. 422) 
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For West (1993a), the hope of ultimate Christian triumph is that amidst the 
socioeconomic and existential tragedy of human life, God will provide for the self-
realization of each individual within community; the hope of socialist triumph is that 
historical progress will eventually produce a system of life that is preferable to monopoly 
capitalism. 
 Having discussed the intent and content of West’s article, the focus of this 
analysis will now shift to an identification of the ideological implications of West’s work. 
This discussion will center on three emergent themes: (a) the notion that God sides with 
the oppressed, (b) the concept of original sin and the possibility of salvation, and (c) the 
theological implications of West’s marriage of Christianity and progressive Marxism. 
God Sides with the Oppressed 
It is somewhat surprising that, given West’s stated aims to improve upon the 
historical limitations of black liberation theology, he nevertheless retains James Cone’s 
contention that God sides with the oppressed in their liberation struggle. Admittedly, 
West, expands Cone’s criteria for who is oppressed from blackness to “. . . the poor, 
oppressed, exploited, and degraded . . . the working classes and underclass of capitalist 
civilization” (West, 1993a, p. 422). Yet West, like Cone, also privileges black Americans 
as exemplifying the condition of oppression. Explaining this designation for black 
Americans he writes: 
 
I suggest that the adjective “black” describe a crucial aspect of the theological 
dimension of my critique of capitalist civilization because the role and plight of 
black people in the emergence, duration, and decline of capitalist civilization 
symbolize the underside of capitalist civilization—the working classes and 
underclass of this civilization. (West, 1993a, p. 422) 
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Thus whether one utilizes the physical experience of blackness advocated by 
Cone or the symbolic experience of blackness advocated by West, implicit in the notion 
that God sides with the oppressed is also the notion of divine partiality for black 
Americans. The logical complications of such divine partiality was discussed previously 
in this chapter relevant to the reality of interconnected spheres of domination (i.e. all of 
humanity is oppressed and privileged in some way). It is important to note that the 
argument here is not for unbridled relativity such that all are oppressed hence none are 
oppressed. James Cone (1975) was right to worry about the damages of this sort of 
politically irresponsible relativism. Yet the suggestion that God is partial to oppressed 
black Americans sways too far in the opposite direction—towards irresponsible 
absolutism that inevitably constrains human agency for change (hooks, 2003a).  
 Not all black theologians have found the notion that God sides with the oppressed 
to be a liberating message for black Americans. In her pioneering womanist discourse, 
“Sisters in the Wilderness: The challenge of womanist God-talk,” Delores Williams 
(1993), like West, is acutely sensitive to the devastating effects of capitalism on black 
life. Unlike West, however, Williams does not connect the notion of God’s partiality for 
the oppressed with black liberation. She argues, in fact, that uncritical appropriation of 
this notion is detrimental to black Americans.  
In her book, Williams interrogates the validity of the Bible as source for the faith 
claim that God sides with the oppressed. Williams discusses biblical texts (i.e. Genesis, 
Galatians, Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, and Jeremiah) that, when read from the point 
of view of non-Hebrew slaves, reveal “. . . a non-libratory thread running through the 
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Bible” (Williams, 1993, p. 144). Speaking specifically of this oppressive thread Williams 
writes: 
 
The point here is that when non-Jewish people (like many African-American 
women who now claim themselves to be economically enslaved) read the entire 
Hebrew testament from the point of view of the non-Hebrew slave, there is no 
clear indication that God is against their perpetual enslavement. Likewise, there is 
no clear opposition expressed in the Christian testament to the institution of 
slavery . . . The fact remains: slavery in the Bible is a natural and un-protested 
institution in the social and economic life of an ancient society—except on 
occasion when the Jews are themselves enslaved. One wonders how biblically 
derived messages of liberation can be taken seriously by today’s masses of poor, 
homeless African Americans, female and male, who consider themselves to be 
experiencing a form of slavery—economic enslavement by the capitalist 
American economy. (1993, p. 146) 
 
 
 Because the Bible produces at best, equivocal messages about God’s libratory 
actions against oppression, Williams argues that black theology’s appropriation of the 
election/exodus experience and the resulting notion of God’s partiality for the oppressed 
provide an inappropriate framework for black American liberation. 
 Also critical of black theology’s faith claim of God’s partiality for black 
Americans is Itumeleng Mosala. Like Williams (1993), Mosala (1993) argues that God’s 
siding with the oppressed is but one of competing biblical truths. By claiming the entirety 
of the Bible as suggestive of God’s desire for black liberation, Mosala argues that black 
theologians are errantly appropriating a ruling-class (i.e. hegemonic) ideology which runs 
counter to black liberation efforts. The results are, according to Mosala, problems of 
theological validity. Discussing the problematics associated with black theology’s faith 
claim that the word of God supports black Americans’ struggle for liberation (i.e., that 
God sides with oppressed blacks) he writes: 
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The abstract exegetical starting point of Black Theology leads inevitably to 
problems about the validity of the particularistic character of this theology. If the 
“Word of God” transcends boundaries of culture, class, race, sex, etc., how can 
there be a theology that is concerned primarily with the issues of a particular race? 
Conversely, if black people are right when they claim that in their struggle for 
liberation Jesus is on their side, how can the same Jesus remain the supreme 
universal disclosure of the “Word of God”? (Mosala, 1993, p. 250) 
 
 
Taken together, the expositions of Williams (1993) and Mosala (1993) reveal 
serious problems with West’s contention that God’s sides with oppressed black 
Americans. Admittedly, some theologians (see for example, Walker, 1993) have 
attempted to resolve the contradiction of an all-loving, transcendent God who sides with 
the oppressed by blurring distinctions between oppressors and oppressed. Such 
theologians have argued that by siding with the oppressed God also is siding with the 
oppressors; through the liberation of the oppressed, oppressors also receive their 
liberation (i.e. humanity). As theoretically appealing as such arguments are, the fact 
remains that it is logically impossible to identify humans who are completely oppressed 
or who are oppressors in every aspect of their identities. In so much as the binary 
between oppressors and oppressed is maintained (i.e. the oppressed are good and the 
oppressors are evil), God’s partiality for the oppressed necessitates bias against 
oppressors. Where distinctions between oppressor and oppressed are blurred, the question 
of who God actually sides with persists. Neither formulation appears to be suggestive of 
God siding with the oppressed and their oppressors. 
More importantly, given the exposition of black theologians such as Williams 
(1993) and Mosala (1993) that biblical witness also presents a God who is not partial to 
the oppressed, the counterargument made by William Jones (1973)—that God is a white 
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racist26—appears to be a more historically supported conclusion than the notion of God 
siding with black Americans. Consequently, the argument for God’s partiality for black 
Americans seems, inescapably problematic.  
Original Sin and Salvation 
 In the analysis of God of the Oppressed, it was argued that one of the implications 
of Cone’s black/white, good/bad binary was that black American suffering had to be 
presented as both good and bad. To the extent that Cone (1975) presented black suffering 
for liberation as ‘joyous’ he was necessarily forced to downplay the physical aspects of 
black suffering. In the present article, West (1993a) argues that the downplaying of the 
physical aspects of suffering (i.e. dread, disease, despair, and death) limited the libratory 
power of earlier articulations of black theology. West counters this lack by emphasizing 
these very real aspects of suffering in his 1993a essay. In doing so, however, West runs 
into a complication of a different sort—the difficulty of articulating the possibility of 
salvation in conjunction with the notion of original sin. 
 For West (1993a), the Christian notion of original sin suggests that humans 
(through a basic drive to stay alive) are predisposed to selfish, self-interested behavior. 
To counter these selfish proclivities and subsequently facilitate self-realization within 
community (i.e. salvation), West advocates democratic participation of the masses in a 
‘socialist civilization.’ The realization of a socialist civilization, West argues, would 
provide humanity the best opportunity for salvation by promoting “. . . socioeconomic 
                                               
26 This was a philosophical exercise by Jones; he did not actually subscribe to a belief in divine racism. 
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well-being, political liberties, cultural diversity, and (if chosen) existential salvation” 
(West, 1993a, p. 421).  
Although this socialist system is the best chance humanity has at earthly salvation, 
West discusses his skepticism that such a socialist civilization will ever be realized. He 
states: 
 
I believe this socialist civilization will neither perfect human beings nor eliminate 
many of the tragic aspects of being human. But it will be much better than our 
deplorable, abominable capitalist civilization. I also believe that it is a historical 
possibility, not historical necessity, that this socialist civilization will be 
established. And given the most probable means of establishing it—namely, 
ultimately by some form of armed struggle—it may be that a socialist civilization 
. . . will ever be established. But for the committed prophetic Christian or 
progressive Marxist, it is a cause worth dying for. (West, 1993a, p. 422) 
 
 
Thus, for West, the reality of original sin necessitates that the realization of earthly 
salvation is decidedly unlikely. Moreover, West emphasizes that each human must face  
“. . . the inescapable realities of human death, disease, despair, dread, and 
disappointment” (West, 1993a, p. 422). West’s emphasis on the reality of death suggests 
a finality that leaves little room for otherworldly salvation. Thus, in West’s model it 
appears that both earthly salvation and otherworldly salvation are not likely to be 
realized. West does state that for Christians, the hope of ultimate triumph (that is, 
otherworldly salvation) “. . . is founded on the paradoxical revelation of a transcendent 
God in historical clothing, who best exemplifies our humanity and provides for our fullest 
self-realization within community” (West, 1993a, p. 422). One is left to wonder, 
however, how this Christian hope might be realized in earthly or otherworldly form, 
given West’s emphasis on the reality/finality of death and the fallible nature of humanity.  
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One is also left to wonder how any hope is obtained from this model. West’s no 
nonsense theology could be mistaken as an opiate, but neither does it readily encourage 
liberation. Why would someone be willing to fight to the death for a cause with so little 
hope of earthly or otherworldly victory? In light of West’s understanding of original 
sin—that humanity is genetically wired for selfish behavior—why would anyone 
sacrifice their lives for human betterment if they are unlikely to reap benefits from their 
struggle? How are the committed Christians and progressive Marxists, whom West 
identifies as pledged to the struggle for socialist civilization, able to overcome the 
constraints of original sin? Are they also acting out of self-interest and, if so, must we not 
also be cautious of their desire for socialist civilization? West’s desire for an accurate 
theology of suffering, struggle, and the existential realities of life has seemingly resulted 
in articulations of death and salvation that seem incapable of sustaining a liberation 
struggle.  
 Here it is helpful to revisit James Cone’s treatment of death and salvation in God 
of the Oppressed. Cone argued that death was not real for black Americans; through a 
vertical encounter they gained knowledge that they had “. . . a freedom not made with 
human hands” (Cone, 1975, p. 140) and that through Christ’s resurrection, they would 
also triumph over death. This necessarily led Cone to downplay physical suffering and 
death because victory over those forces was guaranteed. Black Americans could, in 
Cone’s (1975) view, joyously fight to the death because ultimate victory was already 
won. When consideration is given to West’s exposition that no salvation of any kind is 
guaranteed, Cone’s argument that death is not real for black Americans becomes more 
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understandable. If earthly salvation is not likely (and on this, Cone and West both agree), 
the oppressed need more than West’s exposition to look forward to. Second generation 
black theologian Dwight Hopkins (1997) discusses the psychological need of the 
oppressed for the concept of Christian telos (i.e. salvation). He writes:  
 
Telos helps the downtrodden to hold on in the absurdity of a world gone mad with 
cut-throat competitions in the economy, the popular culture, family, personal 
relations, and the church. If the locked out voices did not have a telos that 
promised that though evil might last through the night, joy comes in the morning  
. . . then people without power, whether racial, gender, sexual, class, may as well 
go insane. (Hopkins, 1997, p. 216) 
 
 
West’s formulation offers very little for oppressed individuals to look forward to. 
Consequently, West’s model seems to hold little practical means of encouraging 
liberation struggles.  
Admittedly, West provides a counter-argument to this critique of this essay in 
another of his works: Prophesy of Deliverance!: An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity (1982). In that book, West provides a disclaimer of sorts regarding the 
difficulty of discerning the ‘truth’ of faith claims. In the following quote, he argues that 
intellectual arguments are insufficient criteria for assessing faith claims. He states:  
 
. . . the justification, confirmation, or validation of the Christian faith rests upon 
the extent to which it promotes the valuing of certain insights, illuminations, 
capacities, and abilities in order to confront honestly and cope effectively with the 
ineluctable vicissitudes and unavoidable limit situations in life. (West, 1982, p. 
96) 
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Held to his own criteria, however, it is still difficult to see how West’s model 
provides the courage and hope necessary to navigate the bleak circumstances he 
describes.  
Marriage of Black Theology and Progressive Marxism 
West uses elements of progressive Marxism to supplant perceived lacks in black 
theology—particularly the absence of sophisticated social analysis that places racism in 
the context of capitalist civilization. Although this marriage allows West to brilliantly 
articulate linkages between racism, U. S. capitalism, and imperialism, there are elements 
of Marxism that seem fundamentally incompatible, or at best only marginally compatible, 
with Christianity.  
West (1982) states that Orthodox Marxist analysis misses the mark in terms of 
identifying the ‘reason’ for religion and culture. This perspective, says West, understands 
culture as a ‘hoax’ played on workers by the ruling class and views religion as a tool for 
pacification and domination. In contrast to the Marxist view of religion, black theologians 
believe black theology to be an authentic expression of the black experience with 
positive, libratory aspects. One wonders what it means when a perspective (i.e., 
Marxism) that discredits religion is used to supplant black theology. Asked differently, 
how (if at all) is the integrity of black theology damaged by a marriage to progressive 
Marxism when Marxism views the black theological faith claim of a transcendent God 
who breaks into human history as false consciousness and black theologians view this 
faith claim as an all-encompassing reality? 
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At issue here is a global question of appropriation—one that implicates each of 
the works analyzed in this chapter. What are the ideological implications of such 
appropriations? West (1982) suggests that a major flaw in orthodox Marxism was its 
dependence on the scientific method which, according to West, revealed an implicit 
desire to control, manipulate, and master. If such desire was a fundamental element of 
Marxist analysis, is progressive Marxism tainted by the same will to control and master? 
Is it possible to appropriate themes, theoretical perspectives, phrases, biblical motifs, etc. 
from their source without also appropriating the oppressive ‘blueprints’ of the thought? 
As previously mentioned, Delores Williams (1993) suggests than an uncritical 
appropriation of the Hebraic Exodus motif has caused black theologians to so completely 
identify with ancient Hebrews that traces of oppressive human interactions (i.e. rendering 
black women invisible in black theology) have been appropriated as well. A similar 
caution has been leveled by Sheryl Sanders (1993) regarding black women theologians’ 
appropriation of the term womanist to frame theological insights. Appropriated from a 
term author Alice Walker used in her book In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens, Sanders 
argues that the term ‘womanist’ is not centered on notions of the sacred and also 
condones sexual ethics (i.e. lesbianism) that discourage the realization of wholeness and 
unity in the black community. 
The concerns of Williams (1993) and Sanders (1993), in conjunction with the 
present concerns about West’s marriage of black theology and progressive Marxism, are 
ideologically significant. All knowledge is constrained by social a priori (Cone, 1975; 
Hopkins, 1997). It is within this context that the importance of language becomes 
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evident. Given the social, economic, and political circumstances (i.e. social a priori) that 
give rise to language, it is not far-fetched to argue, as Heidegger did, that rather than 
speaking language, language speaks us (Quigley, 1998). That is, the language that we use 
constrains us—it reveals our positionality and our social a priori. Thus, when theories, 
motifs, phrases, etc. are appropriated and relayed orally or aurally, we become “. . . over-
determined by the social and personal traditional constructs of human interaction” 
(Hopkins, 1997, p. 217) within which context language is formed. Concretely, this 
suggests that in his appropriation of Marxist social analysis, West necessarily receives the 
traces of control, and manipulation he identified as belonging to Marxist analysis. Given 
the over-determination of the social a priori, how could it be otherwise? 
While there is no definitive answer to the problem of language, social context, 
and appropriation, the argument here is for recognition that all appropriation should be 
undertaken critically. Otherwise the ideological baggage that accompanies the 
appropriation may prove to be more burdensome (i.e. oppressive) than libratory. It 
remains to be seen whether West’s marriage of black theology and progressive Marxism 
will prove to be the former or the latter.  
Concluding Thoughts on Black Theology as a Critique of Capitalist Civilization 
 The critique presented here of Cornel West’s (1993a) work should not 
overshadow the vast contributions his essay has made to black theological discourse. 
Although West’s project was certainly ambitious, the breadth and scope of black 
theological issues accurately covered in his essay was exceptional. Yet West’s 
delineation of the previous limitations of black theology, though highly accurate, failed to 
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include notions of original sin and the faith claim that God sides with the oppressed as 
additional limitations to black religious discourse. As previously discussed in this 
chapter, West’s contention that God sides with the oppressed is neither adequately 
supported biblically (Mosala, 1993; Williams, 1993) nor is it logical when the 
complexities of race/ethnic, gender, economic, social, and political oppression are 
acknowledged. Moreover, when the full implications for human relationships are 
considered, West’s maintenance of the doctrine of original sin provides little motivation 
for or explanation of the human struggle for social transformation. These notions, 
consequently, hold little actual libratory value.  
Jacquelyn Grant: “The Sin of Servanthood and the Deliverance of Discipleship” 
(1993) 
In contrast to Cornel West’s macro-structural analysis, womanist theologian 
Jacquelyn Grant offers an analysis that is micro-structural in nature. Her black 
theological discourse focuses on the impingements of a capitalist, patriarchal system of 
domination on the lives and libratory options of black women. Hypothesizing that an 
unqualified usage of servant language in black theological discourse exacerbates the 
economic and emotional exploitation of black women, Grant’s (1993) essay explores the 
relationship between servant language and black women’s oppression. Due to unresolved 
tensions in Grants (1993) work, she revisits her exploration of servant language in a 
(1999) essay. In order to honor the progression of thought between these two works, both 
will be discussed in the deconstructive analysis that follows.  
174 
 
Womanist scholar Jacquelyn Grant’s essay “The Sin of Servanthood and the 
Deliverance of Discipleship” (1993) questions the appropriateness of the use of servant 
language in Christianity. Although much work has been done by feminists exploring the 
problematics of servant language relevant to the Christian faith (see for example Russell, 
1979), Grant’s work explores servant language relevant to the particular social, historical, 
and cultural framework of black women Christians. In contrast to the work of some 
feminists who have identified the potentially oppressive nature of servant language for 
women in general, Grant uncovers the particularized oppressive nuances of servant 
language as they relate to black women’s historical experiences of slavery and present 
experiences of ‘socio-economic enslavement’ (Williams, 1993). For Grant (1993), these 
experiences make black women’s relationship to servant language qualitatively different 
from the experiences of white women. Thus, Grant’s essay is a critique of traditional 
usages of servant language, and also feminist re-formulations that assume the universality 
of women’s experiences without consideration to the very different life experiences of 
white women and women of color and particularly the historical servant relationship 
between these groups.  
Grant begins her essay by complicating feminist attempts to liberate servant 
language. Such re-formulations have, according to Grant, involved making theoretical 
distinctions between terms such as ‘service’ and ‘servant.’ Yet for Grant, the fact that 
such reformulations retain concepts of suffering and service as integral themes is 
problematic. Grant argues that the disproportionate representation of black women 
(historically and in the present) as domestic servants suggests that theoretical distinctions 
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between the terms service and servant hold little meaning for black women who 
experience service and servanthood synonymously (Grant, 1993). In the following quote, 
Grant explores ways in which servant language under-girds the oppression of black 
women. She writes:  
 
. . . how does one justify teaching a people that they are called to a life of service 
when they have been imprisoned by the most exploitative forms of service? 
Service and oppression of Blacks went hand in hand. Therefore, to speak of 
service as empowerment, without concrete means or plans for economic, social, 
and political revolution that in fact leads to empowerment, is simply another form 
of ‘over spiritualization.’ It does not eliminate real pain and suffering, it merely 
spiritualizes the reality itself. It’s one thing to say that people spiritualize in order 
to ‘make it through the days, weeks, and months’ of agony. But it is another to 
give the people a ‘pie in the sky’ theology, so that they would concern themselves 
with the next world in order to undergird the status quo. The one can be seen as 
liberating while the other is oppressive. (Grant, 1993, p. 209) 
 
 
 For Grant, chattel slavery created a servant/master relationship between blacks 
and whites that influenced biblical interpretation. She argues that a similar servant/master 
relationship between black domestic servants and white women has influenced feminist 
theological perspectives. Thus for Grant, the question of the appropriateness of servant 
language for black women can only be situated within the lived experience of black 
women. In the following passage, Grant articulates the historical context and the present 
political implications of servant language for black women. In so doing, she gets to the 
heart of the theological dilemma of black Americans who embrace servant language. She 
asks:  
 
. . . how do you propose that we are called to service to Jesus, the one who has 
been sent by God to redeem us, when both God and Jesus have been principle 
weapons in the oppressors’ arsenal to keep Blacks and Black women in their 
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appropriate place? Both God and Jesus were portrayed as white and male and 
interested primarily in preserving the white patriarchal and racist status quo . . . Is 
God actually responsible for the systematic pain and suffering of Blacks and 
women? Does God condone the servant-hood relationships between Blacks and 
women? If we are unwilling or unable to accept the proposition implied in an 
affirmative response to these questions, then how are the redeemers liberated from 
the oppressive structures of the oppressor? (Grant, 1993, p. 210) 
 
 
Thus Grant’s essay turns to theodicy as she attempts to make sense of historical 
experiences of service and servanthood for black women in light of God’s will for their 
well-being and liberation.  
Understanding that a direct relationship exists between culture and power, Grant 
argues that those in control of the dominant culture (i.e. white males) also control 
language; thus, the theological language produced by white males has been advantageous 
to them at the expense of women (Grant, 1993). Grant further argues that the 
juxtaposition of theological language with political interests by those in power resulted in 
the use of theological language to undergird political and social agendas.  
Given the tainted (i.e. politically motivated) nature of servant language, Grant 
argues that new language is needed which “. . . challenges the servant mentality of the 
oppressed peoples and the oppressive mentality of the oppressors” (Grant, 1993, p. 211). 
Toward this aim, she proposes a new theoretical reformulation based on W.E.B. DuBois 
notion of two-ness—a double consciousness possessed by black people that provides 
insight into the oppressor’s perspective. Grant utilizes DuBois’ concept of black double 
consciousness and, in turn, posits a triple consciousness for black women wherein they 
have the psychological capacity to “. . . live in two or more worlds at the same time” 
(Grant, 1993, p. 212). The illuminations Grant receives through her re-formulation cause 
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her to reconsider the harmful effects of servant language on black women; she 
subsequently argues that black women’s triple consciousness allows them to liberate 
servant language. The following passage from Grant is quoted at length to convey the 
logical progression of her reconsideration. She writes: 
 
When I consider the ‘twoness’ or ‘double’ nature of the Black consciousness (and 
in fact the triple nature of Black women’s consciousness), I am able to reconsider 
my thesis that this servanthood theme in Christianity needs to be eliminated from 
Christian theology . . . The triple consciousness of Black women makes it possible 
to see how they were able to liberate redemption as they overtly and covertly 
challenged the assumption of the racist and sexist status quo. That triple 
consciousness gave them the possibility of experiencing a liberating Jesus even as 
they were given a racist and sexist one. It enabled me to better understand how 
Black women relegated to domestic service could go to church on Tuesday, 
Wednesday nights and Sunday morning and testify of being a better servant of the 
Lord and Savior Jesus. . . . Perhaps what these Black women were saying is that 
what ‘I am forced to do on Monday through Saturday is redemptive only in the 
sense that it facilitates survival’ . . . True redemption takes place when one 
experiences the redeemer even as it is in the context of oppression. Their speaking 
of such titles as Lord and Master with regard to Jesus and God meant that the 
lords and masters of the white world were illegitimate. (Grant, 1993, p. 213) 
 
 
 Despite her seemingly whole-hearted endorsement of servant language, Grant 
appears to still harbor concern about its usage. She admits that although black women’s 
triple consciousness provides them the capability of receiving liberating messages in 
servant language, such language may still need to be challenged in the broader interests 
of liberation (Grant, 1993).  
For Grant, being a servant of God is suggestive of efforts to eliminate oppression; 
she reasons that if oppressors are unable to see the liberating aspects of servant language, 
libratory chances diminish. Thus, while advocating servant language as appropriate for 
the survival of black women, Grant suggests that discipleship language may be a more 
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appropriate liberation tool for all people. For Grant theological language suggestive of an 
invitation to discipleship is politically preferable to language that suggests an invitation to 
servanthood, particularly for black women who have not traditionally been invited to 
Christian discipleship in the black church, but rather to service (Grant, 1993). Discussing 
the barriers keeping black women from becoming full members of the black church, 
Grant writes: “The truth of the matter, however, is that when women ‘join the church,’ 
they are not allowed to become full members, with all of the rights and privileges 
invested therein; rather, they are only permitted to become servants” (1993, p. 214). 
Thus, for Grant, discipleship language (as opposed to servant language) creates libratory 
spaces for black women.  
Grant cautions that discipleship can only lead to liberation when it is inclusive of 
both black women’s relationship with God and with community. She therefore identifies 
issues that must be addressed in order for black women to engage in liberating 
discipleship. These areas include the usage of conciliatory language to hide oppressive 
relationships and the true affirmation of all humanity to dissolve oppressive relationships. 
These areas will now be discussed in greater detail. 
 Grant argues that terms such as ‘community’ and ‘reconciliation’ cannot be 
realistically discussed when issues of racism, sexism, and class oppression persist. If such 
conciliatory language is not substantiated by actions of justice, Grant argues that such 
language may mirror traditional domestic service relationships wherein the dominant 
culture determines the criteria for community as well as the terms of reconciliation. Grant 
(1993) writes: 
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All too often, notions of reconciliation, covenantal relationship, unity, and 
community mirror those in the system of domestic service relationship. The need 
of one group (partner) are universalized in such a fashion that those on the topside 
of history are the beneficiaries of the system; and those on the underside of 
history are the mere victims of the relationship. Topsided people often presume 
knowledge of the answers; consequently, they invalidate even the questions of 
those who live on the underside of history. (p. 215) 
 
 
 Grant (1993) further cautions that Christianity’s preoccupation with the language 
of reconciliation may need to be put aside in favor of focused energy on the elimination 
of the structures that block reconciliation. For this to happen, Grant argues that servant 
relationships between humans must be dismantled. For Grant, this elimination “. . . means 
that women will no longer shoulder the responsibility of service. Oppressed people, 
women of color, men of color will no longer be relegated to the place of servanthood and 
servitude” (Grant, 1993, p. 215). At the root of these structures is, for Grant, reluctance to 
affirming the humanity of all people. Such affirmation is, for Grant, the first step in 
transcending structures of oppression so that black women and all people can enter into 
discipleship with Christ. 
 Grant’s essay is an insightful analysis of the ways in which lack of attention to 
impaired human relationships can reinforce master/servant ideologies that block 
liberation attempts. Additionally, her essay points to the dangers of short-sighted focus on 
conciliatory language in the absence of dedicated efforts towards repaired human 
relationships and justice. Despite Grants, brilliant analysis relevant to liberation, 
reconciliation, and black women’s well-being, her support of servant language and black 
women’s triple consciousness as tool of survival is, nevertheless, problematic. The focus 
of this analysis will now shift to a discussion of the ideological implications of Grant’s 
180 
 
essay. This discussion involves two themes: black women’s triple consciousness and the 
master/slave meta-narrative. 
Black Women’s Triple Consciousness 
In describing black experiences of double-consciousness, DuBois negatively 
characterizes this survival strategy as: 
 
. . . the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-
sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other 
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his 
twoness,—an American, a Negro; two warring souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Dubois, 1969, p. 49) 
 
 
If the psychological impact of the double consciousness threatens to tear the black 
American asunder, one is left to wonder about the psychological consequences of a triple 
consciousness (i.e. American, black, and female) on the well-being of black women. Yet 
Grant promotes the usage of black women’s triple consciousness as a viable means of 
liberating servant language from its oppressive history. Given black women’s triple 
consciousness, Grant suggests that servant terminology remains an appropriate language 
for black women’ s survival in particular and for black liberation theology in general.  
 In order to retain this argument, Grant is forced to engage in mental gymnastics. 
She acknowledges the oppressive nature of servant language, yet maintains that black 
women’s experiences in America (i.e. their oppression) created an appropriate framework 
for them to derive libratory visions out of these oppressive messages. Stated differently, 
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the coping mechanisms produced out of black women’s suffering resulted in positive 
ends. Presented in this light, Grants essay is an argument for redemptive suffering. 
 The fact that black women developed survival strategies for navigating oppressive 
systems should not diminish the reality of their oppressive circumstances. The triple 
consciousness of black women—which afforded them knowledge of the oppressors’ 
point of view—was only necessary because they were oppressed. Had they not been 
oppressed they would not need liberation; had they not been given tainted biblical 
messages to keep them oppressed, they would not need to redeem those messages. To 
glorify the fact that black women were somehow able to receive liberating messages in 
spite of their oppression seems to take focus off the actual oppression they endured. 
Instead, focus is placed on the ‘exceptionalism’ (West, 1982) of black women. Such a 
meta-narrative of exceptionalism implies that black women are especially suited for 
dealing with their oppressive circumstances. The sad reality of such exceptionalist claims 
is that the onus of responsibility for change is placed on the sufferers. To state this point 
bluntly, why would anyone need to worry about eliminating black women’s oppression? 
If these “super women” have the ability to redeem Christianity, and liberate Jesus, surely 
they can liberate themselves from oppression. 
 The fact remains, however, that black women—without the assistance of all other 
members of the human race—cannot liberate themselves, their religion, or their Jesus. 
They can survive, as they have historically done, within the oppressive system, but they 
cannot transcend it. Thus, to suggest that black women ‘constantly liberate Jesus’ may be 
well-intentioned, but when black women are in actuality the ‘oppressed of the oppressed’ 
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(hooks, 2003; Williams, 1993) the position is ultimately destructive. Such a message 
encourages others to expect super human achievements from black women and also 
encourages guilt in black women who are unable to live up to these societal expectations. 
Master/Servant Meta-narrative  
 Most troubling about this essay is arguably the persistence of a master/servant 
theme that disputes Grant’s stated purpose for her re-articulations. Grant (1993) 
ultimately argues that black women embraced servant language as a way to protest the 
earthly status quo. Black women’s support of God as lord and master meant that white 
masters were illegitimate (Grant, 1993). Significantly, the master changes in Grant’s 
model, but black women remain servants. Regardless of who they are serving, they are 
always in service to others. Implicit in this model is the suggestion of ontological 
servitude—that black women are created to be servants. 
 While ‘God the Master’ may be preferable to whites as masters, the black body 
remains subject to an authority not her or his own. Servanthood, so conceived, implies 
coercion more than choice. Rather than freely seeking to partner with God, Grant’s model 
suggests that black women, given the inevitability of being mastered, choose to be 
mastered by a deity instead of earthly oppressors. The ironic twist here is that black 
women actually (following Grant’s logic) save the Savior in order to be servants to a 
divine master. Such an exposition advocates, at best, limited libratory messages for black 
women. If black women are indeed doing the work of liberation by ‘redeeming the 
Redeemer’ (Grant, 1993, 213) can they not conceive of themselves as being in 
relationships of partnership or friendship with God as opposed to servanthood? Such re-
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conceptualizations, it seems, hold more libratory possibilities for helping black women to 
understand themselves in relationships of mutuality rather than subjugation.  
Jacquelyn Grant: “Servanthood Revisited: Womanist Explorations of Servanthood 
Theology” (1999) 
It is plausible that Grant’s (1993) ultimate decision to attribute positive 
connotations to servant language for black women did not sit well with her womanist and 
emancipatory sentiments. It is not surprising then, that in 1999, she revisited her earlier 
analysis of servant language. In Grant’s first work, she argued that black women, by their 
moral virtue, redeemed servant language from its tainted origins (Grant, 1993). Unlike 
her 1993 essay, Grant’s 1999 essay: “Servanthood Revisited: Womanist Explorations of 
Servanthood Theology” pays serious attention to the problematics that arise when “. . . 
political and social language and interests are used to give content to theological 
language” (Grant, 1999, p. 135). Recognizing that such a conflation of theological 
teachings and oppressive political agendas has been the condition of American 
Christianity for much of U. S. history, Grant (1999) identifies the core issue thwarting 
liberation as relational. Specifically, she argues that human tendencies towards 
domination must be transformed through the adoption of new symbol systems and 
language patterns that contest domination and dehumanization. Discussing the need for 
such a transformation, she writes: 
 
Christianity in all of its majesty, has not enabled us to solve basic relational 
problems. I contend that this is related to distortions of doctrinal issues such as the 
doctrine of humanity. As long as some people are always more servants than 
others, the destructive relationships will continue. As long as both divinity and 
humanity are held captive to the limitations of human sinful need for control and 
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domination, we will never liberate humanity, Jesus Christ, and God. (Grant, 1999, 
p. 135) 
 
 
In many ways, Grant’s 1999 essay highlights a central problem identified by 
James Cone in God of the Oppressed (1975)—how to articulate liberating expressions of 
divinity capable of transcending seemingly intractable human proclivities toward 
domination. For Cone (1975), the solution was a theology that articulated salvation in 
existential terms (i.e. blacks knowing themselves to be free in their minds) and which 
delayed ultimate liberation for an undisclosed future eschatological event. For Grant’s 
part, she offers no new articulations of liberation. Instead, she questions whether Christ 
and Christianity can be liberated at all (Grant, 1999).  
Concluding Thoughts on the Texts of Jacquelyn Grant  
The main critique of Grant’s (1993) work also was leveled against M. Shawn 
Copeland’s (1993) theology of suffering—that it is politically dangerous and 
psychologically irresponsible to present black women’s survival strategies under 
conditions of oppression as salvific. Black women’s survival strategies do not save the 
world; they do not save God and they certainly do not save black women. These 
strategies simply allow black women to function under oppressive circumstances. 
Survival, by its very nature, does not allow for transcendence.  
Notwithstanding the considerable accomplishments black women have made 
historically in terms of surviving oppression, these accomplishments do not confer onto 
black women Christ-like status whereby they are transformed (through their suffering) 
into saviors of humanity. By lauding black women’s exceptional abilities to withstand 
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suffering, the real horror of radical suffering endured by so many black women is de-
emphasized. In doing this, Grant (albeit inadvertently) increases barriers to black 
women’s well-being and liberation. 
While Grant’s (1999) essay offers no new libratory articulations, her lack of faith 
in the libratory power of existing systems of theological norms and language is 
noteworthy in that it reflects an awareness of persistent oppressive meta-narratives 
operating in black theological discourses. Grant’s (1999) request for novel articulations 
of theological language capable of transcending the tainted historical relationships of 
domination and subjugation provides space for the introduction of new theological 
paradigms. Grant’s (1999) recognition of the need for repairing human relationships of 
domination holds the promise that black women can be conceptualized, not as suffering 
Christ surrogates, but as people in need of salvation like the rest of humanity. 
Anthony Pinn: “Embracing Nimrod’s Legacy: The Erotic, the Irreverence of 
Fantasy, and the Redemption of Black Theology” (2004) 
In the final article to be analyzed in this chapter, Anthony Pinn (2004) seeks the 
redemption of black theology. Like Grant (1999), Pinn’s essay: “Embracing Nimrod’s 
Legacy: The Erotic, the Irreverence of Fantasy, and the Redemption of Black Theology” 
(2004) also recognizes the oppressive hold normative structures of language and 
understanding currently enjoy in theology in general and black theological discourse 
specifically. His provocative essay seeks to dismantle the normative understandings of 
being in relationship that make possible the oppression of black bodies in male, female, 
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gay, lesbian, and transgender form. A critical analysis of Pinn’s essay concludes this 
chapter. 
 In his 2004 article “Embracing Nimrod’s Legacy: The Erotic, the Irreverence of 
Fantasy, and the Redemption of Black Theology,” scholar of black religion and professor 
of religious studies, Anthony Pinn explores the significance of African American erotic 
realities for black theological reflection. Pinn argues that black theology’s reliance on the 
Cartesian notion of a mind/body split has prevented black theological reflection from 
considering the role of the erotic in theological discourse. Because of this lack, Pinn 
argues that potential avenues of black liberation have been overlooked. 
 Using a definition of eros conceptualized by Paul Tillich, Pinn (2004) defines eros 
as an energy of connection making or union that facilitates the sustaining of relationships 
with people, thoughts, things, and the divine. While adherence to notions of Cartesian 
duality have, for Pinn, necessitated that black religious reflection focus on agape (love of 
God) and philia (love of neighbor), Pinn argues that agape “. . . is always erotically 
charged . . .” (Pinn, 2004, p. 163) because eros propels humans toward union with nature, 
culture, and the divine.  
Lack of focus on the erotic in black theology is manifested, Pinn argues, in a lack 
of passion and deep engagement in the black liberation movement. On the necessary 
connections between agape, philia, and eros, Pinn writes: 
 
Eros ties together the various relationships of meaning and pleasure that mark 
appreciation of self, contact with others and, for those who are theistic, the divine. 
And, it does so in ways that recognize the integrity of those encountered. In this 
sense eros properly conceived seeks to bring together and unite with agape and 
philia as a uniting of love, power, and justice. The erotic is the mark of 
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embodiment fully, but critically, embraced and celebrated as a way of holding in 
tantalizing tension the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of history. Without recognition of the 
erotic, the body loses its relational elasticity, so to speak. This situation of rigidity 
has ontological implications in that what it means to ‘be’ and be in connection to 
others, is minimized. (2004, p. 163) 
 
 
In order for black theology to fully embrace what it means to be, Pinn suggests 
that the erotic dimension of black life must be acknowledged as an appropriate source for 
theological reflection. Such acknowledgement holds importance in two ways. First, it 
infuses black theology with a sense of irreverence that can call into question those 
structures that perpetuate normative assumptions about what constitutes proper 
relationships in black theological discourse. Second, by taking the irreverence of eros 
seriously, Pinn argues that black theology will gain a vulnerability “. . . that opens it to 
see the beauty in relationships and interactions that were once despised” (Pinn, 2004, p. 
164). Here, Pinn refers specifically to black gay and lesbian relationships and 
interactions. 
Pinn argues that black theology’s embrace of the imagination paradigm as a tool 
for liberation has necessitated reliance on the Cartesian mind/body split and has resulted 
in the absence of erotic realities from black theological reflection. For Pinn, imagination 
can encourage survival, but not liberation. It can allow one to re-order options within the 
status quo, but does not allow space for the transcendence of oppressive systems. Pinn 
argues that the use of imagination can only result in apologetics—responses to 
oppression—that are necessarily constrained by the systemic norms they oppose. Pinn 
crystallizes this notion in the following passage: 
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To imagine is to work one’s passive will within a context which maintains 
something of the survival impulse. It is to be shadowed by the meta-narrative of 
the dominant social structure. Imagination, all things considered, is a rather polite 
mode of re-envisioning in that it does not call into question the elemental nature 
of the grammar of discourse. It is a rumbling within the social matrix that fails to 
challenge its basic design and intent because such disturbances do not radically 
compromise the intent of the social matrix. These disturbances simply create 
acceptable alternatives within the framework of the social order . . . imagination 
as the agent of liberation does not call into fundamental question the essential 
“realness” of the reality promoted by the dominant social system. (Pinn, 2004, p. 
166) 
 
 
Pinn (2004) offers the paradigm of fantasy as a corrective for black theology’s lacks. He 
differentiates his notion of fantasy from that which other theologians (i.e. Harvey Cox 
and Sallie McFague) utilize in their discourse, referring to the latter as more akin to 
notions of fancy and imagination, respectively. Pinn’s understanding of fantasy is closer 
in concept to the existential and is primarily concerned with subjectivity. Pinn 
demonstrates the liberating potential of his fantasy paradigm through an analysis of the 
legend of Nimrod, found in the book of Genesis in the Bible. 
 Given a “traditional” biblical reading, Nimrod (a descendant of Ham and one of 
the princes of the community where the tower of Babel was to be built) epitomized 
arrogance, selfishness, and ungodliness by attempting to unite people in a manner 
contrary to the will of God (Pinn, 2004). The following account of God’s reaction to the 
people of Babel is taken from the book of Genesis. 
 
Now the whole earth had one language and one speech. And it came to pass, as 
they journeyed from the east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar and 
they dwelt there. Then they said to one another “Come, let us make bricks and 
bake them thoroughly.” They had brick for stone, and they had asphalt for mortar. 
And they said, “Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower whose top is in 
the heavens; let us make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered abroad over 
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the face of the whole earth.” But the Lord came down to see the city and the tower 
which the sons of men had built. And the Lord said, “Indeed the people are one 
and they all have one language, and this is what they begin to do; now nothing 
that they propose to do will be withheld from them. “Come, let Us go down and 
there confuse their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.” 
So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the face of all the earth, and 
they ceased building the city. Therefore its name is called Babel, because there 
the Lord confused the language of all the earth; and from there the Lord scattered 
them abroad over the face of the earth. (Genesis 11:1-9) 
 
 
For Pinn (2004), a fantasy paradigm must inform human understandings of the 
nature and meanings of relationships. Thus from a fantasy paradigm, relevant data for the 
story of Nimrod centers on human relationships and the possibilities they hold. By 
embracing the fantasy paradigm, Pinn challenges constraining meta-narratives—even 
divine ones. Thus for Pinn, the legend of Nimrod, as presented in the Bible, is 
problematic because it “. . . does not . . . promote healthy life options; human ingenuity, 
creativity, and ambition result in destruction” (Pinn, 2004, p. 170). The fantasy paradigm 
allows Pinn to reject traditional understandings of Nimrod and the tower of Babel as well 
as traditional notions of divinity that serve as barriers rather than facilitators of human 
liberation. In the following excerpt, Pinn identifies the usefulness of the fantasy paradigm 
in identifying the ‘problem’ of the story of Nimrod. He writes: 
 
Through a movement form the restrictive paradigm of imagination to the 
irreverence of fantasy new possibilities for living emerge. It becomes clear that 
existing social structures (including certain notions of divinity and divine will) 
seek to artificially limit human creativity and connectedness through a denial of 
relationships that threatens the system. Social arrangements—not Nimrod’s 
actions—are problematic. (Pinn, 2004, p. 170) 
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Pinn’s text is complicated and provocative. His understanding of the limitations of 
imagination paradigms provides a useful heuristic for understanding the leaps and limits 
of the previous black theological texts analyzed in this chapter. It is important to note that 
Pinn’s understanding of imagination is compatible with Cornel West’s (1993) 
presentation of black theology’s leaps and limits. For West, these leaps and limits were 
characterized by increased understanding in some instances and the persistence of blind 
spots in others to those sources of oppression having immediate impact on black life.  
Utilizing Pinn’s (2004) concept of imagination, it can be argued that black 
theology’s reliance on the imagination paradigm has limited abilities to envision radical 
liberation possibilities. While an imagination paradigm could identify sources of 
oppression within the context of the established order (West’s leap situations), it could not 
facilitate transcendence of the system of domination because it could not provide radical 
re-conceptualizations of the ‘problems’ and the ‘solutions’ (West’s limit situations). As a 
result, all solutions were constrained by the ideology of the very problems they protested. 
Thus, in God of the Oppressed, Cone (1975) could not envision whiteness being 
otherwise than evil even though his theology was in large part a protest of essentialized 
notions of black inferiority. Copeland’s (1993) meditation on the suffering endured by 
black women could not transcend the meta-narrative of redemptive suffering that 
implicitly condones such suffering. Neither could West’s (1993) discourse conceptualize 
human relational possibilities other than war, selfishness, and self-interest even though 
the realization of his socialist civilization was contingent on alternative manifestations of 
human togetherness. Finally, Grant’s (1993) essay could not relinquish the black 
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exceptionalism myth. As has been previously discussed, it was Grant’s inability to 
envision radical re-conceptualizations of hierarchical relationships of domination that 
fueled the skepticism in her 1999 essay. 
The limits in each of these scenarios can be understood as a failure of the 
imagination paradigm. Viewed this way, Pinn’s suggested inclusion of a fantasy paradigm 
in black theology holds promise for transcending the limitations of current black 
theological discourse. A more fully developed discussion of the usefulness of a fantasy 
paradigm for this project will be provided in the following chapter. For now, concluding 
thoughts on Pinn’s (2004) essay ends this chapter. 
Concluding Thoughts on “Embracing Nimrod’s Legacy” 
Beyond discussion of the imagination paradigm, however, Pinn’s argument for the 
erotic as a source of black theology also is significant in that it calls attention to the 
current Cartesian duality (i.e. mind/body split) in black theology that limits libratory 
possibilities. Certainly, Pinn is not the only scholar to note the lack of embodied emphasis 
in black theological discourse. Nor is Pinn the only black theologian to entertain notions 
of the erotic as beneficial supplants for black theology.27 Specifically, Dwight Hopkins 
(2004) and Karen Baker-Fletcher (2004) are both supportive of a move towards more 
embodied understandings of black theological reflections that take into consideration the 
power and potential of the erotic. For Baker-Fletcher (2004), failure to acknowledge the 
erotic in black theological discourse effectively limits understandings of the human-divine 
encounter because, for Christians, such encounters are erotic—indicative of one’s desire 
                                               
27 See , for example, Dyson (2004). 
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for union with “. . . that which is supremely beautiful, good, and true” (p. 201). Hopkins 
(2004) understands the erotic as an impetus to social justice expressed through the 
necessity of wholeness. He writes: 
 
. . . eroticism includes sex; yet is surpasses sex by situating it within a fluid and 
broader framework. Eroticism works itself from the inside out. The inside consists 
of a transcendent life force, an integrated spirituality clinging sensuously to flesh. 
The flow of the force of life is communal and interactive among human, animal, 
and plant life, as well as the natural elements. It recognizes its cornerstone as the 
holy legacy of Black ancestors. Consequently, eroticism is history, knowledge, 
desire, pleasure, wholeness, and creativity. (pp. 188-189) 
 
 
Thus, the spiritual life force manifested in the erotic seeks integration and wholeness in 
the ecological relationships that surround the individual and connect her or him with 
divinity. The erotic, so conceived, arguably compels humans to seek perfect union 
internally (i.e. an integrated self) and externally—with other humans and all other living 
things that inhabit the earth.  
 While Baker-Fletcher (2004) and Hopkins (2004) highlight benefits of embodied 
theology and the erotic for black theology broadly conceived, Pinn’s (2004) focus is 
more specific. He advocates the irreverence of the erotic as a way to create space for 
black Christian homosexuality. Numerous scholars have discussed the mind/body split 
which pervades and limits black theological reflection.28 Sometimes referred to as a 
Cartesian duality or Platonized Christianity, the privileging of the mind and reason over 
emotions/bodily sensations and Christianity’s failure to perceive the body and soul in 
holistic terms (i.e. body as source of sin, unconnected to the soul) are both consequences 
                                               
28 See, for example, Brown Douglass (2004) or Dyson (2004). 
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of a line of thinking that places the body in an antagonistic relationship with itself. Such 
thinking is exemplified by Christian slaveholders who argued that the salvation of black 
souls had no bearing on their earthly enslavement; slave bodies and souls were 
disconnected (Brown Douglass, 2004; Pinn 2002). 
This line of thinking also promoted eroticized images of blackness in the 
‘dominant discourse of white culture’ (Brown Douglass, 2004; Dyson, 2004); blacks 
were hyper-sexualized and ruled by emotion while whites were intellectual. Discussing 
the sexual exploitation of blackness Kelly Brown Douglass (2004) writes: 
 
Overall, white cultural sexualization of Black people allowed for the Black body 
to be exploited in ways that benefited white racist society. Most importantly, it 
legitimated white supremacist ideology. The fact that Black people were deemed 
ruled by passion was sufficient proof that they were inferior to white people, a 
people ostensibly ruled by reason. Black people were considered people of the 
body/flesh, while white people were considered those of the intellect/soul. In this 
way, blackness became a sign of an “ardent” nature (that is sexual) at the same 
time that it signaled a lack of intellect. (p. 354) 
 
  
In response to dominant white cultural discourse, many black Americans sought to resist 
the sexual stereotypes they were portrayed as. Ironically, such resistance often resulted in 
emulation of the white standards by which blacks were judged to be inferior. Dyson 
(2004) argues that the black Church adopted a conservative and repressive theology of 
sexuality based on Victorian ideals in order to “. . . rebut the myth of black sexuality 
being out of control” (Dyson, 2004, p. 225). While such a stance might appear overly 
conciliatory, the adoption of ‘white standards’ by oppressed blacks served as a strategy 
for invalidating the hegemony of white superiority (Roseboro & Ross, 2006). 
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 However, the emulation of white sexual values constrained the libratory potential 
of black theology, especially for homosexual Christians whose sexuality, perceived from 
Victorian standards, is taboo (Brown Douglass, 2004; Dyson, 2004; Pinn, 2004).  
Pinn (2004) argues that focus on the erotic—an inappropriate focus according to 
the terms of Cartesian duality—introduces an irreverence that provides a radical break 
with constraining theological norms and standards. Such irreverence can break one out 
of normative modes of thought and allow space for fantastic re-conceptualizations for 
doing libratory theology. At the individual level, such re-conceptualizations can allow 
space for the legitimization of homosexuality as an appropriate way of being in 
relationship (Pinn, 2004). The freeing of individuals to encounter divinity ‘as they are’ 
then promotes unity and wholeness on a global level. For Pinn, focus on the erotic 
encourages passion and deep engagement in human relationships and makes vulnerable 
the normative meta-narratives that relegate human relationships to binaries of 
superior/inferior, dominant/subjugated, acceptable/unacceptable, etc. Such passion can 
potentially transcend the relationships of domination that now plague humanity. 
While Pinn’s exposition of the erotic and the irreverent are full of libratory 
potential, they also raise concern. As demonstrated in his treatment of Nimrod’s Legacy, 
Pinn seems comfortable with the notion of God’s will/divine will being problematic for 
liberation efforts. This begs the question of the limits of Pinn’s irreverence in relation to 
the divine. Pinn’s (2004) irreverence enables the privileging of human relationships over 
God’s (supposed) will. Given this scenario, what is the purpose of acknowledging God’s 
will at all? Is God’s will only acknowledged when it is compatible with human goals and 
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aspirations? In other words, if God’s will can be challenged and disregarded if necessary, 
why is God needed at all? What distinguishes Pinn’s understanding of embodied theology 
from secular humanism? Does such conceptualization fall outside the boundaries of 
theology in general and black theology in particular? Finally, can one articulate an 
authentic ‘black theology,’ as Pinn attempts to do, which does not give primacy to the 
word of God? 
Admittedly, Pinn’s articulation opens black theology up to a slippery slope 
relevant to the boundaries and determinants of black theology. Yet given the 
understandable limitations of the black theological discourse analyzed in this chapter, 
Pinn’s call for an eroticized, embodied theology based on the fantasy paradigm deserves 
further exploration. Hence, the focus of the following chapter will be on developing a 
framework for black theological discourse that builds upon previous limitations through 
the concepts of embodied theology and fantasy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TOWARDS A FANTASTIC, EMBODIED, EMANCIPATORY BLACK 
THEOLOGY 
 
 
In the third chapter of this book, select black theological texts were analyzed in 
terms of libratory potential; all but one text (Anthony Pinn’s 2004 “Embracing Nimrod’s 
Legacy”) was found lacking in ability to transcend the oppressive structures critiqued. 
This chapter presupposes that the limitations of previous black theological texts can be 
overcome only by engaging in a radical break with previous conceptualizations of 
knowledge (as suggested by Pinn, 2004) that endorse binary oppositions, master/servant 
language, mind/body separation, notions of exceptionalism (i.e. redemptive suffering), 
and the resulting meta-narrative of ontological suffering of black bodies.29 This phrase 
has been adapted from Beyond Ontological Blackness: An essay on African American 
religious and cultural criticism (1995) by Victor Anderson.30 The articulation of a new 
                                               
29 The phrase ‘ontological suffering of black bodies’ is coined here in reference to the theological 
discourses of James Cone (1975), M. Shawn Copeland (1993), Jacquelyn Grant (1993), and to some extent 
Cornel West (1993a) that, taken together, are suggestive of an overarching theme of  black suffering as 
given, originary, presupposed, necessary, or teleological. 
 
30 Anderson (1995) implements the phrase ontological blackness in reference to tendencies in black and 
womanist theology towards racial reification and essentialism relevant to black life and experiences. While 
Anderson’s work in this area is quite helpful in identifying the ways in which black theology and womanist 
theology are circumscribed by the white racism they critique, Anderson fails to link the meta-narrative of 
redemptive suffering (which predates and strongly influences both black and womanist theology) to his 
concept of ontological blackness. In other words, ontological blackness is not simply a result of flawed 
theology, as Anderson suggests, but a response to a dominant worldview which presents the servitude and 
suffering of oppressed individuals, and in this case, black Americans as both given and beneficial. Because 
Anderson’s concept of ontological blackness fails to incorporate the ways in which the meta-narrative of 
redemptive suffering influences black and womanist theology and also influences other philosophical 
articulations (i.e. the liberation theology of Gustavo Guteirrez and  the educational philosophy of Paulo 
Friere), the term ‘ontological suffering’ is instead adopted relevant to philosophical discussions of the 
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vision of black theological reflection capable of transcending the meta-narrative of 
ontological suffering of black bodies is the ambitious purpose of this chapter.  
Fragments 
In an essay entitled “African American Thought: The Discovery of Fragments” 
David Tracy (1999) argues that fragments (as opposed to systematic conceptualizations) 
have always been present in black religious thought. For Tracy, these fragments, when 
acknowledged, allow novel and potentially liberating insights to be gained from history 
because they release the constraints associated with totalizing systems of thought. Tracy 
argues that any claims to totalizing systems carry with them implicit norms that silence, 
repress, and marginalize all themes that fail to fit systemic norms. Because fragments are 
erratic and disturbing, they shatter pretenses of universality and, in so doing, create 
spaces for marginalized themes to be heard (Tracy, 1999).  
Tracy’s understanding of the libratory potential of fragments is useful here. 
While, there is a wealth of knowledge contained in historical articulations of black 
theology, the libratory potential of this knowledge is limited (as demonstrated in chapter 
three of this book) by numerous oppressive themes and meta-narratives adopted by each 
author. When considered in their entirety each text, except Anthony Pinn (2004), proved 
incompatible with the goals of the present project. Even Pinn’s (2004) work, though ripe 
with emancipatory potential, comes dangerously close to rejecting the need for God in 
human salvation and is consequently, also ultimately incompatible with the goals of this 
project. Utilizing Tracy’s conceptualization of black theology as fragments, those useful, 
                                                                                                                                            
suffering of oppressed individuals in general and term ‘ontological suffering of black bodies’ is adopted 
relevant to philosophical/theological discussions of black American suffering.     
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relevant, and compatible articulations of black theological discourse can be used to 
supplant this project’s re-articulated black theological vision while all counter-libratory 
themes and meta-narratives can be rejected. This appropriation of fragments is beneficial 
because it opens spaces of possibility in the re-articulation of black theological discourse.  
Applying this conceptualization of fragments to the black religious discourse 
presented in Chapters II and III, the initial pieces of a re-articulated black theological 
vision can be identified. The first fragment to be retained from Chapter II (history of 
black theological discourse) is the belief in human agency to wrestle with theology and to 
surmise instruction, meaning, and purpose for life from theological reflection. Also 
retained will be the conceptualization of God as beneficent and desirous of liberation for 
the oppressed. The belief that God is active in the liberation of the oppressed is, however, 
rejected.31 While Howard Thurman’s (1963) argument that one can derive value from 
suffering will be retained, it will be done cautiously because such an assertion is fraught 
with the danger of misinterpretation. Admittedly, some suffering, such as that which 
results from natural causes, is inevitable (Thurman, 1963) and one may indeed derive 
pedagogical benefits from it. However, neither pedagogical benefit nor redemptive value 
should be assigned to suffering that is a direct result of human volition;32 to do so (as was 
argued in chapter three) is to ultimately sanction the suffering.  
                                               
31 See Williams (1993) and Mosala (1993) for refutations against arguments for God’s active involvement 
in the liberation of the oppressed. 
 
32 The extent to which suffering due to natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, fire, etc.) can be attributed to 
human greed, sin/volition is debatable. Many theologians and critical educators argue that most human 
suffering results from the direct or indirect actions of human beings. For more on suffering from human 
volition and sin, see for example, Brock and Parker (2001); Park (1993; 2004); and Purpel and McLaurin 
(2004). 
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From Chapter III (textual analysis of select contemporary black theological texts) 
important fragments will be retained from each author. James Cone (1975) paved the way 
for challenging the given-ness of dominant presentations of Christianity. He 
demonstrated that reality can be successfully contested; thus for the present project, 
Cone’s contestation of the presumed originary nature of particularized theological 
“realities” is retained. M. Shawn Copeland (1993) identified the Bible as potentially 
oppressive to the lives of Black women and subsequently called for selective biblical 
interpretations. Copeland’s recognition of the need for selective appropriation is therefore 
retained for the present project. Cornel West (1982, 1993a) provided a concrete plan for 
liberation of the oppressed, refuted the supposition that racism was genetic, and identified 
the far-reaching consequences of monopoly capitalism. Thus, this project adopts the 
following fragments from the works of Cornel West: the necessity to articulate a 
theological vision that includes concrete means of liberation and an awareness of the 
interconnections between the exploitative economic structure of capitalism and other 
social/economic manifestations of oppression such as racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. 
Jacquelyn Grant (1999) recognized the need for changing the symbols and language that 
under-gird inequitable dominant/subordinate human relationships in order to foster social 
justice. This project takes from Grant’s (1999) work, its ultimate goal: the repairing of 
human relationships through a fundamental shift in the conceptualization of human 
relationships of domination. Finally, Anthony Pinn (2004) recognized the need for an 
embodied theology and called for the introduction of irreverence and fantasy into 
theological discourse. Thus this project retains from Pinn (2004) the recognition that a 
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libratory theological vision must not be merely a conceptual activity, but must begin in 
the body through recognition of the real physical, mental, and psychological 
consequences of suffering for oppressed persons. Further, Pinn’s call for fantastic, 
irreverent theology is taken seriously here; heading Pinn’s call, the black theological 
vision for this project will build on the fragments of black theology discussed above and 
will be founded on the concept of fantasy. What follows, then, is a discussion of the 
‘fantastic’ portion of this re-articulated black theological vision.  
The Fantastic 
As its fifth entry for the word ‘fantasy,’ Merriam-Webster offers the following 
definition: “the power or process of creating especially unrealistic or improbable mental 
images in response to psychological need.” (Merriam-Webster, 2006). This chapter 
proposes a new vision of black theology based on the Asian (particularly Korean) 
concept of Han—the psychological pain endured by victims of oppression (Park, 1993). 
That a non-black, non-Christian concept should form the basis of a new vision for black 
theology seems ridiculous when considered within present understandings (i.e. from 
Anthony Pinn’s (2004) explanation of an imagination paradigm) yet has distinct 
advantages when understood from a fantasy paradigm. For better or worse, black 
theology developed out of experiences of racism, domination, and oppression; as such 
black theology is tied to the oppressive ideology of white racism and patriarchy. Stated 
differently, black theology cannot articulate a vision that transcends this oppressive 
ideology without articulating an alternative reality which provides a radical break with 
current understandings/conceptualizations of the status quo (Pinn, 2004). As discussed in 
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Chapter III, imagination allows the critique of oppressive structures, but not their 
transcendence. The introduction of the concept of Han provides the cultural and religious 
‘jolt’ necessary for a radical break with the status quo. Yet as will be briefly discussed 
below, the racial and political experiences of Korean people and patriarchal experiences 
of Korean women share surprisingly painful commonalities with U. S. black Americans. 
As such, the concept of Han is readily applicable to the life experiences and salvific 
needs of black Americans. 
The Han of Koreans and the Han of U. S. Black Americans: Some Similarities 
Korea was formally annexed by Japan in 1910, though Japan had been highly 
involved in Korean political affairs years prior to formal annexation (U. S. Library of 
Congress, n.d.). After annexation, the Japanese occupied Korea and treated Koreans as a 
conquered people (U. S. Library of Congress, n.d.). The Japanese initiated various 
cultural attacks: literature was only printed in Japanese, Koreans were not allowed to 
organize politically, Koreans were encouraged to adopt Japanese religion and were also 
(humiliatingly from the point of view of the Korean people) made to replace their own 
surnames with Japanese ones (Fukuoka, 1996; Lambert, 2004; Park, 1996). Additionally, 
Korean historical archives, religious structures, and cultural artifacts were either 
destroyed or augmented to better reflect Japanese culture (Fukouka, 1996; Lambert, 
2004). While these cultural atrocities were terrible, they were unfortunately not unique to 
Korean people. Similar acts of cultural imperialism were endured by African slaves when 
they were forcibly transported to the American colonies and required to adopt new 
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names, a new language (Afrolumens Project, 2004), and were forbidden from practicing 
traditional African religions (Raboteau, 2001).  
Additionally, the near starvation, beatings, and rape of Korean ‘comfort 
women’—those women and girls who were conscripted, tricked, or kidnapped for the 
sexual use of Japanese soldiers (Park, 1996; Soh, 2001)—shares similar markings of 
patriarchal abuse endured by African slave women and later by free black women in the 
U. S. who endured the often unwanted sexual advances and rape committed by white 
slave owners during slavery, white male landowners during periods of sharecropping, and 
white male heads of household during periods of black women’ s domestic service 
(Collins, 2000; Copeland, 1993; Dash, 1997; Grant, 1993; Williams, 1993).  
Finally, the more than three-quarters of a million Koreans currently living in 
Japan (largely the survivors and descendents of those conscripted in Japan in 1945) 
continue to face racism, discrimination, and economic exploitation (Fukuoka, 1996; Park, 
1996). It is not difficult to see the commonalities between the oppression faced by these 
Korean people in Japan and the current economic and social oppression faced by black 
Americans in the U. S. These shared experiences of cultural assault, patriarchal abuse, 
racial prejudice, and oppression between Korean and U. S. black people make the Korean 
concept of Han especially useful for enhancing black theological reflection. Thus, while 
the articulation of a black theology of liberation based on the concept of Han may seem 
fantastic, it is believed that such fantasy underscores the break with traditional 
understandings of sin, God, and salvation necessary for the social transformation this 
project seeks.  
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Han and the Han Resolution Framework 
Han is a Korean term used to describe the ‘depths of human suffering’ (Park, 
1993, p. 15) that produce extreme psychological pain for victims of oppression or 
wrongdoing. Park describes the concept of Han as follows: 
 
The victims of various types of wrongdoing express the ineffable experience of 
deep bitterness and helplessness. Such an experience of pain is called Han in the 
Far East. Han can be defined as the critical wound of the heart generated by unjust 
psychosomatic repression, as well as by social, political, economic, and cultural 
oppression. It is entrenched in the hearts of the victims of sin and violence, and is 
expressed through such diverse reactions as sadness, helplessness, hopelessness, 
resentment, hatred, and the will to revenge. (1993, p. 10) 
 
 
Park (a Korean theologian and professor of theology) introduced the concept of Han to 
western theological discourse in The Wounded Heart of God: The Asian concept of Han 
and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (1993). In this book Park argues that Christianity, 
centered on the doctrine of sin, offers “salvation” to sinners but does not address the 
needs of victims of sin. He writes: 
 
It is my view that the guilt of the oppressor is not a matter to be resolved through 
the unilateral proclamation of forgiveness and absolution by a priest or a pastor, 
without regard to their victims. Forgiveness must take place in cooperation with 
victims and must involve offenders’ participation in the dissolution of their 
victims’ Han-ridden shame. The one-sided forgiveness proclaimed by any 
authority is not forgiveness, but false comfort. (Park, 1993, p. 84) 
 
 
Park (2004) reiterates this theme in a later work on Han. He writes: 
 
 
In Christian theology, sin is the only category we have to diagnose the wrong of 
the world. We have drawn the map of salvation for sinners and have left those 
who have been sinned against to find the way themselves. (p. 9) 
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Park (1993) argues that the salvation offered to sinners through the doctrine of sin is 
incomplete because it privileges the sinner’s vertical relationship with God and excludes 
from consideration the sinner’s horizontal relationship with those he or she sinned 
against. Salvation is relational; sinners must be reconciled with those they have sinned 
against before they can be reconciled with God. Likewise, those who have been sinned 
against must have their deep pain (i.e. Han) resolved through reconciliation with their 
oppressors before they can be reconciled with God. Unless these two relationships—
horizontal human relationships and vertical relationship with God—are both honored, 
salvation (i.e. repaired human relationships of love and care with other humans and with 
God) will not be realized (Park, 1993). Discussing this process of salvation, Park (1993) 
writes: 
 
This dialectical salvation is the relational, dynamic, and affective interaction 
between sinners and their victims, and the cooperative efforts of the two to 
dissolve Han and sin. In this salvation scheme, the oppressors dialectically 
participate in the well-being of the oppressed. Both are interpenetrated in an 
indivisible dialectical destiny. The oppressors (sinners) cannot be saved unless the 
oppressed (victims) are saved or made whole and vice versa. In other words, no 
one is fully saved until all are saved. Salvation is wholeness, and no one can 
actualize wholeness by him or herself. (p. 101) 
 
 
 While Park is concerned with healing the wounds of Han for oppressed 
individuals, he acknowledges that victims of sin also commit sin themselves. In fact, he 
argues that victims of unresolved Han are often caught in perpetual cycles of sin and 
violence because their hurt causes them to internalize the values and perspectives of their 
offenders (Park, 2004) and subsequently sin against others. He writes: 
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When people’s deep wounds are not healed, the wounds become vortexes of 
troubled waters, intertwined with their own instinct of survival and fear. Many 
victims instinctively synchronize their wavelengths with their offenders. They 
internalize their perpetrators’ images and values and externalize them in treating 
their own victims. In short, they see the world through their oppressors’ eyes. 
Seeing again through their own eyes begins the process of healing. (Park, 2004, p. 
3) 
 
 
 For the victims of sin (even though they are themselves sinners), the actual 
problem of sin remains insignificant until their own Han is resolved (Park, 1993). Thus, 
Park argues that sin and Han must be addressed together to sufficiently address the 
problems of the world (Park, 1993, 2004). 
 To promote salvation (i.e. right relationships with humanity and God), Park offers 
his Han resolution framework which includes a detailed analysis of the structure of Han 
and describes a process for Han resolution that encourages offenders and their victims to 
be reconciled to each other and to God. A discussion of the structure of Han and key 
elements of Park’s (1993, 2004) Han resolution framework follows. 
Structure of Han 
Park (1993) identifies the origins of Han in social, political, and economic 
structures of domination which emanate from the capitalist global economy, patriarchy, 
and racial and/or cultural discrimination. These structures are further manifested through 
various socio-economic avenues (i.e. neo-colonialism, militarism, religious exclusivism, 
racism, sexism, and other hierarchical social and economic structures) to produce 
environments conducive to personal and collective sin and personal and collective Han 
(Park, 1993).  
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Han exists in conscious and unconscious levels and can involve individuals and 
groups (Park, 1993). Additionally, Han manifests itself in active and passive forms (Park, 
1993). At the individual level, Han can manifest itself as through vengefulness, fury, and 
a will to revenge (active form) or in its passive form as resigned bitterness, self-hatred, 
and helplessness (Park, 1993). At the collective level, active conscious Han can be 
understood as a ‘collective will to revolt’ arising from a group’s experiences of 
oppression and exploitation (Park, 1993, p. 36). In its passive form, Park describes 
conscious group Han as a despairing “. . . feeling which resides within victims who have 
been oppressed for a long period without any hope” (1993, p. 37). As an example of 
passive conscious group Han, Park offers Jewish survivors of the Holocaust who 
despaired because they were not only angry at Nazi inhumanity, but also at God for 
allowing it. 
 Park (1993) suggests that unconscious group Han can be transmitted to other 
generations through culture or ethnic ethos. Active unconscious Han manifests itself in 
racial resentment while passive unconscious Han manifests itself in racial lamentations 
epitomized by Negro spirituals and African American Blues music (Park, 1993). In 
addition to individual and group Han, Park (1993) also identifies a Han of nature which 
results from humanity’s abusive treatment of the ecological system. Park (2004) 
summarizes the structures of Han in the following passage: 
 
Han exists on two levels: individual and collective. At its individual level, it is the 
will to revenge, resignation, regret, diffuseness, absence, bitterness, and 
helplessness, reacting to a private oppression that can also often be connected to 
collective and structural oppression. At its collective level, Han is the corporate 
will to revolt, collective despair, communal wrath, group discontent, racial 
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treatment, and racial lamentation. The collective dimension of Han includes its 
structural level that involves chronic and systemic exploitation and injustice. 
(Park, 2004, p. 15) 
 
 
 The concept of Han is complicated by the reality of complex human 
relationships. A victim of Han in one context may be an oppressor in another context. For 
example, an African American male may experience Han from racial discrimination but 
also may cause women to experience Han through his exercise of patriarchal privilege. 
Whatever the context of Han (i.e. individual or group, active or passive, conscious or 
unconscious), individuals are motivated to resolve Han; it can be resolved negatively (by 
punishing or killing the offender) or positively (through love and care) or can be 
transmitted to future generations (Park, 1993, 2004).  
For Park (2004), successful resolution of Han (i.e. resolution through love and 
care) involves reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the wronged such that the 
wrongdoer reorients him/herself and is forgiven by the wronged person. Describing the 
benefits of Han resolution through love and care for the oppressor (as opposed to 
negative Han resolution), Park writes: 
 
It is a different matter to confront the oppressor with justice and care. Only the 
love that humanizes our enemy enables us to deal with him or her again. By 
turning the other cheek we demand justice and equality from our oppressor and 
enter into an ongoing relationship with him or her. Only when we care enough for 
the oppressor can we challenge him or her to change. This care for the oppressor 
becomes the essential ingredient in resistance. Without it, resistance would turn 
into hatred and retaliation, dehumanizing us and failing to change the oppressor. 
(Park, 2004, 67) 
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 Positive resolution of Han involves four steps: awakening, understanding, 
envisagement, and enactment (Park, 1993). Awakening involves the wronged person’s 
realization of his or her own suffering. Once Han is acknowledged, it must be understood 
rationally, intuitively, and incarnationally. Rational understanding of Han occurs at the 
conscious level while intuitive understanding occurs subconsciously; in both instances, 
understanding involves knowledge of the reality of one’s own Han in relation to the 
‘spectrum of Han-producing situations’ in the world (Park, 1993).  
Incarnational understanding involves the embodiment of rational and intuitive 
understandings of Han into mindful, daily life practices (Park, 1993). From a 
phenomenological viewpoint, each level of understanding manifests itself through 
compassion and empathy—shared pain with others inflicted with Han. The next step in 
positive Han resolution, envisagement, is hope that involves imagining ways of being in 
the world that are not defined by hierarchy, domination, and oppression. The final 
process of Han resolution involves engaging the wrongdoer in compassionate 
confrontation; for Park, this step is empowering because it allows the oppressed person 
agency in “. . . dismantling Han-causing elements in the world” (Park, 1993, p. 171). This 
compassionate confrontation calls oppressors to repentance; if they are willing to reorient 
themselves away from hierarchy, domination, and oppression, reconciliation can take 
place.  
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Key Elements of Park’s Han Resolution Framework 
 Park’s (1993, 2004) Han resolution framework offers novel insights on 
conceptualizations of original sin, salvation, and God. These conceptualizations will now 
be addressed. 
Original Sin 
 Park rejects the notion of original sin—the tainted nature of humanity resulting 
from the biblical fall of Adam (Park, 1993). Sin is for Park a willful act which destroys 
harmonious relationships; that the doctrine of original sin holds humanity responsible for 
sins they did not commit is, according to Park, illogical (Park, 1993). Moreover, the 
notion of original sin blurs distinctions between sinners and those they have sinned 
against by presupposing the equally sinful nature of both (Park, 1993). The result is a 
theology that provides little theological analysis towards alleviating the deep suffering of 
the oppressed (Park, 1993). Writes Park: “The equality of original sin is good news for 
the wrongdoer, but bad news for the wronged” (1993, p. 80). 
 Rather than a belief in original sin, Park (1993) endorses a belief in original Han. 
While rejecting the notion that sin can be transmitted intergenerationally, Park suggests 
that the structure of Han can be transmitted biologically, mentally (i.e. consciously), 
spiritually (i.e. unconsciously), and socially. Biologically, children may inherit Han 
resulting from the sinful nature of their parents or they may receive the emotional 
woundedness of their parents through mental or spiritual levels (Park, 1993). Finally, Han 
can be transmitted socially because children inherit the social environments (e.g. violent 
life-styles, ethnic conflict, and hierarchical human relationships) of their parents (Park, 
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1993). While sin incurs guilt and requires repentance, Han brings forth shame and 
requires reconciliation (Park, 1993). Only by treating the concepts of sin and Han jointly, 
can salvation be realized (Park, 1993, 2004). 
Salvation 
 Park makes it clear that salvation is not a personal state to be achieved, but a 
dialectical, relational experience. He writes: 
 
Salvation is not something we can put into our pocket as a possession. Nor does 
salvation mean securing a ticket to paradise or heaven. Salvation is the restoration 
of a loving relationship with God and neighbors. It is not a place or a possession, 
but rather a relationship…Salvation brings about true fellowships with God and 
others. (Park, 2004, p. 120) 
 
 
The implications of this conceptualization of salvation are significant. Salvation is not 
realized through repentance of sin unless that repentance is connected to a ‘profound 
interior change’ (Park, 1993, p. 90) which impels the sinner to gain forgiveness from his 
or her victim by rectifying sins through a developed ‘orthopraxis’ (Park, 1993, p. 89) for 
social justice—the righting of impaired inter-personal and institutional relationships 
(Park, 1993). 
 Such an understanding of salvation means that salvation is not guaranteed. This 
conceptualization encourages human agency for change; rather than relying on 
individualized notions of salvation that allow one to withdraw from the problems of the 
world by concentrating exclusively on personal relationships with God. Park’s (1993, 
2004) conceptualization holds that one’s relationship with God remains impaired until all 
human relationships are restored. Thus mutuality is encouraged as opposed to 
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individualism; if salvation is to be achieved it must come from human efforts and not 
from God.  
God 
 Arguably, the most controversial element of Park’s reconciliation framework is 
his presentation of a wounded God. Rather than being all-powerful and capable of 
bringing about salvation at any time, Park’s God is wounded like the oppressed. All 
powerful in the ability to love humanity, God is nevertheless limited in ability to bring 
about harmonious human relationships (Park, 1993). While God “. . . seeks to bring good 
out of all situations” (Park, 2004, p. 143), human freedom—to either reject or embrace 
God’s will—limits God’s ability to act. Referring to the ways in which humans can limit 
God’s actions, Park writes: 
 
I believe that our response can either fulfill or foil God’s purpose. If we exalt 
God’s will, God’s power is free to act upon us. Yet by rejecting God’s will in 
favor of our own desires, our refusal to trust in effect limits the divine will. 
Although there is no guarantee that the intentional will of God will be realized at 
the end, God’s ultimate will is to make the most of tragic events for our own 
good. . . . God’s mightiness, however, has been misunderstood for ages. It is not 
the arbitrary or one-sided power with which God is able to do anything God 
wants. Rather, it is the strength with which God cares for us and actualizes our 
potential. God is all powerful, not in controlling or forcing us, but in caring for 
and loving us. (2004, p. 143) 
 
 
 Because salvation as defined by both vertical and horizontal relationships is 
dialectical (i.e. involving reconciliation between both oppressor and oppressed and 
between God), Park reasons that not only is God incapable of saving humanity apart from 
human efforts, but God-self also needs saving. Sin destroys human relationships and also 
wounds God (Park, 1993). God suffers because “. . . God’s love for humanity is too 
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ardent to be apathetic toward suffering humanity. No power in the universe can make 
God vulnerable, but a victim’s suffering breaks the heart of God” (Park, 1993, p. 121). 
Park argues that God’s love for humanity is expressed most saliently in God’s suffering 
on the cross through Jesus Christ (Park, 1993). The cross is representative of God’s full 
participation in the suffering of the oppressed (Park, 1993). Because God’s suffering is 
due to impaired human relationships, God’s suffering will not end until human 
relationships are repaired. Thus, God requires human agency for God’s salvation; stated 
another way, God needs saving. Park (1993) writes: 
 
God’s agape toward both the Han-ridden and the sinners will not be fulfilled 
without their healing and return. In other words, God cannot save Godself apart 
from the salvation of humanity. God needs human beings if God’s salvific history 
initiated with creation is to be fulfilled. (p. 123) 
 
 
The Relationship between “Love” and Ontological Suffering 
Having discussed novel conceptualizations presented in Park’s Han resolution 
framework (i.e. understandings of original sin, salvation, and God), this chapter shifts to a 
discussion of Park’s conceptualization of love. Rather than a novel application of this 
concept, however, Park’s (1993, 1996) presentation of love bears traces of the meta-
narrative of ontological suffering. A discussion of Park’s “love” and its implications for 
the present project follows. 
Love 
Park argues that the basis of Han resolution (and consequently salvation) is love, 
expressed through compassionate, caring relationships. For Park, efforts at salvation 
cannot authentically be undertaken out of the need to be saved or out of moral obligation. 
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Salvific works are only authentic if they are undertaken out of care and regard for the 
well-being of others. He writes: 
 
Relationships derived solely from moral obligation can be exhausting; but 
relationships which arise from the genuine heart of care are a true blessing for the 
people involved. All the relationships we develop without genuine love are 
stressful and extinguishable. Teleo-deontological relationships may yield the 
moral satisfaction of fulfillment, but not salvation. Relationships which result 
from pure compassion in God’s love bring forth salvation. (Park, 1993, p. 108) 
 
 
Park argues that the model of love for humans is, not surprisingly, God. God’s 
suffering—exemplified through Christ’s crucifixion—demonstrates the profound love of 
God for humanity. Writes Park (1993), “The cross is God’s unshakable love for God’s 
own creation” (p. 123). The love of God for all humanity is manifested in God’s suffering 
on the cross—with the sinned against and because of sinners (Park, 1993). Thus, God’s 
vulnerable love (i.e. God’s suffering love) becomes the model Park offers for humanity to 
emulate in the process of social transformation.  
Significantly, those most capable of emulating God’s suffering love and initiating 
social and ecological transformation are the wounded, the oppressed, and the sinned 
against. These ‘wounded healers’ (Park, 1996), by virtue of their Han, possess the 
appropriate experiences necessary to recognize and heal the Han of others. Referring to 
the vocation of these wounded healers, Park (1996) writes, “Only the deeply wounded 
can see and understand the inmost wound of a sufferer. In this sense, the marginalized 
can be the healers of the wounded of our society” (p. 136). In addition to healing the 
wounded, the wounded healer also must, ultimately heal him or herself because the 
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offender (who is imprisoned by her or his oppression) cannot free him or herself. 
Referring to the need for the wounded to heal themselves, Park writes: 
 
In a true sense, the offended himself or herself can heal his or her own wound. 
The offender can only help the healing of the wound by participating in the 
process through his or her own metanoia (emphasis author’s). Jesus the betrayed 
sought Peter the betrayer to forgive his sin and transform him. The offender is 
locked in and only the offended can open the door. The offender dehumanizes 
himself or herself in the act of dehumanizing others to such a degree that his or 
her distorted existence cannot make others’ wounds whole. (Park, 1993, p. 147) 
 
 
 Significantly, Park’s framework, designed to shed light on the overlooked plight 
of the oppressed, presents the oppressed as responsible for healing themselves and others 
who are wounded. In the process, the oppressed also heal their oppressors. Although the 
oppressed must repent of their sins and work to eradicate the Han-filled structures they 
created (Park, 1993, 2004), they are unable to initiate this process as a consequence of 
their sinfulness (Park, 1993). Instead, the wounded must do salvific work for their 
oppressors by initiating reconciliation. Placing the onus to initiate salvation squarely on 
the shoulders of the oppressed, Park writes: 
 
But victims must initiate this process of true reconciliation, since the oppressors 
hardly come to repentance by themselves, as their own wrongs prevent them from 
seeing reality. Oppressors are often locked in a room where the door has no knob. 
Their prison is self-centeredness. Many do not even know that they are 
imprisoned . . . The oppressed can see their oppressors better from outside, 
knowing where the door is and how they can come out. The oppressed can help 
them see their own blindness and the effect of their own wrongs. Without the 
assistance of victims, perpetrators would not see the pain caused by their evil 
work. Only victims can open the offenders’ eyes to see what they have done. 
Victims are thus able to help offenders convert from their own iniquity. (1993, p. 
172) 
 
215 
 
Victims help sinners to repent through compassionate confrontation which involves the 
‘preparatory toil’ (Park, 1993, p. 174) of letting go of one’s bitterness over oppression 
and forgiving one’s oppressor (Park, 1996) in order to help the oppressor’s conversion. 
Park (1993) recognizes that the oppressor, when confronted compassionately, may not 
repent. In such cases, he argues that the oppressed can help resolve their own Han 
through acts of compassionate confrontation (regardless of outcome) and through 
orthopraxis to rectify impaired human and institutional relationships. However, such 
efforts will never result in the complete dissolution of Han because such requires true 
reconciliation between oppressors and oppressed. 
Park’s model bears a striking resemblance to Paulo Freire’s 33 (1970, 2001) 
argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for liberating themselves and their 
oppressors.34 For Freire (1970, 2001), love (defined as commitment to others), 
necessitates that the oppressed return the suffering inflicted by their oppressors with care 
and restoration of their humanity. Freire writes: 
 
This, then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate 
themselves and their oppressors as well. The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, 
and rape by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power the strength to liberate 
either the oppressed or themselves. Only power that springs from the weakness of 
the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both. (1970, 2001, p. 44) 
 
 
Freire goes on to state: 
 
 
                                               
33 Freire’s work is cited here to underscore the far-reaching consequences of the ontological suffering 
paradigm and the embedded nature of this paradigm in the fields of both theology and education.  
34 This similarity is not unintentional; Park (1993) cites Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed in his book. 
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Although the situation of oppression is a dehumanized and dehumanizing totality 
affecting both the oppressors and those they oppress, it is the latter who must, 
from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity; the 
oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable 
to lead this struggle. (1970, 2001, p. 47) 
 
 
Even though the wounded suffer from a deep ‘rupture of the soul’ (Park, 2004) and 
experience a stifled humanity of rape, exploitation, and oppression (Freire, 1970, 2001), 
they must nevertheless emerge from these traumas and initiate the process of healing the 
world. Thus both Park (1993) and Freire (1970, 2001) offer conceptualizations that bears 
traces of the ontological suffering meta-narrative this project is attempting to dismantle. 
The ontological suffering meta-narrative suggests that those who suffer bear 
responsibility for saving the world because oppressors—so weakened from the power of 
their oppression—cannot do so. Whether carrying out the ontological project of 
humanization (Freire, 1970, 2001) or the Christ-like project of saving the world, the 
wounded, oppressed, and the sinned against, must practice a love strong enough to heal 
and right relationships of the world. No attention is given to whether or not the oppressed 
want to be saviors of the world. By virtue of their oppressed condition, they have no 
choice. If the oppressed do not initiate the process of humanization/salvation it won’t be 
realized (Freire, 1970, 2001; Park, 1993) because oppressors’ “. . . distorted existence 
cannot make others’ wounds whole” (Park, 1993, p. 147). Only the wounded can heal the 
world; it is their ontological purpose for being. Through their salvific suffering, the 
oppressed become agents of God (Brock & Parker, 2001), working to bring about 
salvation through acts of love and compassionate caring (Park, 1993, 2004). 
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 Like God’s Han-filled demonstration of sacrificial love for humanity, the 
oppressed are encouraged to demonstrate loving commitment to others by sacrificing 
themselves (i.e. forgoing their need for self-care and internal healing). The oppressed 
must ignore their own need for love and care and concentrate instead on the well-being of 
their oppressors in order to save (Park, 1993) or humanize (Freire, 1970, 2001) the world. 
The reward for this type of loving, compassionate commitment to the world is the 
possibility of salvation, but the price for the oppressed is sacrificing themselves.  
 Physical, emotional, and spiritual wounds need to be healed, not exalted. The 
oppressed are in need of love and care; they should not be required to put the needs of the 
world above their own needs. The oppressed do not bear the burden of healing, 
humanizing, or saving the world without the assistance of other human beings who 
participate daily in the economic and social destruction of the world. While those who are 
economically, socially, politically, or sexually oppressed could participate in helping 
others in pain after they have begun their own healing,35 to encourage oppressed 
individuals to heal their oppressors is simply irresponsible theology. It is greatly 
overstating the point to suggest (as do Freire, 1970, 2001 and Park, 1993, 2004) that the 
oppressed lack the ability or the awareness to stop engaging in acts of oppression without 
the assistance of the oppressed. Certainly, it is difficult work to acknowledge one’s 
culpability in the exploitation and/or mistreatment of another human being—but it is 
work that oppressors are capable of carrying out. 
                                               
35 Park (1993, 2004) suggests that oppressed people can dissolve their Han by helping other wounded 
individuals. 
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Park (2004) acknowledges rare instances when sinners, racked by guilt come to 
repentance. While these instances may not lead to equitable human relationships,36 they 
at least demonstrate a cognizance of wrongdoing that Park and Freire suggest oppressors 
lack the ability to perceive. There are other examples of oppressors coming to the 
realization of their wrongdoing. Perhaps the most salient examples are to be found among 
slaveholders who acknowledged the wrongness of their participation in chattel slavery. 
While the social context of the southern slaveholding society consisted of 
powerful norms to be successful, economic prosperity was at odds with the tenets of 
evangelical Protestantism to which most slaveholders subscribed (Oakes, 1982). To 
reconcile this dilemma, Oakes (1982) argues that many slaveholders, especially those 
migrating west, limited themselves to sub-standard living conditions and invested their 
profits from slave ownership into purchasing more slaves (Oakes, 1982). Yet for all of 
their privation, slave owners were still bothered by the inherent contradictions between 
Christianity and slave ownership. Oakes (1998) cites a minister who owned slaves as 
follows:  
 
It is exceedingly difficult to use them as money, to treat them as property, and at 
the same time render to them that which is just and equal as immortal and 
accountable beings, and as heirs of the grace of life, equally with ourselves.37 
(Oakes, 1982, p. 104) 
 
 
                                               
36 Brock and Parker (2001) argue that guilt is inappropriate for building equitable relationships because it 
inverts the relationship between oppressor and oppressed by holding the sin over the head of the oppressor. 
In such a relationship, the oppressed and the oppressor are bonded by the oppressor’s guilt, not love. 
 
37 Sarah McCulloh Lemmon, ed., The Pettigrew Papers (Raleigh, NC, 1971) 
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Some slave owners found it impossible to reconcile their vocations with their 
religion and freed their slaves. An example of this comes from Freeborn Garretson, a 
Maryland slave holder. After a religious conversion Garretson writes:  
 
As I stood with a book in my hand, in the act of giving out a hymn, this thought 
powerfully struck my mind, ‘It is not right for you to keep your fellow-creatures 
in bondage; you must let the oppressed go free.’38 (Oakes, 1982, p. 106) 
 
 
 Slaveholders who persisted in keeping their slaves, even though they knew it to be 
morally wrong, were plagued by the belief that they would face eternal damnation for 
their crimes against humanity (Oakes, 1982). Describing this phenomenon, Oakes writes: 
“The pervasive inner turmoil among the slaveholders is revealed in their startlingly 
frequent declarations that when they died they would go to hell” (Oakes, 1982, p. 114). 
According to Oakes, such declarations could not be attributed to generalized evangelical 
beliefs about the spiritual unworthiness of all humanity; while slaveholders were 
convinced of their own damnation, they were equally convinced that their slaves would 
go to heaven when they died (Oakes, 1982). From these confessional writings, it is clear 
that slaveholders were quite capable of discerning the wrongness of their actions; those 
who did not free their slaves made conscious choices to place earthly profits over what 
they believed to be otherworldly salvation (Oakes, 1982). 
 Yet another example of a slaveholder’s consciousness of wrong actions is found 
in Frederick Douglass’ “A Meeting with His Former Master” (1984). Upon returning to 
Maryland, Douglass is invited to the bedside of his former master, now more than 80 
                                               
38 Kenneth L. Carrol, “Religious Influences on the Manumission of Slaves in Caroline, Dorchester, and 
Talbot Counties,” Md. Hist. Mag., LVI (1961), 188. 
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years old and dying. Describing the treatment he received from Captain Thomas Auld, 
Douglass writes: 
 
He had struck down my personality, had subjected me to his will, made property 
of my body and soul, reduced me to chattel, hired me out to a noted slave breaker 
to be worked like a beast and flogged into submission, taken my hard earnings, 
sent me to prison, offered me for sale, broken up my Sunday-school, forbidden 
me to teach my fellow-slaves to read on pain of nine and thirty lashes on my bare 
back and had, without any apparent disturbance of his conscience, sold my body 
to his brother Hugh and pocketed the price of my flesh and blood. (Douglass, 
1984, pp. 215-216) 
 
 
Yet despite these brutalities, Auld, when asked by Douglass what he thought of 
Douglass’ escape North states: “Frederick, I always knew you were too smart to be a 
slave, and had I been in your place, I should have done as you did” (Douglass, 1984, p. 
218). Auld’s words (as well as those of other slaveholders cited above) evidence a 
consciousness of wrongdoing that belies the claim of oppressors’ blindness to their 
misdeeds. These individuals were not oblivious to their sins or incapable of altering their 
actions; no amount of cleverly worded mental gymnastics can disguise the fact that they 
were more concerned with profit margins than black lives. Philosophies and theologies 
that present oppressors as ‘weakened by their power’ do great harm by enabling the 
oppressors to remain as such through an implicit endorsement of the status quo.  
Admittedly, these are only a few examples. It is not surprising, thought, that there 
are so few examples of the oppressed taking responsibility for their own sins. 
Indubitably, the persistence of the ontological suffering paradigm prevents the surfacing 
of many alternative conceptualizations of oppression and liberation. Yet some do exist 
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and these should serve as the building blocks for conscious efforts of a new paradigm 
built on mutual responsibility. 
While many oppressors do not confess their wrongdoing without provocation, it is 
a mistake to interpret their lack of responsibility as inability. It is a further error to 
mistake the survival strategies of oppressed individuals for inherent salvific traits39 
capable of saving oppressors. The perceptive abilities Park (1993) proposes that the 
oppressed have due to their woundedness is not a genetic trait, but a sensitivity of to the 
plight of others, cultivated through oppressive circumstances (Collins, 2000). Similarly, 
the callousness of many oppressors to the suffering of others is learned, not biological. If 
oppressors are in a prison of their own self-awareness it is because their life 
circumstances have not largely been dependent on remaining aware of the situations, 
circumstances, and emotional needs of others (Collins, 2000). Said differently, oppressors 
can afford to be ignorant of the oppressed; the oppressed must, for their survival, be 
knowledgeable of their oppressors (Lorde, 1984). These are learned behaviors, not 
ontological pre-dispositions. The solution to learned callousness is education. Park’s 
model does not seek to educate oppressors in any substantive way; it relieves them of 
responsibility for their own actions and overburdens the oppressed to (continue to) be the 
pack mules of humanity (Collins, 2000). An awareness of and/or sensitivity to the needs 
of others does not make oppressed individuals exceptionally capable of saving the world. 
It only makes them convenient targets for irresponsible theology. 
 
                                               
39 See for example King (1967), Cone (1975), Copeland (1993), and Grant (1993). 
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Concluding Thoughts on the Han Resolution Framework 
 Ultimately, Park’s theology, rather than helping to heal the woundedness of 
victims, serves the needs of oppressors by helping them to avoid responsibility for saving 
themselves and for doing the difficult work of repairing human relationships. The work 
of saving the world can not be born by a group of exploited and vulnerable people alone. 
The responsibility of salvation is shared by all of humanity—oppressors and the 
oppressed. Rather than initiating world salvation, the oppressed need to be healed before 
they can even join the struggle to transform the world.  
Relevant to black theological discourse, Park’s (1993, 1996) model of vulnerable 
love is especially harmful. By modeling his understanding of love after the sacrifices of 
Jesus Christ, Park literally encourages the oppressed to be Christ-like in their compassion 
and caring. Yet Park describes the life of Jesus as one of Han-filled suffering (1993, 
2004). 
 
Not only did the cross express the Han of God; so also did the thirty-three years of 
Jesus’ living. We have concentrated on the cross of Christ as God’s suffering. But 
we have neglected the suffering aspect of Jesus’ life . . . He was acquainted with 
the deep Han of human beings . . . Jesus’ suffering for three hours on the cross 
was one thing; his many years’ suffering with smothering religious stipulations 
was another. The latter was a profound source of Jesus’ Han. Compared with at 
least three years’ suffering from humiliation, mockery, false accusation, religious 
inquisition, the three hours’ suffering was rather light. (Park, 1993, p. 125) 
 
 
The Han of Jesus, an innocent who suffered for the world, was so great that he 
had difficulty bearing it. Referring again to the Han of Jesus, Park writes “His death was 
not a natural one, but a Han-filled one that found voice in his outcry, ‘My God, my God 
why have you forsaken me?’” (2004, p. 117). Oppressed black Americans are not Jesus 
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Christ and should not be encouraged to bear their Han-fullness as Jesus did. Black 
Americans are not Christ-surrogates. To place such unrealistic expectations on a group of 
oppressed individuals is irresponsible because it implies that suffering is noble and 
virtuous. By presenting sacrificial suffering as a way to be like Jesus, Park, albeit 
unintentionally, suggests that suffering is holy and sacred. 
 Black women in particular have internalized the message of sacred, Christ-like 
suffering (Weems, 2004; Williams, 1993) to their peril. After the wounded have healed 
the world, how will their own wounds be healed? Brock and Parker (2001) pose this 
intriguing question in the following passage. 
 
Theologians may say that the suffering of victims helps heal the world, but who 
will heal the suffering victims? Who will take the crucified down from the cross 
and grieve? How will their lives be restored or redeemed, their bitter anguish 
salved? (p. 42) 
 
 
Health statistics for black Americans suggest that they are indeed in need of salve for 
their woundedness. Black women have the highest mortality rates of any race/ethnic 
group for almost every major cause of death (Womancando.org, 2002) What this suggests 
is that suffering, rather than being salvific, is deleterious. Black Americans are already 
brutalized by poor health, low educational attainment, etc. Must they also be brutalized 
by their religion? If God is, as liberation theologians suggest, partial to the oppressed,40 
why would God desire oppressed black Americans to suffer the Han of Jesus? Yet such 
desire—in this case divine disfavor—can be extrapolated from Park’s (1993, 2004) 
                                               
40 Although this project does not endorse the view of divine partiality see Gustavo Gutierrez (1988) for an 
example of this argument. 
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model. His model does not suggest divine partiality for the oppressed but rather when 
applied to black Americans, suggests the divine racism of God.41 Park ultimately relies 
on the ontological suffering paradigm even though he is acutely aware of the pain of 
victims of sin and the inherent wrongness of ignoring their plight. Rather than an 
indictment of his work, this fact reveals the pervasiveness of oppressive meta-narratives 
and the difficulty of even those most concerned with the suffering of victims to transcend 
those paradigms.  
Fragments of Han 
 While Park’s adherence to the ontological suffering meta-narrative is unfortunate, 
it does not prevent the adoption of the concept of Han for this re-articulation of black 
theological discourse. Neither does it diminish the usefulness of several of his other 
insights for this project. Here David Tracy’s (1999) conceptualization of black 
theological fragments can be expanded to Park’s model as well. Using the concept of Han 
as a foundation, this new black theological vision begins with the recognition that all 
survivors of radical suffering are in need of Han resolution. It follows that the meeting of 
such needs must be of primary importance for reconciliation/liberation efforts. 
Additionally, Park’s rejection of the notion of original sin also is adopted. As is Park’s 
(1993, 2004) recognition that sin involves impaired human and institutional relationships 
and salvation. Rather than being simply and interior process, salvation involves 
participation in the destruction of Han-producing structures in the world. Finally, also 
adopted is Park’s conceptualization of God as wounded and in need of salvation.  
                                               
41 See the argument set forth in William Jones’ (1973). Is God a White Racist: A Preamble to Black 
Theology. 
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Towards Transcendence 
It is somewhat discouraging that the theme of ontological suffering of the 
oppressed (whether expressed in its generic form here or specifically as the suffering of 
black bodies in various black theological discourses) persists in black theology, liberation 
theology, and education. Why must efforts at reconciliation, healing, wholeness, and 
social justice persistently begin with the understanding that the oppressed are the only 
ones capable of initiating social transformation? Why must such initiation continuously 
be framed in terms of the love and sacrifice of the oppressed? The question posed in 
chapter three bears repeating here: what better method of maintaining the status quo and 
avoiding social transformation could there be than to place the onus of responsibility for 
world transformation and world salvation on those who are most vulnerable and 
oppressed? Clearly, an alternative to this paradigm is needed.  
 Having rejected Park’s meta-narrative of ontological suffering of the oppressed, 
what models are available to provide an alternative understanding of love and human 
relationships? While no codified theology was found which offers such a 
conceptualization, the initial ideas are presented in Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca 
Ann Parker’s (2001) Proverbs for Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search 
for what Saves Us. 
Brock and Parker (2001): Proverbs for Ashes 
 Like Park (1993, 1996, 2004), Brock and Parker (2001) expand 
conceptualizations of salvation to include forgiveness for sinners, but also healing for 
victims. Their theology is based on earlier work by Brock (1988) on sin and salvation. 
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For Brock (1988), sinfulness is not a genetic mark of humanity but a consequence of 
impaired human relationships—a sign of our own damage and the damage that we do to 
others. In this sense, Brock’s (1988) ‘brokenheartedness’ (i.e. damage resulting from 
impaired relationships) is very similar to Park’s (1993) concept of woundedness. In both 
cases, brokenheartedness or woundedness need to be healed not punished. 
Brock and Parker (2001) build on Brock’s (1988) conceptualization of human 
relationships to problematize the presumed redemptive nature of suffering and sacrifice. 
Brock and Parker differ from Park in their understanding of the relationship between 
love, sacrifice, and salvation. They are critical of theologies which present Christian 
sacrifice as a positive connotation. In the following quote Brock and Parker (2001) 
explicate the problematics of theologies conflating the Christian principles of love and 
sacrifice. They write: 
 
. . . when theology presents Jesus’ death as God’s sacrifice of his beloved child 
for the sake of the world, it teaches that the highest love is sacrifice. To make 
sacrifice or to be sacrificed is virtuous and redemptive. (p. 25) 
 
 
Such conflation is for Brock and Parker tantamount to encouraging Christians to be 
passive to abuse. They continue their explanation in the following passage: 
 
Jesus is presented as the obedient son, accepting violence because his father wills 
it. The salvation offered by Jesus is gained by his sacrifice of himself to abuse. In 
other words, he accepts violence for the sake of his love for perpetrators of 
violence, whether it is God or sinful humanity. Defining love and relationship as 
obedience and sacrifice structures them in terms of power and abuse . . . But why 
would a loving being use violence to draw humanity closer to himself? Abuse 
creates intense emotional bonds, but they are the bonds of violated boundaries, of 
broken hearts. Why did God require a brutal sacrifice before he could love 
imperfect beings as themselves? (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 157) 
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Arguing that neither Jesus’ death on the cross nor the sacrifice of the wounded are 
salvific, the authors seek to articulate ways of being in human relationship that do not 
endorse suffering and sacrifice. At the center of their theology are the concepts of 
presence and love. These concepts will now be discussed. 
Presence 
 For Brock and Parker (2001), presence, defined as “. . . a power which guards, 
judges, and continually recreates” (p. 9), is a manifestation of God. Presence is a life-
giving force that provides all humanity with access to God. As a result of human broken-
heartedness (i.e. sinfulness) awareness of presence may be lost. For Brock and Parker 
(2001), this loss is a result of some type of violence (e.g. racism, sexism, hate crimes, 
homophobia, intimate violence, political torture, economic exploitation, etc.) that violates 
appropriate boundaries in human relational bonds. Violence harms both the sinner and his 
or her victim by denying both access to presence. According to Brock and Parker, acts of 
violence 
 
. . . diminish the presence of spirit by wrapping oppressor and oppressed, 
perpetrator and victim, together in emotional chains that force the air out of the 
space between them. These claustrophobic emotional chains of abuse and 
oppression can be mistaken for love because their emotional power to bond is 
fierce. But such chains suffocate the spirit, two selves are fused into one, either of 
which can give itself up to the other. Neither will notice the spirit is missing. 
Selflessness becomes the model for love when the spirit is absent. (2001, p. 157) 
 
 
 Like Park’s (1993, 2004) understanding of Han, the above passage from Brock 
and Parker recognizes the harm done to both the sinned against and the sinner when 
impaired human relationships exist. Brock and Parker also join Park in recognizing the 
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devastating effects of woundedness on the sinned against. Describing the effects of loss 
of presence on the wounded individual, Brock and Parker write:  
 
We can be so violated that we lose the luminosity in ourselves, our aliveness 
scattered to coals and ashes, fragments of broken fire. We can live in the muddy 
ashes of a life without presence, dissolve into the critical acids of self-hatred, or 
burrow deep into the confines of that which can rationally control. Without some 
glow in the night, life fades, presence is diminished. (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 
213) 
 
 
 Denied presence must be restored to the brokenhearted in order for them to have a 
chance at thriving. Such healing requires the victim to speak the truth of her or his 
violation and have that truth affirmed. The victim must then be allowed to grieve. The 
painfulness of this process necessitates that it only be undertaken in the midst of a caring 
community of individuals that embody presence, “. . . reverence the sacred presence of 
[other] human beings and . . . protect life by taking actions that keep faith with their 
knowledge of something other than lessons of oppression, or abuse, or violence” (Brock 
& Parker, 2001, p. 110). In order for those oppressed by violence to speak the truth of 
their reality, they must remember their violation. Phenomenologically, this remembrance 
is a re-living of violations; Brock and Parker describe such remembrance as a terrifying 
experience. They write: 
 
. . . remembering violence requires a descent into hell. The terrifying feelings 
return, as if the flesh is torn again. Remembering requires reliving what happened 
before it can be retrieved and put into words. After the descent, the telling of truth 
about violence and abuse is possible when friends or other steady witnesses listen 
patiently until the story is told. The telling begins the recovery, the work of the 
spirit to save. (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 146) 
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The psychological response to such an ordeal is grief over the magnitude of one’s 
violation and the effects of loss of presence in one’s life. If one is able to recover from 
violence, the knowledge gained impels the restored person to work for social 
transformation. Brock and Parker (2001) describe the process by which restored persons 
come to work for social justice in the following passage. 
 
Restored, people return to ordinary life and expand their concern to others—not 
as self-sacrifice but as self-possession. Present to themselves and to the reality of 
others, they do not live in denial of violence but in remembrance of presence. 
They have embraced a greater knowledge of the world, of evil. When we come 
into such presence of ourselves we are able to take responsibility for our actions 
and lives, in all their ambiguity. And in that process of taking responsibility, we 
turn the corner toward the practice of loving, the practice of transforming the 
world. (p. 100) 
 
 
Although there is no guarantee that the broken hearted will ever be fully restored, 
caring communities provide the best chance for the sinned against to be healed. Though 
Brock and Parker (2001) ultimately arrive at the conclusion of Park (1993, 2004)—that 
salvation begins when the sinned against work to transform the world—their theologies 
differ significantly. Brock and Parker’s rejection of the benefits of suffering as sacrifice 
necessitates that their theology relieve from the wounded, the oppressed, and the 
brokenhearted, the onus of responsibility for repairing violated human relationships. The 
difference between Brock and Parker’s (2001) and Park’s (1993, 2004) understanding of 
the role of the wounded in social transformation arises out of their different usage of the 
concept of love. 
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Love 
 Brock and Parker describe two types of love—selfless and erotic. Eros is 
exemplified by “. . . reciprocity in love, the yearning to be in another’s presence, in the 
fullness of spirit, manifest in the power of love” (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 158). While 
Brock and Parker view eros as life-giving, they conceptualize selfless love—the product 
of violated human relationships—as life-taking. Brock and Parker (2001) argue that when 
encouraged, selfless love (applied in the interest of healing wounded relationships) only 
serves to create more victimization because it strengthens the empathetic union between 
sinner and the sinned against. The sacrificial love of God for humanity epitomizes such 
an empathetic union; the atonement theory holds that the love of God for the world was 
so great that God sacrificed Godself (i.e. through Jesus Christ, the human embodiment of 
God) to save the world (Brock & Parker, 2001).  
 To present a theology that requires the oppressed to understand the woundedness 
of their oppressors and to love their oppressors despite the oppressor’s sins is akin to 
asking the oppressed to take on the empathetic union God (through Jesus Christ) 
demonstrated for the sake of sinful humanity. Yet this is exactly what ‘compassionate 
confrontation’ (Park, 1993, 2004) asks of the oppressed. In order to carry out this type of 
love, the oppressed must shed themselves of their inner wounds—the part of themselves 
that was sinned against—without having healed those wounds.42 Such actions implicitly 
suggest that the wounds of the oppressed are insignificant and by implication, so are the 
                                               
42 Park (1993, 2004) argues that woundedness (i.e. Han) can be dissolved through the process of 
compassionate confrontation of the oppressor; such an understanding of healing is, however, not endorsed 
in the present project. 
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oppressed—except as agents of the oppressor’s salvation (Brock & Parker, 2001). Such a 
theology makes the oppressors more important than the oppressed because the oppressed 
are asked to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the oppressor; no such compunctions are 
placed on the oppressors. For Brock and Parker, when empathetic union is understood in 
this way it further victimizes the oppressed by obligating them to carry out the emotional 
work of their oppressors. Brock and Parker write: 
 
Empathetic connection to another is not necessarily life-giving or life-saving. The 
empathetic bond can hold a human being captive to another’s unjust demand. Our 
ability to feel for another can become an unholy bond in which the other’s 
obligation to feel for himself, or feel for herself, is ignored. (2001, p. 197) 
 
 
The ‘unholy bond’ of oppression is strengthened when the oppressed are encouraged 
engage in compassionate confrontation with their oppressors because the responsibility of 
oppressors to feel for themselves is not acknowledged. 
 In contrast to selfless love, Brock and Parker describe compassion inspired by 
eros as life-saving. Because eros is concerned with the flesh, it encourages taking care of 
the body instead of inflicting it with suffering (Brock & Parker, 2001). When restored 
people honor presence in their lives, they become guided by spirit which allows 
discernment of positive compassion (i.e. that which is used to heal) and negative 
compassion (i.e. that which destroys presence and suffocates life). Such discernment 
promotes social transformation (Brock & Parker, 2001). Discussing the work of ‘spirit’ 
Brock and Parker write: 
 
The spirit, the breathing space of love, allows us to discern when we have been 
violated, when our love for another has reached the limits of our ability to endure 
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pain, when we cannot remain present . . . Love engages the self and its passions, 
instead of suppressing the self. (2001, p. 158) 
 
 
Erotic love impels restored individuals towards reciprocal union and does the 
work of healing. Such love is embodied by caring communities of restored people—not 
wounded individuals. Restored people, through daily acts of erotic love, counter violence 
by “. . . introducing in the flesh the truth that violence denies” (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 
110). Such embodied love requires the presence of healthy bodies, not the dissolution of 
wounded ones. Brock and Parker write: 
 
Love is most fully incarnate when human beings are present in many dimensions 
of themselves—physically, spiritually, emotionally, aesthetically, and 
intellectually present. Physical love is an important dimension of eros, a life-
sustaining power that finds expression in many relationships. . . . The more 
present human beings can be to each other, as the fullest selves they can be, the 
more complete the love. (p. 158) 
 
 
Thus the wounded and oppressed must be healed43 before they can participate in 
the work of changing the world. Such healing differs from that proposed by Park (1993, 
2004) because it does not require relationship with one’s oppressor. 
Brock and Parker make it clear that love—although it may involve pain—does not 
require sacrifice. They write: 
 
Love is not without pain. Love involves change and to change involves risk. We 
face the limits of love in the finite circumstances of our lives, the experiences 
which have nurtured and wounded us. Love requires courage for risk-taking and 
self-possession, not self-sacrifice. The more we love, the more loss carves into 
our souls. Pain is the risk of loving, not the basis of love. (p. 158)  
                                               
43 Brock and Parker (2001) make it clear that the trauma of violation may be so great that healing or 
restoration never occur. 
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Thus Brock and Parker’s theology, although similar to Park’s (1993, 2004) theology, 
differs in its conceptualization of compassion and its understanding of the process 
through which one undergoes healing and works for social justice. 
Concluding Thoughts on Proverbs for Ashes 
 Brock and Parker’s work is significant because it provides a model which 
transcends the ontological suffering meta-narrative by dismantling the presumed 
necessity of relationship between oppressor and oppressed. The wounded, whether they 
are sinners, sinned against, or (as is most likely) both can be healed through caring 
communities. The sinned against need not suffer the trauma of re-living their violation in 
the presence of the oppressor. The oppressor need not be joined to the oppressed out of 
the paralyzing and counter-productive emotion of guilt. Both oppressor and oppressed 
can be healed separately in order to sever the violation that bonds them in misery. Both 
can reconnect with the presence that violence denied them; both can then join the caring 
communities that salve violated wounds to transform the world (Brock & Parker, 2001). 
Through an adoption of Brock and Parker’s concepts of erotic love, caring communities, 
and healing, important theological tools are provided for the conceptualization of a re-
articulated black theology.  
 Preceding sections of this chapter have discussed the fragments of black 
theological discourse, Park’s concept of Han, and Brock and Parker’s concepts of erotic 
love, caring communities, and healing that will contribute to a re-articulated vision of 
black theology. The final section of this chapter will explicate the black theological 
discourse which results from an amalgamation of these fragments.  
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A Fantastic, Embodied, Emancipatory Discourse for Black Theology 
Sin 
 Sin consists of impaired human, institutional, and ecological relationships (Brock 
& Parker, 2001; Park, 1993, 2004). These relational impairments can be based on diverse 
social categories such as race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, religious 
preference, political affiliation, sexual orientation, intimate relationship, etc., but they all 
violate healthy and reciprocal human relational boundaries (Brock & Parker, 2001). Acts 
of sin may result from greed (e.g. the volitional rupture of relationships for economic, 
social, or political gain) or failure of awareness (i.e., the sinner fails to anticipate effects 
of her/his actions on other humans, institutions, or the environment). In either case, sin 
ultimately results from mis-education. The role of education in repairing relationships 
will be discussed in chapter five of this project. 
The result of sin (i.e. impaired relationships) is Han or deep psychological 
woundedness on the part of the recipient of the sin (Park, 1993, 2004). The sinner also is 
Han-filled (Park, 1993, 2004) because she/he has likely been sinned against44 and further 
distances her/himself from God by sinning against another. Such woundedness causes 
both the sinner and the sinned against to lose presence (Brock & Parker, 2001)—an 
awareness of and perception of deep connection with God and all humanity. Out of 
woundedness, both sinner and sinned against may repeat the cycle of relational violation, 
                                               
44 Park (1993) emphasizes the recycling nature of Han; sin is both a cause and a consequence of impaired 
relationships. Thus, those who violate others have likely been violated themselves (the sinner also is the 
sinned against). 
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producing even more Han and sin45 (Park, 1993, 2004). Institutional, relational, and 
environmental Han interact to produce interlocking structures of domination (i.e., 
monopoly capitalism, patriarchy, racism, gender oppression, class exploitation, etc.). To 
stop the cycle of sin and Han, the wounded need Han resolution (Park, 1993, 2004); Han 
resolution at the individual level consists of individual healing whereas Han resolution at 
the societal level is consists of social transformation.  
God 
 The existence of a God that is just and desires repaired human relationships is 
presupposed. God is a beneficent entity whose presence is always available for all of 
humanity to receive (Brock & Parker, 2001). God’s presence (i.e. grace) can be disclosed 
through suffering and oppression, but also is available to individuals who are not 
experiencing radical suffering. This point is significant because it discounts the notion 
that those who suffer have special access to God or are more able to discern God’s will 
because of their suffering (Brock & Parker, 2001). Though God’s presence is available to 
all that will receive it, human sin blocks awareness of God’s presence and limits God’s 
power to save (i.e. repair relationships for) humanity (Brock & Parker, 2001; Park, 1993, 
2004). In this sense, the Han of humanity also wounds God (Park, 1993, 2004). 
 God’s woundedness means that regardless of the depths of God’s love for 
humanity, God cannot save humanity (Park, 1993). It is the responsibility of humans, 
working cooperatively, to repair this world that we have ourselves broken (Brock & 
                                               
45 This definition of sin does not preclude the possibility of evil in the world. Evil, thought it may exist, is 
not susceptible to human power and can therefore only be responded to through prayer (Purpel & McLarin, 
2004).  
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Parker, 2001; McFague, 1982; Purpel & McLaurin, 2004; Park, 1993, 2004). The human 
onus for earthly salvation is significant; it means that human agency in this world is 
needed rather than otherworldly preoccupation. While many oppressed black Americans 
possess a psychological need for the existence of otherworldly salvation—to help in 
coping with the seemingly unceasing oppression in this world (Hopkins, 1997)—
heavenly preoccupation forestalls the human undertaking of salvific action and must 
therefore be discouraged. It is entirely conceivable that God can transcend human logic 
(Thurman, 1963/2000) and establish existential salvation in the undisclosed future (West, 
1993a), but human beings are suffering now and human beings have the ability and 
capacity to stop this suffering now. Human action to change the world must be 
undertaken now, regardless of the possibility of otherworldly salvation. The presentation 
of God as wounded also, importantly, solves the theodicy dilemma. God is not all 
powerful—God’s power is limited by human freedom. God cannot therefore stop 
suffering without the assistance of humanity. Theology need no longer create excuses for 
God’s failure to end suffering and oppression. God cannot end suffering alone. This 
endorsement certainly creates fear that no salvation of any kind will ever be realized, but 
it also creates a strong motivation for human action. If we want salvation, we need to 
begin the work of healing the world. 
 The presentation of a wounded God is not an endorsement of secular humanism. 
Though God’s power is limited through human action, God’s grace is sustaining in the 
midst of radical suffering. It was God’s grace that allowed enslaved Africans to endure 
the extreme violation of their humanity and to live through a system of exploitation that 
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they were never meant to survive (Lorde, 1984). It is God’s grace that sustains within 
oppressed individuals the knowledge that they were created for freedom (Cone, 1975). 
This chapter, therefore, does not endorse the belief that God is irrelevant or unnecessary 
for salvation; though God cannot save the world due to human freedom, God’s grace is 
the sustaining force through which humans can be inspired to greater heights of caring 
and healing work in order to save the world ourselves. 
Onus of Responsibility for Change 
 It is the responsibility of the world to save the world. This is does not translate 
into “it is everyone’s responsibility so it is really no one’s responsibility.” Every human 
being living on this Earth has a responsibility to make changes in her or his life and her or 
his relationships that will heal the world. Those who are presently enduring radical 
suffering, however, cannot participate in saving the world until they are themselves 
healed. Healing is required for all who are wounded—oppressors and the oppressed—
because, for the wounded, their own wounds have more salience than their sins (Park, 
1993, 2004). Those who are sinners are not likely to attend to the wounds of others until 
receiving balm for their own. Those who are sinned against likely lack the physical, 
mental, and emotional strength necessary to heal the world because they need restoration. 
When sinners and the sinned against are restored, they become capable of participating in 
healing the world for social transformation. 
 Healing occurs when the wounded (whether or not those persons also are 
oppressors) are immersed in caring communities where they can tell the truth of their 
violations, receive affirmation, grieve, and possibly join in the process of salvific social 
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transformation (Brock & Parker, 2001). The healing of woundedness through caring 
communities is a sort of re-education because it restores individuals by directing them 
away from individualism and selfishness towards reciprocity, community, and God’s 
grace. Simply put, caring communities re-educate sinners and the sinned against in love. 
Love 
 Love can be understood as eros—an embodied love that impels individuals 
toward reciprocity and connection (Baker-Fletcher, 2004; Brock & Parker, 2001; 
Hopkins, 2004; Pinn, 2004). Because erotic love is embodied love, it does not attempt to 
separate the mind from the body or the body from the soul. Embodied love occurs in the 
flesh. It takes seriously the concepts of care and suffering because embodied love 
experiences these concepts rather than conceptualizing them. Embodied love is painful 
and risk-taking love (Brock & Parker, 2001) that opens itself up to act on behalf of 
wounded individuals with the knowledge that such actions are ambiguous and of 
uncertain outcome (Bauman, 1995). Embodied love understands that suffering is a felt 
experience of deep pain and anguish (Park, 1993; 2004) that cannot be spiritualized 
without inflicting more harm on the sufferer. Embodied love is a discernable love that 
can be given in order to heal or withdrawn in order to preserve the well-being of the giver 
(Brock & Parker, 2001). This type of wise, complicated, caring, in the flesh love is 
produced by healed individuals within caring communities—not those who are wounded. 
 The wounded produce a different kind of love—a selfless love (Brock & Parker, 
2001). Selfless love is a violated and unequal love because it requires those who are 
incomplete due to woundedness to give up even more of themselves for the sake of their 
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violated relationship. Such love is abusive (Brock & Parker, 2001) and serves to 
exacerbate the empathetic bonds between oppressor and oppressed; empathetic bonds of 
this sort are too violated to be useful (Brock & Parker, 2001). The present discourse 
categorically rejects selfless love because it attempts the ridiculous imitation of God’s 
love for humanity; because humanity is by definition not divine, it is irresponsible for 
theology to encourage humans towards divine emulation. Humanity can and should 
model the service of Jesus to the oppressed and Jesus’ concern with right relationships; 
humanity can never, however, emulate the divine and self-sacrificing love of God 
(through Jesus) for humanity and should not try. A loving, wounded God does not 
demand such sacrifice (Brock & Parker, 2001) because God desires humanity’s 
wholeness, not brokenness (Park, 1993). 
Salvation 
 Salvation is a state of harmonious relationship with other humans, nature, and 
God (Park, 1993). Salvation is a process that begins internally with the wounded 
individual. Once an individual is restored through a caring community, he or she (now 
capable of embodied love) joins other caring communities and begins to heal others who 
are wounded. At the same time, the restored individual can also begin redressing the 
relational, institutional, and environmental sins she/he committed. Such repentance on the 
part of the healed sinner can help the sinned against who lack caring communities to heal 
as well (Park, 1993, 2004). In this way, Han can be resolved and humanity can come 
closer to achieving earthly salvation. Such a process may never be fully attained; human 
fallibility must be taken into consideration (West, 1993a). Healed individuals may 
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commit sins either because they become violated again or because they choose to (for 
whatever reason) deny God’s presence (Brock & Parker, 2001). Yet such actions can be 
mitigated by education against selfish individualism. If the present social education (i.e. 
dominant ideology) which encourages mind-body separation, profits over individuals, 
and exploitation over mutuality, has produced a Han-filled world, surely education 
directed at cooperation, sustainability, and embodied love can stave off sin and 
oppression. 
Oppressor/Oppressed Binary 
In a world where sin and Han interact (Park, 1993), it is likely that most 
individuals experience degrees of both privilege and oppression, dependent on the social 
context being examined (Collins, 2000; hooks, 1984). Given such a situation, 
essentialized notions of oppressors and oppressed are inadequate concepts around which 
to develop a re-articulated black theological discourse. Instead, recognition of varying 
degrees of privilege and oppression allows the complexities of both sinners and sinned 
against to be honored. This is not to suggest that all oppression is equal; clearly, some 
individuals are more oppressed than others and some wounds of Han run deep, while 
others may be more superficial (Park, 1993, 2004). Relevant to black Americans, 
economic changes resulting in social mobility for some blacks and relegation of others to 
an ever-expanding under class suggests multiplicities in black oppression and privilege 
(hooks, 1993a) that are not captured by the oppressor/oppressed binary. 
The recognition of varying degrees of privilege and oppression also contests the 
assertion that God sides with the oppressed. God desires the wholeness and healing of all 
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humanity (Park, 1993). To deny the complex relationships of privilege and oppression 
which are derived from the interlocking spheres of domination (Collins, 2000) that 
plague our civilization is to deny both the oppressed and the oppressors their full 
humanity (i.e. their wholeness).  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when the complexity of the 
oppressor/oppressed relationship is honored, the faulty logic behind notions of the 
oppressed saving the world becomes clearer. It has been argued that oppression clouds 
the mind of oppressors to such an extent that they cannot see their way out of their 
exploits; it is only the oppressed who have the purity and clarity of perception to liberate 
themselves and their oppressors. Yet this aesthetically pleasing philosophical scenario 
does not play out as beautifully in application. Suppose an educated black woman scholar 
experiences marginalization in her white male dominated field, but exerts her heterosexist 
privilege in her church as she participates in homophobic actions against gays and 
lesbians. In such a scenario, the woman is both an oppressor and oppressed. How can the 
part of her that exerts homophobic oppression discern a clear path to liberation for the 
oppressed? Are the gay and lesbian individuals she oppresses allowed on such a path? 
Just as this woman needs to be healed of the alienation she feels from her job, she also 
needs to resolve the Han of homophobia she perpetuates in her church.  
Individuals need healing and wholeness whether they are sinners, sinned against, 
or as usually occurs, both. Wounded, Han-ridden individuals need immersion in caring 
communities willing to bear witness to their suffering. The violated bonds of 
oppressor/oppressed need not be revisited in order for healing to occur. God’s love does 
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not demand this. In reality, the sinner and the sinned against may never reconcile with 
each other. Each can emerge from a caring community and go on to work jointly (though 
not necessarily together) to dissolve other existing structures of Han. If they do reconcile, 
the sinner must initiate reconciliation out of a changed heart, not guilt or obligation. The 
latter would only serve to keep the sinner bonded to the sinned against out of guilt (Brock 
& Parker, 2001); such a relationship is neither reciprocal nor conducive to wholeness and 
healing. In this way, the oppressor is responsible for her/his own redemption and the 
victim is not made into vehicle for sinner’s salvation (Brock & Parker, 2001).  
Ontological Suffering 
Suffering does not ennoble (Townes, 1993). No group of people was created for 
suffering, born to suffer, chosen to suffer, especially suited for suffering, or have, through 
their suffering, redeemed the world. Suffering from natural causes (i.e. acts of God) must 
be anticipated and managed, but suffering from human volition cannot be considered the 
will of God. Suffering must not be valorized to encourage those who suffer to bear their 
burdens in stoic fashion. All of these notions are components of theology that is both 
irresponsible and politically dangerous. All humanity is responsible for 
saving/repairing/restoring the world. All of humanity can participate in dismantling the 
structures of Han and domination.  
Christianity and the Bible 
 
I saw in Christianity’s ideas about Jesus, a theology that made people passive and 
acquiescent in their own suffering, a legacy of abuse entrenched in doctrine. I 
could see that human beings were not led to trust their own wisdom, power, and 
capacities to love, but always to turn to another more powerful than they and to 
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confuse the pain and emotional entrapment of abuse with love. (Brock & Parker, 
2001, p. 158)  
 
 The dilemma of this section, expressed so eloquently by Brock and Parker (2001), 
also speaks to the overarching theme of this project—that of appropriation and liberation. 
If Christianity (and by extension, the Bible) are riddled throughout with oppressive meta-
narratives and politically dangerous messages for the oppressed, why should they be 
retained in a theological discourse that attempts to transcend oppressive meta-narratives 
and politically dangerous themes? Why not instead advocate praxis of secular humanism? 
To further nuance this question, consider Audre Lorde’s famous quote about the dangers 
of using patriarchal tools in the service of liberation. Lorde (1984) writes:  
 
. . . the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us 
temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring 
about genuine change. (p. 112) 
 
 
Lorde’s quote makes salient the dilemma of this project and begs the question of whether 
the project of liberation founded on the ‘master’s tools’ of Christianity and critical 
analyses is necessarily doomed to failure.  
The Christian message is largely propagated through use or misuse of the Bible—
the purported word of God. Riddled as the Bible is with patriarchal authority and 
oppressive themes (Weems, 1991), is the Bible a tool of the master designed to maintain 
the status quo it legitimizes? The larger theoretical question being posed here is one of 
appropriation. Is Black theology, appropriated largely from black interpretations of 
Christianity and the Bible, included in the arsenal of the ‘master’s tools’ or can a 
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theology so circumscribed by Protestant Christian discourse be molded into a counter-
hegemonic weapon of liberation utilizing more of the ‘master’s tools’ (i.e. critical and 
deconstructive analyses)? Here a closer examination of the usage and treatment of the 
Bible by black Americans is useful. 
 The Bible is a political document, created to “. . . advocate and shape social 
behavior according to certain ideals” (Weems, 1991, p. 72). Many of the ideals advocated 
in the Bible exhibit androcentric bias and serve to legitimate ideals supportive of an 
elitist, male hierarchy (Weems, 1991). Moreover, previous biblical analyses and 
interpretations served to legitimate Eurocentric domination, relegating content about 
blacks and other non-Europeans to the margins (Felder, 1991). Thus, the Bible, as it has 
been presented through Protestant Christian discourse,46 problematizes both the female 
gender and the non-European race/ethnicity (Felder, 1991; Weems, 1991). Yet given 
these problematics, the Bible has been historically and remains a source of comfort, 
guidance, and inspiration for black Americans and an integral part of black religious life 
(Felder, 1991; Grant, 1993; Hoyt, Jr., 1993; Wimbush, 1991, 1993). Speaking to the 
significance of the Bible in contemporary black life, Cain Hope Felder writes: 
 
Even persons who question the continuing power of the black church in the black 
community cannot miss the influence of the Bible in providing the language, the 
imagery, and the cadences in which black people inside and outside the church, 
communicate their experience. (1991, p. 7) 
 
                                               
46 See Cain Hope Felder’s (1993) “Cultural ideology, Afrocentrism and biblical interpretation” for a 
fascinating explanation of  ways in which Eurocentric ideology denied and minimized the significance and 
presence of Black people and culture in the Bible and of biblical support for multiculturalism, racial 
tolerance, and racial/ethnic plurality. 
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It must not be assumed that black Americans, who have historically and in 
contemporary times relied heavily on the Bible to provide meaning for their lives, are 
exhibiting false consciousness or lack sophistication in reading the Bible (Weems, 1991). 
Instead, many black biblical scholars have pointed to the nuances in black culture and the 
reading strategies derived from black culture that reconcile discrepancies between 
oppressive Biblical texts and libratory understandings.  
Several scholars of the bible have credited the aural tradition initiated by enslaved 
Africans for allowing contemporary black Americans to receive liberating messages from 
the Bible. Slaves were forbidden to learn to read for purposes of control (Raboteau, 1978; 
Weems, 1993); as a result of the physical deterrent to literacy, slaves developed an 
adaptive aural tradition wherein actual Biblical texts became less important than “…the 
telling and re-telling, the hearing and re-hearing of biblical stories” (Wimbush, 1993). 
Blacks, first as slaves, and later as ‘free’ disenfranchised people selectively appropriated 
those biblical stories that spoke to their desire for liberation and ignored the passages that 
were understood to be oppressive (Grant, 1993; Raboteau, 1978; Weems, 1993; 
Wimbush, 1993). The following quote by biblical womanist scholar Renita Weems 
discusses the historically aural interpretive process of black Americans in the following 
passage. It is quoted at length to convey the full implications of her thesis. She writes: 
 
Because slaves were not permitted to read for themselves, their exposure to ideas, 
notions, concepts, knowledge, and information was chiefly through word of 
mouth. Indeed, one piece of literature that was intentionally and consistently 
made “available” to them, namely the Bible, was communicated through public 
readings or sermons. As to be expected, the transmitters of the Bible in a slave 
culture rehearsed and interpreted the contents of the Bible as they saw fit. Thus 
what the slaves learned of the Bible’s content, however was that the very material 
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they forbade the slaves from touching and studying with their hands and eyes, the 
slaves learned to claim and study through the powers of listening and memory. 
That is, since slave communities were illiterate, they were, therefore, without 
allegiance to any official text, translation, or interpretation; hence once they heard 
biblical passages read and interpreted to them, they in turn were free to remember 
and repeat in accordance with their own interests and tastes. (Weems, 1991, pp. 
60-61) 
 
 
For Weems, the experience of oppression resulted in adaptive interpretive 
strategies that required resistance to those elements of the Bible that contradicted or 
threatened to harm black Americans’ understandings of identity, worth, and survival in 
order to preserve their emotional, mental, and religious well-being (Weems, 1991). 
Weems’ statement is provocative. It has been emphasized throughout this chapter that 
survival strategies—such as the above aural tradition of black Americans, lack libratory 
power. Weems’ previous quotation suggests that black biblical interpretations are not 
bound by the limitations of the actual biblical text. Although an exploration of the 
libratory implications of Weems’ thesis is beyond the scope of this project, such an 
assertion deserves further inquiry. 
 Scholarship also continues to emerge in biblical hermeneutics that may create 
spaces for interpretations of biblical text that refute patriarchy, racism, and misogyny 
(Felder, 1991; Hoyt, Jr., 1993). It is true that contemporary scholarship in biblical 
interpretation has shed light on previously marginalized biblical voices in ways that 
highlight the contributions of people of color to biblical history (Felder, 1993; Martin, 
1993). These and other scholarly avenues hold promise for relieving some of the 
Eurocentric domination that currently pervades the Bible.  
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While the extent to which biblical scholars will be able to liberate the Bible 
remains to be seen, the fact remains that the Bible is a significant force in black American 
life (Weems, 1993; Wimbush, 1993) This project cannot ignore the relevance of the Bible 
for many contemporary black Americans. Regardless of the oppressive messages of 
biblical content, some individuals’ identities are inseparable from their religious and 
cultural beliefs and practices (Lugones & Spelman, 1990). To advocate for black 
Americans to relinquish the Bible and/or Christianity would be to initiate violence on 
individuals with a vested emotional, psychological, and religious interest in Christianity. 
A re-articulated black theology of healing and wholeness cannot seek to rupture 
individual identities in such a way. That having been stated, biblical texts and 
interpretations, being humanly created, are not immune to critique. Exposure to such 
critique may prompt individuals to reject those biblical texts and interpretations that do 
not encourage transcending oppressive limitations.  
It remains to be seen whether or not Christianity will maintain its central role in 
so much of black life. Given the context of postmodernity, Christianity as the ‘absolute 
center’ of black theology becomes problematic. In the introduction to “The Global 
Context” in Black Theology: A documentary History, volume 2: 1980-1992, James Cone 
(1993) writes: “No longer do I feel comfortable speaking of Jesus Christ as the absolute 
and final truth of God’s revelation.” (p. 355). Allowing the possibility for multiple ways 
of experiencing God’s presence and liberating message, numerous theologians have 
called for increased dialogue between Christianity and other faiths (Cone, 1993; Hill, 
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1999; Roberts, 1993, Silva, 1999). Renee Hill (1999) captures the complications of the 
postmodern condition for Christianity in the following passage. 
 
Black Christian theologies cannot afford not to be in dialogue with other religious 
traditions. As expressions of transformative power and resistance, black 
theologies cannot function in isolation. The Christian hegemony that has 
controlled and defined African American religious discourse is being challenged 
by African Americans who practice Islam, African-derived traditional religions 
(including Santeria, Akan, Yoruba, and Vodun), Buddhism, Judaism, and 
Humanism among other traditions. As part of their internal mechanism for 
critique, black Christian theologies of liberation first must be aware of themselves 
within the history of Christian dominance in relation to other religious 
expressions in the United States. Second…black theologians must be willing to be 
open to learning from other traditions on a variety of different matters, including 
the meaning of freedom, oppression, and full humanity. This openness will 
necessitate wrestling with the ambiguity and anxiety that arise when the 
absoluteness of Christ as the one and only way to God and to salvation is called 
into question. (p. 147) 
 
 
The religious dialogue Hill and other liberation theologians call for may very well 
result in religious transformations to black theology that ultimately include Christianity 
and the Bible as one of multiply centered perspectives, marginal perspectives, or defunct 
perspectives of the future. This remains to be seen. The relationship between the 
postmodern condition and Christianity also, necessarily, calls into question the 
relationship between the postmodern condition and black theology.  
‘Black’ Theology? 
Black theology developed out of and was a response to white supremacy and the 
inferior status it conferred onto black life (Anderson, 1995). In particular, black theology 
critiqued the implicit collusion of North American theology in white supremacy; such 
collusion was demonstrated chiefly through its silence on the social, economic, and 
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political exploitation and degradation of black Americans (West, 1993a). Necessarily 
then, black theology originated within the context of a ‘modernist sensibility’ that also 
ushered in ideologies of black power and essentialized understandings blackness 
expressed through racial discourse (Anderson, 1995; hooks, 1993a). Beginning in the mid 
1970’s, however, the discourse of postmodernity47 emerged as a challenge to 
essentialized or universal concepts (McGowan, 1991) and consequently, as a challenge to 
‘black’ theology as well.  
The far-reaching consequences of ‘capitalist civilization’ and Third-world 
imperialism (West, 1993a) have resulted in economic shifts both in the U. S. and abroad 
that have also changed the influence of race on black oppression (hooks, 1993a; West, 
1993b). The simultaneous upward mobility of some blacks and the ever-increasing 
relegation of others to the urban underclass have resulted in a situation where for some 
black Americans, other forms of oppression (gender, sexual orientation, religious etc.) 
may take on more salience than oppression occurring from race/ethnicity (Hill, 1999; 
hooks, 1993a). Such differences may render oppressive experiences of the U. S. black 
economically exploited underclass more similar to the experiences of economically 
exploited third-world persons than those of middle or upper class black Americans 
(Collins, 2000; West, 1993b). Thus, for ‘black’ Americans, organizing ‘black’ theology 
around the concept of racial identity becomes problematic. 
                                               
47 While scholars debate whether conditions in the present are sufficiently different from the period of 
modernity to warrant the phrase ‘postmodernity’ (See for example Bauman, 1995 or McGowan, 1991), the 
phrase postmodernity used here refers not to an actual period of time, but to the discourse which attempts to 
theorize, explicate, or investigate the concept of postmodernity. 
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It has been argued that the adjective ‘black’ is a misnomer which suggests a 
biological rather than sociological designation into the group referred to as black 
Americans and as such, inadequately conveys the complexity of identities that comprise 
the social construction of blackness48. Race is given social meaning for political and 
socio-economic reasons (Collins, 2000). But those defined as black have various cultural 
and ethic expressions (Hill, 1999; hooks, 1993). There are multiple and competing 
identities of blackness instead of one form, image, or norm for blackness (Collins, 2000; 
Hill, 1999). Referring to the social construction of race, theologian Renee Hill writes: 
 
Recent discourse about race, along with gender and other aspects of identity, has 
come to the conclusion that race is not to be understood as a matter of essence or 
biology. Race is socially constructed. Being black or any other race is defined and 
understood within a broad context of history and culture. (Hill, 1999, p. 140) 
 
 
The essentialized racial discourse of early articulations of black theology lacked 
creative spaces within which black Americans experiencing forms of oppression other 
than from race/ethnicity could strive for liberation (Anderson, 1995; Hill, 1999). The 
silence of many black theologians on gender oppression and homophobia, for example, 
led not only to new avenues of black theological inquiry (i.e. womanist theology and 
black gay and lesbian theology) but to the call for more complex understandings of 
blackness as encompassing multiple cultural, economic, social, and political locations 
(Anderson, 1995; Hill, 1999; hooks, 1993a). These scholars believe that while “. . . the 
permanency of race as an effective category in identity formation” (Anderson, 1995, p. 
                                               
48 See for example Victor Anderson’s (1995) Beyond ontological blackness or bell hooks’ (1993) 
“Postmodern blackness” for explanations on the difficulties of adequately capturing the identities intended 
to be subsumed by the adjective of blackness. 
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11) is conceded, awareness is needed of the ways in which black Americans negotiate 
their multiply located identities in complex ways. Yet while the concept of ontological 
blackness (i.e. racial reification) presented in modernity was problematic, some scholars 
also make problematic the acknowledgement of postmodern blackness. 
Cornel West (1993b) for example, is suspicious of ‘postmodernism’ because the 
ideology of its ‘modern’ precursor was instrumental in the essentialization, devaluation, 
and exploitation of oppressed people. Additionally, West (1982, 1993b) observes that 
while blacks in America existentially experience the postmodern condition49 of the Other, 
they will unlikely find in postmodernism tools of liberation because postmodern 
exploration of concepts such as difference and otherness remain disengaged from the 
plight of the oppressed in black America. While bell hooks (1993a) is hopeful of the 
libratory potential of postmodern discourse for oppressed black Americans, she, like 
West, is critical of exclusionary academic debates on postmodernity that appropriate the 
concepts of difference and otherness but fail to “incorporate the voices of displaced, 
marginalized exploited, and oppressed black people.” (hooks, 1993a, p. 512). In the 
following passage, hooks writes: 
 
It is sadly ironic that the contemporary discourse which talks the most about 
heterogeneity, the decentered subject, declaring breakthroughs that allow 
recognition of Otherness, still directs its critical voice primarily to a specialized 
audience that shared a common language rooted in the very master narratives it 
claims to challenge . . . Third world nationals, elites, and white critics who 
passively absorb white supremacist thinking and therefore never notice or look at 
black people on the streets or at their jobs, who render us invisible with their gaze 
in all areas of daily life, are not likely to produce liberatory theory that will 
                                               
49 West (1982, 1993b) argues that blacks in America embodied the postmodern condition through 
experiences of degraded otherness and subaltern marginality.  
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challenge racist domination, or promote a breakdown in traditional ways of seeing 
and thinking about reality, ways of constructing aesthetic theory and practice. 
(1993a, pp. 512-513) 
 
 
Theorist Patricia Hill Collins (1998) calls attention to the exclusive language of 
postmodernism that acts as a barrier of access to many marginalized people. More 
importantly perhaps, Collins (1998) and hooks (1993a) both question the benefits to the 
dominant society of a set of theories which interrogate notions of subjectivity and 
authority and thereby undermine black people’s and black women’s group authority at 
the exact time when black women and other marginalized individuals are gaining voice 
around these attributes.50 In such instances, real struggles over identity and authority are 
reduced to discursive play that holds little potential for political action and social 
transformation (Collins, 1998). 
Given these considerations, contemporary black theology faces a potential 
dilemma. Efforts to move beyond static notions of blackness make collective bonding for 
social change difficult (Collins, 1998, 2000); such efforts also run the risk of 
overshadowing black Americans’ historical experiences of sorrow and triumph in 
America and the unique culture, sensibilities, and survival strategies resulting from those 
experiences (hooks, 1993a). On the other hand, maintaining recognition of blackness as a 
natural or essential racial identity tends to reify the social construction of race (Anderson, 
1995; Collins, 1998) in ways that gloss over the diversity of individual identities within 
the group of people known as black Americans (hooks, 1993a).  
                                               
50 Nancy Hartsock (1990) makes a similar claim in “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?” 
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That black theology has been able to withstand a de-centering of the modernist 
theme of black oppression/white racism through the eruption of womanist, gay and 
lesbian, humanist, and third-world theologies is significant. The “center” of black 
theology may no longer hold, yet if the volumes of contemporary work that exists on 
black theology are any indication—black theology remains a viable force for Christian-
inspired conceptualizations of the many facets of oppression which impede healthy 
human relationships in the ancestors of enslaved Africans and the people they share the 
world with.  
The resilience and highly adaptive nature of Black theology suggests its viability 
for non-black American individuals as well. Both bell hooks (1993a) and Cornel West 
(1982) contend that the existential feelings of uncertainty, alienation, and despair best 
characterizing experiences of black Americans in modernity are now, due to the 
postmodern condition, a shared psychological state of most people in the world. For 
hooks this existential condition—referred to as yearning, cuts across racial, class, gender, 
and sexual oriented boundaries and is a potential site for the promotion of common 
interests and bonding (hooks, 1993a). If this condition of yearning which has typified 
much of the black experience in America (hooks, 1993a; West, 1982) is conceptualized 
as a manifestation of symbolic blackness (West, 1993a) or ideological blackness (Hill, 
1999) rather than ontological blackness (Anderson, 1995), a re-articulated, fantastic, 
embodied, emancipatory black theology can provide a framework for understanding and 
ameliorating yearning in ways that are libratory in words and actions. 
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This chapter has presented constituent fragments of a fantastic, embodied, 
emancipatory black theology and attempted to construct those fragments into a viable re-
articulation of black theology for social transformation. It has been argued that such 
transformation is ultimately pedagogical—consisting of internal and external educational 
processes. The primary discourse utilized in this chapter has been theological, yet the 
goal of this project (i.e. transcendence of oppression through repaired human 
relationships) necessarily finds expression in educational discourse through articulations 
pursuant to social justice. The final chapter of this book will discuss points of 
convergence between theological and educational discourses of transcendence (i.e. social 
justice). In this way, the re-articulation of black theology explicated in this chapter is 
placed within a broader pedagogical framework designed to foster social justice. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SO WHAT DOES ALL THIS HAVE TO DO WITH EDUCATION . . . REALLY? 
 
 
It is a symptom of the false separation between mind and body or body and spirit 
(Brown Douglass, 2004) that such a chapter as this is even necessary. The separation of 
church and state in U. S. culture presumably dictates that matters of the spirit have little 
to do with matters of the mind. For the purposes of this chapter, education is understood 
in its broadest application as the means through which individuals learn ways of being in 
harmonious relationships with themselves and others. In this regard, the re-articulation of 
black theology proposed in this book is necessarily educational. More specifically, the 
ideas suggested in chapter four, though articulated through a discourse of theology, are 
the same ideas articulated through discourses of peace education and social justice. In 
order to explicate this point, the purpose of the present chapter is to detail key theological 
themes articulated in chapter four along with corresponding educational themes relevant 
to social justice. These key theological themes include: (a) belief in human agency for 
social transformation; (b) notion of the sacred; (c) contesting the given-ness of 
hierarchical structures of domination; (d) recognition for erotic love and compassion; and 
(e) salvation. 
Human Agency for Social Transformation 
 A major theme expressed in preceding chapters of this book was the belief in 
human agency to solve local and global problems of dominating economic, social, and 
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political relationships. While this theme is prevalent in the political discourse of Collins 
(2000), the religious discourse of numerous black theologians chronicled in Chapter II 
(e.g. Garnet, 1843/1925; King, 1967; Stewart, 1833/2002; Walker, 1829), the black 
theological discourse of Pinn (2004) in Chapter III, the religious discourse of Andrew 
Sung Park (1993, 2004) and Brock and Parker (2001) in Chapter IV, such a belief in 
human agency for social change also is prevalent in the educational paradigm of critical 
pedagogy. 
 In an article questioning the role of education in social transformation that is 
directed towards a peaceful society, Purpel (2003) utilizes a spiritual framework based on 
“that which inspires and gives breath to” (p. 255) to argue for human responsibility in 
social transformation. Purpel argues that social justice requires moral outrage over human 
suffering and belief in truth-telling51 and healing as crucial steps toward social 
transformation. Human agency in these efforts is imperative. He states: 
 
What is absolutely crucial to redemption is human responsibility and human 
agency since these traditions require that we act as God’s agents, dedicated and 
committed to constructing and sustaining intentional communities based on joy, 
love, peace, and justice. (Purpel, 2003, p. 257) 
 
 
 Discussing school violence within the broader context of peace education, 
Shapiro (2006) argues for deliberate human efforts to resolve conflict and to understand 
and respect human differences in the interest of social justice. Making clear connections 
between social justice and education, he states: 
                                               
51 Purpel (2003) refers to this process as confession and witness.  
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It can and needs to be the result of deliberate human efforts to develop 
understanding and sensitivity that nonviolent behavior demands . . . In the 
broadest sense our greatest human challenge—to end the violent nature of our 
existence—is an educational one (Shapiro, 2006, p. 469) 
 
 
 Henry Giroux (2006) argues that public schools should be sites which encourage 
critical democratic participation (i.e. opportunities for students to critically reflect on 
socio-economic conditions that shape human relationships and opportunities for 
educators to be ‘engaged and transformative intellectuals’ (32) in efforts to critically 
interpret history, empower students, and ally with other cultural workers) for social 
justice. Discussing the human agency required for critical democratic citizenship and 
social justice, he writes: 
 
Teachers need to become bearers of public intellectuals and engaged critics 
capable of resurrecting traditions and memories that provide new ways of reading 
history and reclaiming power and identity in the new interests of creating a 
democratic society that affirms difference, justice, equality, and freedom…If 
democracy is not to fall victim to a growing ethnocentrism, individualism, and 
consumerism, at the very least educators and others can work together to develop 
a political and ethical discourse that provides a rationale for students and others to 
comprehend democracy as a way of life that consistently has to be fought for, 
struggled over, and rewritten as part of the practice of critical citizenship (Giroux, 
2006, p. 33) 
 
 
Thus whether the goal is realizing a peaceful society, eliminating school violence, or 
utilizing schools as sites for encouraging democratic participation, these works clearly 
reflect the need for human agency in bringing about conditions that foster social justice. 
In doing so, these works, like the re-articulated vision of black theology discussed in 
chapter four, encourage changes in individual insight and relationships that create 
conditions necessary for social justice. 
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Notion of the Sacred 
 Explicit and implicit in chapter four is the notion of the sacred. Explicitly, this re-
articulated black theology endorses a belief in a beneficent God who desires the creation 
of cooperative, loving, and peaceful human relationships. This project also endorses the 
belief that the sacredness of each human life (Shapiro, 2006) provides implicit 
justification for the need for all of humanity to experience relationships free of forms of 
domination that violate the sacred nature of human life. These notions of the sacred also 
are reflected in educational discourse. 
 In an article explicating the concept of engaged pedagogy, bell hooks (2006) 
argues that education as a libratory practice involves the educator’s commitment in the 
learner’s wholeness and well-being; in making this claim, hooks invokes the belief in 
education as a sacred act. She writes: 
 
To educate as the practice of freedom is a way of teaching that anyone can learn. 
That learning process comes easiest to those of us who teach who also believe that 
there is an aspect of our vocation that is sacred; who believe that our work is not 
merely to share information, but to share in the intellectual and spiritual growth of 
our students. To teach in a manner that respects and cares for the souls of our 
students is essential if we are to provide the necessary conditions where learning 
can most deeply begin. (hooks, 2006, p. 137) 
 
 
 In “The Grace of Great Things: Reclaiming the Sacred in Knowing, Teaching and 
Learning” Parker Palmer (2006) explores the possibilities of recovering the sacred in the 
institution of education. Although certain that a reverence for the sacred—that which is 
worthy of respect—is needed in education, Palmer concludes that educational institutions 
are ill-equipped to infuse notions of the sacred into learning environments. Instead, he 
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suggests that educators carry the onus for re-introducing and sustaining the sacred in 
education. Palmer (2006) writes: 
 
I don’t think institutions are well suited to carry the sacred…Institutions have 
their utility. They have jobs to do…But I don’t believe that the qualities we are 
talking about here are going to be carried institutionally…I believe these are 
qualities we carry into the world in our hearts, through solitude and through 
community. (p. 171) (emphasis author’s) 
 
 
Both authors suggest that whatever else it may be, meaningful education involves notions 
of the sacred. While the authors do not make explicit mention of the divine in their 
works, they nevertheless honor the theme of the sanctity of human beings through their 
arguments that sacredness originates from human activity. In this way, these works are 
clearly linked to the notion of the sacred espoused in chapter four of this book. 
Contesting the Given-ness of Hierarchical Relationships of Domination 
 James Cone’s early work in black theological reflection was integral in 
establishing that relationships of domination presented to subjugated people as originary 
and given could be contested. Countless black theologians have utilized Cone’s 
methodology to re-articulate similar interpretations of reality. While such contestations 
are arguably the basis of academic black theology, they also are prevalent in educational 
discourse which seeks to provide counter-claims against antidemocratic, market-driven, 
exploitative and socially unjust modes of education.  
 Though the present circumstances of our global existence have been characterized 
as interlocking matrices of economic, social, and political oppressions manifested as 
racism, sexism, homophobia, class oppression, ageism, localized monopoly capitalism, 
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and global economic imperialism (Collins, 2000; West, 1993a), significant numbers of 
educators have provided counter-discourses which, like the re-articulation of black 
theological discourse developed in chapter four, challenge the inevitability of these 
various forms of oppression and exploitation. 
 In an article exploring issues of tracking, cognitive ability, and segregation Hudak 
(2006) problematizes the practices of educational placement by questioning in whose 
interest such systems of sifting and sorting children into segregated groups of ‘regular’ 
and ‘special needs’ groups serve. Rather than accepting the seemingly harmless nature of 
prevailing attitudes that ‘there is a place for everyone,’ (p. 402) Hudak questions the 
moral and ethical issues of placement and in doing so reveals inherent inequalities 
between those who have power and authority to assign social identities and those who are 
denied voice to contest their assigned placement in the world. 
 Risner (2006) interrogates the context of heterosexist bias, anti-gay prejudice, and 
other hierarchical relationships of domination that manifest themselves in the oppression 
of socially marginalized groups to reveal ways in which dominant ideologies organize 
privilege for some and oppression for others. Referring to the importance of participating 
in these interrogations of the given for the future educators he teaches, Risner writes: 
 
. . . I find it helpful to outline the manner in which the dominant culture not only 
organizes political, social, and economic privilege for some, but also separates, 
discredits and discriminates against others . . . Simply, put, when we refer to the 
dominant culture and its ideology we are referencing the assumptions, ideas, 
concepts, and values that prevail in the central ways in which we organize our 
lives. Although usually associated with the ‘taken for granted’ socio-political 
realm, or more plainly, people and their relationships to power, dominant 
ideology powerfully colors societal opinion, behavior, and worldview. At the 
same time, the unquestioned nature of dominant culture allows a commanding 
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control that unfortunately benefits some people at the expense of others . . . (2006, 
p. 290) 
 
 
 In her controversially received article “The Silenced Dialogue: Power and 
Pedagogy in Educating Other People’s Children,” Delpit (2003) deconstructs white 
educators’ relationship to the ‘culture of power’ (p. 151) in schools and the effects of this 
unacknowledged power on the education of children of color. Importantly, she dispels the 
assumption that seemingly good intentions (especially those that conceal culturally-
biased agendas) are sufficient criteria for educating for equity and social justice. Instead, 
Delpit argues that issues of cultural and community context cannot be ignored relevant to 
educational issues; white educators who teach children of color must interrogate their 
relationship to the culture of power and acknowledge the privilege it affords them. To 
pretend such power differentials do not exist is, for Delpit, to participate in the 
perpetuation of the status quo. By making problematic the unacknowledged power and 
authority conveyed through middle class culture and values, Delpit suggests culturally 
appropriate understandings of education that facilitate social justice for all children.  
 Responding to recent increased attention to the plight of boys in schools, Kimmel 
(2006) makes problematic the normative conceptualizations of masculinity that under-
gird the issues of boys, violence, and schools. Arguing that rigid gender stereotypes 
impede boys’ emotional development and leave them isolated, Kimmel suggests that such 
rigid conceptualizations marginalize boys who fail to measure up and encourages them to 
“prove” their masculinity in ways that impede academic achievement, male-female 
relationships, and peaceful school environments. By contesting the thought processes 
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which excuse male violence through a ‘boys will be boys’ (p. 284) mentality, Kimmel 
contests the given-ness of a constituent piece of patriarchal domination. 
 Finally, Villaverde (1998) discusses youth identity as a contested site of power 
and explores art as a medium for mobilizing youth to resist systems of domination 
through radical democracy. She argues that the ability of art to traverse socio-cultural and 
economic barriers makes it particularly useful in critical pedagogy because art provides 
conceptual spaces within which youth can work through issues of articulating 
marginalization and dissonance, raising critical awareness, etc. Thus, Villaverde posits art 
as a tool for youth to both understand and resist those structures of domination that seek 
to control them; in doing so, she articulates a means through which youth can join in the 
process of dismantling structures of social injustice. 
 Though seemingly disparate, the works cited above each attack specific matrices 
of domination which underpin structures of social injustice. Through their interrogations 
of the prevailing hierarchical structures of domination, the authors suggest that education, 
rather than perpetuating the status quo, can foster transcendence. This theme of 
transcending hierarchical relationships of domination links these works to the re-
articulated black theology discussed in chapter four. 
Education as Erotic Love and Compassion 
 
When we live outside ourselves, and by that I mean on external directives only 
rather than from our internal knowledge and needs, when we live away from those 
erotic guides from within ourselves, then our lives are limited by external and 
alien forms, and we conform to the needs of a structure that is not based on 
human need . . . But when we begin to live from within outward, in touch with the 
power of the erotic within ourselves, and allowing that power to inform and 
illuminate out actions upon the world and around us, then we begin to be 
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responsible to ourselves in the deepest sense. For as we begin to recognize our 
deepest feelings, we begin to give up, of necessity, being satisfied with suffering 
and self-negation, and with the numbness which so often seems like their only 
alternative in our society. Our acts against oppression become integral with self, 
motivated and empowered from within. (Lorde, 1984, p. 58) 
 
 
 In the passage above, Audre Lorde speaks to the power of the erotic—that 
resource which resides within a ‘deeply female and spiritual plane’ (p. 53)—in resisting 
social injustice. While such associations between the erotic and social justice have been 
posited in the black theological re-articulations of this book, they also find applicability 
in educational literature. There, emphasis on erotic (non-sexual) love and the care and 
compassion it engenders, have assumed their place within certain educational discourses. 
 For example, Garrison (2004) proposes the concept of eros or passionate desire as 
a heuristic for understanding and re-constructing self-creation within community. While 
self-actualization (referred to by Garrison as selfish self-creation) encourages social 
injustice, self-creation inspired by eros involves learning to play creatively and well with 
those who differ from us. Such passionate self-creation in the context of community 
provides, for Garrison, the foundation of participatory democracy. Thus through an 
embrace of the education of eros, Garrison links social self-creation with social justice.  
Though other educational discourse does not explicitly name the concept of the 
erotic, advocacy for such constructs as compassion, care, and love are integral to notions 
of the erotic presented in this book (i.e. the desire for connection, union, and reciprocal 
relationship with others). In a similar manner, Pennell (2006) invokes the theme of 
compassion when she argues that social justice demands the creation of compassionate 
communities within schools. Such communities are imperative to counter the prevailing 
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educational system which for the sake of rationalism, denies students’ wholeness. She 
writes: 
 
. . . I propose the creation of compassionate communities in schools . . . this is not 
a sentimental notion—I am not so naïve as to think that schools will be 
transformed by a sudden influx of compassion. But I do believe that a classroom, 
where ostensibly the purpose is to make discoveries together, is a natural place for 
compassionate community to develop. The first step in this development is to 
rethink and re-act existing power structures in the classroom, consciously seeking 
to value and recognize every member of the community. (Pennell, 2006, p. 41) 
 
 
Pennell suggests that the desire to suffer and celebrate with others in community is 
necessary to end social injustice.  
Additionally, hooks (2003b) argues that human desires for love and connection 
have been replaced by an excessive acquisitiveness that feeds social injustice. For hooks, 
the steps necessary for social justice are clear: by living simply, we can reconnect with 
our capacity for compassion, care, and social justice. She writes: 
 
We can resist the temptation to greed. We can work to change public policy, 
electing leaders who are honest and progressive . . . We can show respect for love. 
To save our planet we can stop thoughtless waste. We can recycle and support 
ecologically advanced survival strategies. We can celebrate and honor 
communalism and interdependency by sharing resources. All these gestures show 
a respect and a gratitude for life. When we value the delaying of gratification and 
take responsibility for our actions, we simplify our emotional universe. Living 
simply makes loving simple. The choice to live simply necessarily enhances our 
capacity to love. It is the way we learn to practice compassion, daily affirming our 
connection to a world community (hooks, 2003b, p. 498) 
 
 
Finally, Shapiro (2003) sums up the relationship between education, compassion, 
and social justice. Rather than achievement measured through increased test scores, he 
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argues that education is about learning to live together peacefully and compassionately. 
Discussing this greater purpose of education, he writes: 
 
Education . . . is ultimately about something much more precious and profound. It 
is about the making of a world; about kids learning what it means to be human 
and questioning the ways that individuals can live together. In short, and in its 
most profound sense, education is not a transmission belt for acquiring technical 
skills or a competitive edge over one’s peers. It is about developing selves that 
have the moral, spiritual and cognitive capacities to live in just, compassionate 
and responsible communities. (Shapiro, 2003, p. 476) 
 
 
I argue that implicit in the above educational discourse advocating for compassionate, 
loving, and just communities is also advocacy for the erotic in education. This advocacy 
for the erotic, like that articulated in chapter four of this book, is the recognition that the 
work of social justice involves genuine care, compassion, and desire for the well-being of 
and connection with those with whom we share the world. 
Education as Freedom and Salvation 
Having cited educational discourse germane to themes of human agency for social 
transformation, notions of the sacred, contestation of hierarchical structures of 
domination, and education as eros, the remaining content for this section will focus on 
presentations of education as freedom and salvation.  
Education as Freedom 
Most notable for her argument that education be conceived of as the practice of 
freedom is Maxine Greene (1988). In Dialectic of Freedom Greene explores ways of 
acting on individual freedom that also honor the context of community within which 
individuals are necessarily situated; developing such acts of freedom is for Greene, a 
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pedagogical process. Thus, she argues that education, rather than continue on its current 
course of training students to fill allotted spaces within the status quo, should develop and 
nurture possibilities of re-imagining the world. Greene posits that education, properly 
conceived, is “. . . a process of futuring, of releasing persons to become different, of 
provoking persons to repair lacks and to take action to create themselves” (p. 22). Yet 
such self re-creations must be undertaken with criticality, compassion, and solidarity with 
others to honor the dialectic between the individual and her or his socio-cultural 
community. Greene’s conceptualization of education—pushing against perceived 
constraints within the context of communal solidarity and compassion—necessitates a 
democratic approach to social transformation that all of humanity is required to 
participate in. She writes:  
 
It remains a matter, for men and women both, to establish a place for freedom in 
the world of the given—and to do so in concern and with care, so that what is 
indecent can be transformed and what is unendurable may be overcome. (Greene, 
1988, p. 86) 
 
 
 Like Greene, Paulo Freire (1970, 2001) also posits education as an act of freedom. 
While his placement of the onus of responsibility for change on the oppressed to liberate 
themselves and their oppressors has been problematized in this book (see Chapter IV), 
Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed nevertheless provides an invaluable contribution to 
social justice work through its argument for education as a praxis of freedom which can 
further the processes of humanization. Through his denouncement of banking education 
and his advocacy for dialogical education through which educators and learners become 
“both simultaneously teachers and students” (p. 72) by jointly naming and transforming 
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the world in order to humanize it, Freire presents a model of education as a means to free 
individuals from oppressive forms of knowledge and from relationships of domination.  
Education as Salvation 
J. Krishnamurti (1953/1981) provides an explicit link between education and 
salvation in his book Education and the Significance of Life. For Krishnamurti, education 
properly conceived can change the world by developing individuals who are free from 
fear and capable of sustaining peace. Correct education directs one away from selfishness 
and acquisitiveness and cultivates within the individual an integrated understanding of 
life—of the interconnections between self, other humans, nature, ideas, and things 
(Krishnamurti, 1953/1981). For Krishnamurti, social change occurs only after individuals 
realize fundamental change (i.e. education) within themselves by perceiving the essential 
‘what is’—the capacity to understand the interconnected nature of life and to love. He 
writes: “Education in the true sense is helping the individual to be mature and free; to 
flower greatly in love and goodness.” (Krishnamurti, 1953/1981, p. 23). Stated 
differently, education is, for Krishnamurti, discerning and changing wrong relationships. 
In the following passage, Krishnamurti explicitly links education and salvation. 
 
Right education comes with the transformation of our selves…We must learn to 
be compassionate, to be content with little, and to seek the Supreme, for only then 
can there be the true salvation of mankind. (Krishnamurti, 1953/1981, p. 50) 
 
 
 Greene (1988) and Freire (1970, 2001) establish a relationship between education 
and freedom; Krishnamurti establishes a relationship between education, freedom, and 
salvation. Like the re-articulated black theological discourse discussed in Chapter IV, 
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these works suggest that the ways in which we understand our selves and our 
relationships with others (i.e. education broadly conceived) determines the extent of our 
freedom and, ultimately, our salvation.  
This section has discussed thematic elements of various educational discourses of 
social justice that correspond to the central theological constructs adopted in chapter four 
of this book. The purpose of this demonstration was to identify ways in which the re-
articulated black theological discourse offered here can be understood as an educational 
project. Although the theological language utilized in this project is specific, the ideas 
articulated transcend the specificity of the theological language used. Rather than being 
isolated from each other, the theological and educational discourses cited represent 
different branches of a general social justice framework. 
While a framework of critical pedagogy is used here to locate black theology 
within an overarching paradigm of education for social justice, such an inclusion is not 
meant to imply that critical pedagogy (as demonstrated in the above works) is immune to 
critique. Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline critiques that have been 
leveled against critical pedagogy (see for example Burbules, 2000 or Ellsworth, 1994), it 
can be generally argued that critical pedagogy, like the other social justice projects 
discussed here, is also limited by its reliance on the imagination paradigm. Indeed much 
of the work of educators like Maxine Green is based on the importance of imagination for 
freedom. As has been previously argued in this book, imagination, while helpful in 
reordering relationships of power to make them more humane (Pinn, 2004) fails to 
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promote transcendence. It can therefore be argued that critical pedagogy, like black 
theology, requires an infusion of the fantastic for transcendence.  
Black Theology, Fantastic Pedagogy52 and Possibilities of Transcendence 
The main question guiding this philosophical exploration has been whether ways 
of being in relationship articulated through black theology and other subjugated forms of 
knowledge can transcend relationships of domination. I believe it is appropriate to 
conclude this thought project with some ruminations on possible classroom implications 
of a fantastic black theology/pedagogy because my experiences of teaching 
undergraduate students illustrates many of the tensions and complications I have 
attempted to articulate in this book.  
For several years, I have taught a social foundations of education course which 
explores diverse social issues relevant to education and social justice (e.g. homophobia, 
racism, gender stereotyping, ability grouping, poverty, etc.). Although each topic is 
challenging, the most difficult topic of each semester invariably involves racial issues in 
education. This difficulty comes, I believe, as much from my experiences with racial 
oppression as from the reluctance of many students in the class (who are predominantly 
white and female) to be confronted with issues of race. When I began teaching the course 
I was excited about the possibilities it held for helping public school students realize 
social justice, by “enlightening” their future teachers.  Yet I was somewhat naïve to the 
emotional toll teaching such a course to predominantly white students would have on me.  
                                               
52 This term is adopted from a phrase used by Glenn Hudak during a conversation about this project. 
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My deeply held belief that the educational system perpetuates racial inequality 
guides me to teach in ways that cause future educators to interrogate their own racist 
assumptions as well as the educational practices that help sustain inequity. As a result, 
there are generally a number of students in each class that display varying levels of 
resistance to the information I present. When discussing issues of race it is not 
uncommon for students to argue that racism was certainly an issue in the past, but is 
presently no worse and consequently no more deserving of emphasis than other social 
issues. Certainly, my own biases come into play during these discussions because I am a 
living witness to the reality of racism that many of these white students deny.  
The degree to which I confront this resistance (i.e., whether I ignore their 
hostility, gently challenge it, or try to debate them out of it) determines the amount of 
mental fatigue I experience from these “consciousness-raising sessions” with students. 
Because of the emotional toll of teaching this course, I have consciously altered my 
responses to student resistance. When I began teaching the social foundations course, 
student expressions of resistance caused me to exert ridiculous amounts of energy trying 
to convince these students of the detriments of racism to everyone. For the most part, my 
efforts amounted to wasting precious energy that could have been used in the service of 
more worthwhile causes. I say this because these efforts left me mentally and emotionally 
exhausted and rarely achieved the change in student attitudes I desired. 
I began to rethink my pedagogical strategy after discussing my frustrations with a 
friend (who also taught in social foundations). Student responses to his pedagogical 
approach to race convinced me that my efforts to convince white students of the realities 
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of racism were misplaced. My friend, who is white and male, routinely began his 
discussions of race with the statement that he, like all white people who reside in the US, 
is a racist, necessarily tainted by the white racist patriarchy of this society.  
His statement arose no mutiny from the class; regardless of whether they were 
changed by his statement, they nevertheless heard it.  Sitting with my friend, discussing 
his relatively painless introduction of white racist patriarchy to his class, I could not 
envision such a conversation occurring in my own class. In my class, students either 
persistently challenged or outright disbelieved statistics indicating negative school 
outcomes for race/ethnic minority students in public schools, legitimated the achievement 
gap between white and black students as a lack of motivation on the part of black 
students and parents, and framed affirmative action in college admissions as ‘taking 
opportunities away from qualified white students and giving them to unqualified black 
students.’    
While the merits of such arguments are debatable, I believe that the expression of 
these arguments and my responses to them highlight several important and inter-related 
points that shed light on the possibilities for transcending relationships of domination. 
These points will be organized and discussed below in terms of several of the fragments 
of black theology/pedagogy previously adopted in this book. These include: (1) 
recognition of the need for safe spaces and caring communities; (2) attending to micro 
and macro structures of domination; and (3) categorical rejection of meta-narrative of 
ontological suffering of the oppressed. 
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Recognition of the Need for Safe Spaces and Caring Communities 
 I have come to realize that, in many ways, it is unfair to expect students to “get it” 
in terms of acknowledging ways in which our society objectifies individuals because they 
are themselves objectified and oppressed. As Patricia Hill Collins (2000) points out, all 
individuals receive varying degrees of privilege and penalty within the matrix of 
domination. Yet while most people can readily identify their own victimization, they 
have difficulty acknowledging the significance of other forms of victimization or their 
own complicity in the victimization of others (Collins, 2000). 
Like so many people in our society, I believe that many of the students in my 
class are hurting from their own oppression. To ask them to not only acknowledge the 
oppression of others, but to admit to their own complicity in that oppression is to ask a lot 
of these wounded individuals. To me it is like someone who has received a gaping wound 
without understanding why; she desperately thrashes around, trying to call attention to 
and receive care for her wound. In the process of her thrashing, she wounds someone 
else. When she is finally approached by another individual, it is not to care for her 
wound, but to make her confess to the wound she gave another. In such a scenario, the 
wounded person requires balm for her wound before she becomes willing to devote 
adequate attention to rectifying the wound she gave another. Perhaps if these wounded 
students who are often so angry that class time is ‘wasted’ on talking about issues of race 
had caring communities within which to grieve over their own hurt, they might emerge as 
much less angry and much more understanding people.  
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This observation applies not only to my students, but to me as well. Perhaps the 
fact that my own racial wounds have not been healed makes me much less sympathetic to 
student resistance to issues of race. Taking Collins’ (2000) argument to heart about the 
degrees of penalty and privilege experienced by every one within the matrix of 
domination, I am required to take an honest assessment of the power that I yield over 
students in the classroom. Here Foucault’s (1980) analysis of the inescapability of power 
relations proves most relevant. Describing ways in which all individuals participate in the 
circulation of power Foucault writes: 
 
Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain.  It is never localized here or there, 
never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a community or piece of wealth.  
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do 
individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.  They are not only its inert 
or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation.  In other 
words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its point of application. (Foucault, 
1980, p. 98) 
 
The social foundations course that I teach is a requirement which students must 
pass in order to graduate. In addition to students’ coerced enrollment in this class, I 
subject students to my authority as an instructor by requiring them to learn knowledge 
that I believe is libratory and true. Thus from the student’s perspective, their resistance 
may be as much about attempts to carve out spaces of mental freedom for themselves as 
about hostility to issues of race. They may very well experience my version of libratory 
education as an oppressive form of coercion. Given this context, safe spaces (Collins, 
2000) or caring communities (Brock & Parker, 2001) where students and instructors 
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could experience learning that is geared towards freedom, healing, and repairing 
relationships would seem ideal. Yet relevant to Foucault’s analysis of the inescapability 
of relations of power, such transcendent sites of restoration seem not likely to be found in 
the classroom. The inherent power differentials within the classroom context (at least in 
my classroom) seem to preclude college classrooms from being optimal places where 
caring communities can be cultivated.  
Certainly, more exploration is needed about the boundaries and determinants of 
safe spaces within which caring communities can develop. While Brock and Parker 
(2001) do not specify the constituent elements of caring communities except to point out 
that they are comprised of individuals capable of discerning between healthy and 
empathetic love (100), Collins (2000) does note that safe spaces by their nature are 
exclusive communities. Exclusivity is necessary in safe spaces so that individuals can 
free themselves from dominant surveillance long enough to construct affirming and 
libratory self-images of themselves (Collins, 2000). Thus, future questions relevant to 
safe spaces may explore the viability of safe spaces and caring communities for 
encouraging large-scale social justice projects. Additionally, information is needed on the 
psychological toll membership in caring communities places on individuals. For example, 
what are the long-term psychological consequences of bearing responsibility for restoring 
wounded individuals to wholeness? While this project advocates for the necessity of 
caring communities, the application of this concept to real world settings is likely to be 
much more complicated.  
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Attending to Micro and Macro Structures of Domination 
Patricia Hill Collins (2000) makes it clear that social transformation requires 
resistance to the status quo at both micro and macro structural levels. At the micro-
structural level, resistance involves cultivating the mind as a space of freedom (Collins, 
2000). This project contributes to Collins’ formulation by proposing that healing the 
wounds of Han is a pre-requisite for such personal transformation. Although more work 
needs to be done relevant to safe spaces and caring communities, these concepts still 
seem to be promising for fostering resistance at the micro-level. 
While the classroom context may ultimately prove inappropriate for cultivating 
caring communities, I believe the classroom is, nonetheless, a viable site for countering 
oppression in the hegemonic domain. In the classroom I have seen student thought-
processes change in ways that encourage social justice. Education that provides 
alternatives to the negative images associated with social markers of difference goes a 
long way towards resisting hegemony. Such education can help individuals regain ‘free 
minds’ (Collins, 2000) by revealing to them the structures of domination underpinning 
socially constrained identities and images. Subsequent alterations in the ways individuals 
understand themselves and others can lead to changes in interpersonal relationships. Such 
changes serve to further contest the hegemonic domain by thinking and acting in ways 
that resist common sense ideologies which perpetuate domination. In this way, changes at 
the personal and interpersonal level can precipitate change at the structural and 
disciplinary levels of power (Collins, 2000).  
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Rejection of Meta-narrative of Ontological Suffering of the Oppressed 
My status as a black woman influences the reactions students in my class have, 
particularly to issues of race. Although my intimate familiarity with racism allows me to 
approach the nuances of this issue in ways that differ from those not directly impacted by 
racial oppression, my familiarity also causes me to take student resistance to the realities 
of racism personally. There is a heavy emotional cost associated with laboring to receive 
acknowledgement from students that they often, for many different reasons, refuse to 
give. To me it is quite significant that while my colleague and I both reached a small 
number of students by the end of our respective social foundations courses (likely ones 
that were already pre-disposed to hearing messages of social justice), his goal was 
accomplished with seemingly much less mental and emotional exhaustion – at least over 
the issue of race.  
Here, then, is a major flaw that I have come to believe exists in the religious and 
educational literature which suggests the necessity of oppressed individuals in taking on 
the responsibility of saving the world. While I certainly don’t believe that I am saving the 
world through the classes that I teach, I do think that I am doing important social justice 
work. The difficulties that I encounter, however, as someone experiencing oppression 
while at the same time trying to teach about it are considerable. These difficulties 
highlight for me the ridiculousness of any philosophy, theology, or pedagogy that 
encourages oppressed individuals that they must not only survive their oppression, but 
also save the world.  
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Relevant to my teaching experiences, I believe the work that I do is valuable, but 
not worth my emotional well-being. If teaching an undergraduate college course breaks 
me down psychologically, why and with what additional resources am I to save the 
world? When the embodied reality of oppression is acknowledged, the ridiculousness of 
such an assertion as the oppressed saving the world becomes obvious. My teaching 
experiences, therefore, underscore the destructiveness of perpetuating any version of the 
ontological suffering meta-narrative.  
Possibilities for Reconciliation and Transcendence? 
This project is ultimately one of reconciliation, both on a personal and political 
level. Therefore, the final point of discussion for this chapter involves the possibilities for 
reconciliation and ultimately transcendence that this project holds. My advocacy of 
caring communities as places where the wounds of oppression can be healed stems from 
the absence of oppressor/oppressed relationships within these sites. According to Brock 
and Parker (2001), oppression creates powerful, empathetic bonds that suffocate 
oppressors and those whom they oppress. Because these bonds are never fully healed 
(Brock & Parker, 2001), revisiting them, even in terms of reconciliation becomes 
potentially detrimental to oppressed individuals. Brock and Parker describe the 
empathetic bonds of oppression as follows: 
 
Racism, sexism, intimate violence, and homophobia are abuses of power that are 
devastating to love. They prevent us from being fully present and alive. They 
diminish the presence of spirit by wrapping oppressor and oppressed, perpetrator 
and victim, together in emotional chains that force the air out of the space 
between them. These claustrophobic emotional chains of abuse and oppression 
can be mistaken for love because their emotional power to bond is fierce. But 
such chains suffocate the spirit, two selves are fused into one, either of which can 
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give itself up to the other. Neither will notice the spirit is missing. (Brock & 
Parker, 2001, 157) 
 
 
The violence that these bonds introduce can be quelled by caring communities, but never 
completely healed. While no longer traumatized by the violation of oppression, restored 
individuals nevertheless remain affected by violence; they incorporate knowledge of this 
violence into their worldview (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 100).  
In such instances, how can reunion between oppressors and those they have 
oppressed be beneficial? I do not believe that these empathetic bonds, which never fully 
heal, should ever be revisited. Even when the oppressor experiences a genuine change of 
heart such as by undergoing ‘conversion to the oppressed’ (Freire, 2001), he or she still 
bonds with the oppressed through the guilt of past misdeeds (Brock & Parker, 2001). 
These are not the bonds of reciprocal relationships; they are bonds of misery that use 
guilt to invert the power relationships between the former oppressor and the formerly 
oppressed (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 41). Such instances amount more to power 
inversions than true opportunities for transcendence. This is not meant to belittle the 
significance of conversion to the oppressed, but rather to highlight the dangers of 
revisiting empathetic bonds of oppression. Oppressors who convert to the oppressed can 
make amends for their wrongs by working to dismantle systems of domination, but they 
do not have to and should not join in social justice projects with those they have 
oppressed. The risks for oppressed individuals are too great. 
 I realize that my perspective may appear overly pessimistic, but it takes seriously 
the embodied nature of oppression and seeks to prevent oppressed individuals from 
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experiencing needless violence – especially when that violence parades itself as 
reconciliation. Referring once again to the work of Patricia Hill Collins (2000), however, 
I realize that the observations made by Brock and Parker (2001) about relationships of 
oppression and the conclusion I draw from those observations do not represent the 
entirety of knowledge on relations of power. I speak from a perspective that is 
constrained by social a priori (Cone, 1975). Though I have tried to sketch out the 
constituent elements of a fantastic black theology capable of providing a pedagogy of 
healing, wholeness, and transcendence, my knowledge of this subject is incomplete 
because I have never experienced transcendence. My desire for social justice necessitates 
that I carry out this project despite these limitations. The task is now for others interested 
in social justice to learn from, critique, and build upon what I have written to further the 
cause of social justice. 
Conclusion 
This thought project began by exploring the potential of a re-articulated black 
theology for transcending structures of domination and realizing earthly salvation (i.e. 
social justice through repaired human relationships). While many oppressive elements 
were found within the various historical and contemporary discourses of black theology, 
much libratory content was also found. Most hopeful was the ability of this discipline to 
adapt to changing historical and social-cultural realities while still articulating a libratory 
message. It is this highly adaptive nature of black theology that I believe makes it a 
suitable starting point for a re-articulated vision of social justice; I believe the nature of 
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black theology also makes it compatible with work currently being done in critical 
pedagogy.  
In this chapter, I have used my teaching experiences to highlight some of the 
fragments developed in previous chapters of this book. Though there were some noted 
areas where application of these concepts to the classroom context proved difficult, I 
nevertheless believe that these applications demonstrate the viability of this project for 
social justice efforts. The re-articulated, fantastic, black theology/pedagogy presented 
here is not meant to suggest that all marginalized groups be subsumed under the category 
of blackness. It does suggest, however, that blackness can be understood ideologically 
(Hill, 1999) and symbolically (West, 1993) and that such conceptualizations, rather than 
privileging blackness, suggest that the noun blackness is particularly expressive of the 
tensions between oppression and activism (Collins, 2000) that characterize those 
impacted by the matrix of domination. As such, this re-articulated vision of black 
theology/pedagogy, which seeks to articulate paths of freedom out of the context of 
oppression, seems a promising starting point for engagement in coalition building with 
other groups interested in social justice. If the continued relevance of black theology is 
any indication, the success of a social justice project founded on a re-articulated vision of 
fantastic, embodied, pedagogical black theology seems fruitful. 
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